
ESSAYS

UPON

PEACE and WAR.

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ESSAYS

TEACHING

ESSAYS

PEACE AND WAR

ESSAYS



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ESSAYS

U P O N

PEACE at Home,

A N D

W A R Abroad.

In Two PARTS.

P A R T I.

By *Charles D'Avenant*, L.L.D.

*Id agendum ne omnium rerum jus & potestas ad
unum Populum perveniat.*

Tit. Liv. lib. 2. dec. 5.

L O N D O N,

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986

TO THE
QUEEN.

Madam,

YOUR last Words from the Throne, encourage me to lay a Book at Your Majesty's Feet, treating of that Peace and Union among themselves, which, in Expressions so earnest and moving, You have recommended to Your People.

A 3

'Tis

The Epistle

'Tis to be hop'd the *French* King's open and ſecret Attempts to diſturb the Quiet of *Europe* ; his violent Infractions of a Treaty ſo ſolemn as was that of *Ryſwick* ; the Scheme he has form'd to render *Spain*, and all its Dominions, dependent upon his Empire ; the Steps he is making towards Univerſal Monarchy, and the reaſonable Fears his Greatneſs ought to beget among us, will ſo operate, as to bring all Sorts of Men to throw aſide their Heats and Animofities, and to unite in their own Defence, againſt the common Danger.

That for many Years there have been Parties in this Kingdom is too evident ; but 'twas what the beſt Patriots all along deplor'd, though formerly the Miſchief was hardly to be avoided :

Dedictory.

ed : Endeavours to keep up a great Land-Force in Times of Peace, Neglect of Trade, general Profusion, the Spoils some had made upon the Publick, and their alienating Crown-Lands to an immense Value, both here and in *Ireland*, could not but provoke Them who were to feel the Weight of present Taxes, and of future Debts.

In a free Nation such Conduct will ever inflame the Minds of Men, and incite all true Lovers of their Country to exert their utmost Strength in its Rescue. These Contests to promote good Government, and to carry on a bad one, divided the Realm. The Corruptions of the Age were attack'd with virtuous Courage; at first by thin Squadrons, whose Numbers increas'd from time to

The Epistle

time, till at last they were strong enough to make such a Stand as prevented universal Ruin : In the mean while Mismanagement was supported with more Warmth than perhaps was either just or decent. And these Struggles were no small Interruptions to Your immediate Predecessor in his Councils, and in his Business of the War.

And 'tis no wonder the Face of the Waters is not yet quite smooth; after a high Storm there will remain an Agitation of the Waves for many Hours. Ambition may be still at work, and some may yet be grasping at Power, which they hope to compass by the Aids and Voices of their Faction: But G O D has enrich'd Your Princely Heart with such Prudence, as soon discerns what most conduces
to

Dedicatory.

to the Happiness of the Nations
over which Your Scepter is ex-
tended.

The beginning of Your Reign
has shewn how desirous Your
Goodness is to unite all Your
Subjects, but if the Spirit of Dis-
cord is not to be appeas'd, if Men
will so little consult Your Quiet,
and their Countries Welfare, as
still to keep up Parties ; when
both Sides come and contend be-
fore *Solomon* , waiting for the
Royal Judgment in their Favour,
which Side (under the Regal In-
fluence) shall be the Governing
Part, possess the Authority, be
the Constitution, and have the
Living Child : Your High Wif-
dom will never think it belongs
of right to them who consented
to have it mangled ; and that
they are to be esteem'd the true
Pa-

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Parents, who, though they could not enjoy it themselves, yet desir'd its Preservation.

Your Heart, intirely English, will judge with Ease whose Merits have been the greatest, and who are the fittest Objects to be shin'd upon ; but descended as You are from a long Race of Kings, You believe it beneath Your Dignity to be QUEEN of no more than half Your People ; which at last becomes the Case of Princes, who think to Rule their Dominions by the Strength or Interest of Parties.

'Tis Your Right to Command the Whole, and You have reduc'd the Whole to Your Obedience, not by the mean Arts of indulging your Subjects in Follies, to themselves fatal, and injurious

Dedicatory.

jurious to Your Power ; but by Governing so uprightly, and with such Courage , that the Good shall hereafter find it needless, and the Bad see 'tis dangerous, to raise Factions within the State.

Though there be not yet so great a Calm in Affairs as Your Piety , Your tender Regard to Your People, the Constancy of Your Mind, Your Care and Concern for the general Cause of *Europe*, should be rewarded with, and as a Princess adorn'd with so many Virtues and Perfections, ought in Reason to expect : Your Reign however is like to be attended with this Circumstance of Felicity, That it will not be so hard to oppose the Designs of corrupt and wicked Men (whose Measures some time ago were in

The Epistle

a manner broken and defeated)
as it may prove difficult to temper their Zeal who have given repeated Proofs of their right Intentions to the Publick.

'Tis not easy to allay the Indignation which a continued Series of Misgovernment may have begotten in the Thoughts of Men, who, as often as necessary Aids are given to Your MAJESTY, cannot but reflect how much Treasure has heretofore been wasted : From hence just Anger may arise ; and they who have no other Aims but to be well Govern'd, may call aloud for the Punishment of Vices which had long kept their Ground, but at last were plainly vanquish'd.

They who stood in the Gap,
and whose adhering to their Principles,

Dedictory.

ciples, fav'd *England*, may expect to Triumph, and peradventure to reap all the Fruits of Victory ; but Your Gracious Wisdom, and Noble Compassion to Your whole People, contemplate, That if there have been Crimes, there are many Partakers in the Guilt ; That the Profusion of several Millions must have enrich'd Numbers, who are devoted to the Hands by which their Fortunes have been rais'd ; That to restore such Order as will bless Your Reign, and make Your Subjects happy, must be the Work of Time ; And that moderate Courses undermine Corruption, and sap its very Foundations ; whereas it may be so fortify'd as to resist any sudden Batteries that are made upon it.

We

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We are fortunate to have upon the Throne of Her Ancestors a Princess who can have no Designs but to promote the Publick Good ; who Countenances the best Patriots, leaving room for Repentance to such as may be thought to have offended ; and who desires in the War wherein She is embark'd, to be strengthened with the Hearts and Hands of all Her Kingdoms.

'Tis Union at Home must make Your Armies and Your Fleets victorious Abroad, and enable Your MAJESTY to hold the Balance of *Europe*, and to protect the Protestant Interest, whereof You are the Head. The Eyes of Christendom are fix'd upon Your Actions and Councils. In this Juncture Foreign Nations will be inclin'd to judge,
That

Dedicatory.

That a Great QUEEN is not so much to consider what may Please at present, as what is Right and Safe, and which Way Her Fame may be established in all succeeding Ages.

'Tis much a Nobler Game to be Umpire Abroad, in a Cause which is like to engage the Arms of the whole World, than to determine at Home, in the low Struggles between contending Parties: And 'tis to be hop'd Regard to the Fame and Glory of their Royal Mistress, will induce the different Sides to unite, that She may be the stronger by this Concord, and bring all the best Patriots and wise Men, to look forwards, forget the past, and to approve of Measures leading to Moderation. That this will be the wisest Course is so far

The Epistle

far certain, that the main End of Wisdom and Philosophy, has been to keep Passion within the Bounds of Reason.

In Foreign Alliances, steady Government, wise Measures, Frugality in what relates to the Publick, Vigilance in the Ministry, and Union among the People, are more valu'd than the Naval Forces a State is able to set out, or than the Troops it can lead into the Field: For these Aids are not long to be rely'd on, where the general Administration is defective, or when there are Divisions in a Kingdom. And the Figure Your MAJESTY makes in the present Confederacy, is owing to Your Prudence, and to the Steps You have made towards healing our Breaches; which Work, when Your Goodness has

Dedicatory.

accomplish'd, You will have equal'd in Renown any of Your most famous Progenitors.

These Measures ; and the Strength Union must produce, will invite Nations to court Your MAJESTY's Alliance: And Your Scepter, rooted in the Hearts of all Your Subjects, will flourish, spread, and yield such Branches, as may shelter distant Kings and Princes from the Storms *French* Tyranny would bring upon their Heads.

The Treaty with *Portugal*,
and the Declaration of *Savoy*, are
the Effects of that high Opinion
the World has conceiv'd of Your
Noble Temper, supported by
Courage, and guided by the Rules
of Wisdom. And, which is of
infinite Importance in this Jun-
cture,

The Epistle

ture, Your Conduct at Home has brought the *States General*, not by the Influences of Power, but of Love, to join with *England* in stricter Bands of Friendship, to come in with their whole Weight, and to embrace with more Warmth than ever, the common Cause of *Europe*.

May Your Endeavours to promote the Happiness of Your own People, and indeed of Humankind, always Prosper. May GOD, in Compassion to the Realms You Govern, bless Your MAJESTY with long Life, and perfect Health. May Heaven shower down its Blessings upon the happy Partner of Your Bed, the Prince, who has been so Fortunate, as to see divided Interests still center in their Love and Duty to His Royal Person. And may You both Live
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Dedictory.

together many, and many Years,
the Illustrious Patterns of Con-
jugal Affection.

I cannot give a greater Proof
of thinking Your MAJESTY's
Reign just and good, and that Your
Affairs are upon a right Foot, than
to Publish this Book, containing
Truths which a bad Government
could never bear. And tho' my
former Writings have been Printed
without a Name, I shall now beg
leave, with all Humility, to sub-
scribe,

Madam,

Your MAJESTY's most dutiful Subject,

and most humble and most

obedient Servant,

Charles D'Avenant.

October

1891
The 1st day
of the month

I have been
of the month

of the month

of the month

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of the month

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ESSAYS

ESSAYS

UPON

PEACE at Home,

AND

WAR Abroad.

INTRODUCTION.

HE who writes upon Matters of Government, should use his utmost Endeavours to divest himself of all kind of Passion, not only because it obscures his Judgment, and renders the Faculties of his Mind less free in their Operation, but by reason that it leads him to mingle with the Interests of the Publick his own Inclinations, which often grow so prevalent

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lent as to make him forget the Duty he owes to that Commonwealth of which he is a Member; and guided by Hatred or Affection, he comes at last to forsake Truth, which ought to be their only Object, who take upon 'em, either as Historians, to relate Facts, or as good Citizens and Patriots, to handle any high Question of State, or as Philosophers, to correct the Manners of the People.

But to allay that Heat which mutual Strivings has stirr'd up, to throw off Partiality to those whom we have constantly thought in the right, to banish Resentments we bear to such as we have ever believed to be in the wrong, and, from having been long a Party, to become an upright and an equal Judge, is a difficult Task; and yet he must undergo all this who desires to render his Writings beneficial to his Country.

Some perhaps will urge that in this nice Juncture they only ought to treat of our Affairs who have all along born a neutral Mind, who have been unconcern'd Spectators in all those Disputes which for so many Years have
in-

inflam'd the Hearts of Men, who have lifted themselves under no particular Banner, and who have sate retir'd at home, deploring the Miseries these fatal Divisions must at last bring upon the Kingdom.

If such Men are to be found, and if they be otherways in any degree fit for an Undertaking of this Nature, they alone have a Right to handle these Points: They will come in without Byass or Prepossession, and, having been of neither side, they may advance what they think just, reasonable, or expedient, without being suspected of aiming to gratify their Friends, or to contradict their Enemies; to which Censure all Proposals for the Publick Good are liable in a divided Nation.

We may venture yet further, and affirm, If there can be produc'd in this Realm a Set of Persons, qualify'd to perform all the Functions and Offices of State, who have not hitherto given up their Names to any Faction, and who in Matters of Government are blank and virgin Tables, that such, and none but such, ought to have the whole Administration of our Business;

That all Offices of Honour and Trust ought to be committed to their Hands; That, if possible, the People should be represented in Parliament by none but such sort of Men, who neither intangled in old or new Partialities, nor wrought upon by fresh or antient Animosities, might calmly and deliberately debate and pronounce upon the intricate and difficult Affairs that lye before 'em.

But all this is more to be wish'd for than expected. Where are there Men of this disinterested and disengag'd Temper to be found? In the Contagion of Civil Discord that has so long raged in *England*, who is there that remains untainted? Is not the Distemper Radical and Epidemical? Have not these ill Humours floated in the Body Politick from the latter end of the Reign of King *James* the First, to this very day? Has not Faction rang'd about ever since, tho' in different Shapes and Forms? Has not one sort of Frenzy (tho' with some lucid Intervals) possess'd us for near fourscore Years? Have not different Opinions about Religious Matters, or concerning Government, kept us all the while
at

at a wide and unfriendly distance one from the other? Did not some of our Princes, by setting up an Interest opposite to that of their People, render Parties and Divisions in a manner necessary for the Preservation of our Liberties? But more particularly from the Year 1678, was there not as it were a formal Separation of the Tribes? Did not the Waters, agitated by frequent Storms, swell up, overflow the Banks, and come at last to divide into two mighty Streams? And who is it of the People that has not in his Turn been violently carry'd along with the Strength of the one or of the other Current?

That we are a divided Nation is manifest enough, but 'tis as evident that in these intestine Heats, very few can boast to have observ'd an exact Neutrality.

If here and there a Man has been so reserv'd as hitherto to have declar'd himself of neither Party, look into the Actions of his Life, and it will generally appear, that he who has been thus unactive is rather govern'd by his own natural Fears, than guided by any su-

✓ perior Wisdom that is in him; That he has not refus'd to meddle, out of meer Honesty and Vertue, and as disapproving the warmths of either side, but you will most commonly find, that he who thus sits still, while the Minds and Spirits of all others are in Motion, does it from the lazy Indifference of his Temper, or out of that Self-love which so strongly possesses some Men, that they will suffer the Whole to perish, rather than give themselves one moment of disquiet.

In the National Disputes that have been so long afoot here, most Men are so far from remaining Neuter, that hardly any single Person has preserv'd Temper enough to offer a Mediation; each Man has warmly espous'd his side, the Paper-War has been carry'd on with Industry, Wit, and Sharpness, and no Method has been left unattempted to incite the Passions; but to calm them, who is there that interposes?

That no Writer has engag'd in so good an Undertaking, may peradventure proceed from this; that 'tis much an easier Task to stir up the Passions of Men, than to work upon their Reason.
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inflaming Oratory, Satyr, and Invectives, go off with another sort of Relish, gain more Attention, and please better, than their cold Precepts whose Aim it is to lay before the People what is Honest, Safe, and Advantagious to the Publick.

And the ill Success with which an Attempt of the like Nature may be probably attended, is perhaps the Cause that none have ventur'd to treat upon this Subject. In Times far less Corrupt than these are, 'twas complain'd of by *Valerius* the Dictator, how little they pleas'd who promoted Concord; *Non placeo Concordiæ auctor*, of which the true ground may be, that to foment Divisions is the Interest of private Persons; to appease 'em concerns only the general Good; and commonly they render themselves more acceptable who serve private Turns, than they who have no Prospect, but to serve the Commonwealth.

Having for some Years last past propos'd to Communicate, from time to time, such Observations that occur to me as I shall think of Service to the Publick; and believing it might not

be unseasonable (at a Juncture when *England* is engaged in a War to support the House of *Austria*) to say something of the Right this illustrious Family has to the Succession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, I resolved to handle that Subject; being fully convinc'd how much this Kingdom is concern'd in the Question, and how fatal it will be to us to suffer the House of *Bourbon* to fix it self in *Spain*: But in collecting together my Materials for this Work I soon found it necessary first to look at home.

For 'tis in vain to think of securing our Religion, Civil Liberties, Trade, Foreign Plantations, and our Dominion of the Seas, by the Terror of our Arms, unless some Remedies can be thought on, that may cure our intestine Mischiefs.

Alliances may be made with all the Foresight, Prudence, and Circumspection imaginable; Leagues may be form'd, such as may tend to assist his Imperial Majesty, and preserve the Ballance of *Europe*; Fleets may be fitted out, and Armies may be rais'd; but all our Designs and Councils must be at last defeated, we shall consume
our

our selves to little or no Purpose, and we shall never truly exert our Strength, nor with full Effect, unless all good Patriots interpose with their utmost Endeavours, to put an end to the Divisions that are among us,

It seems against all natural Sense, that Dangers threatening from abroad, should not unite the Minds of Men at home. *Externus Timor magnum Concordiae vinculum.* And yet there are Instances innumerable of Countries, upon whom no foreign Force could have made any Impression, which have been ruin'd by dividing among themselves.

If ever it imported a People to look to their own Preservation, we ought to do it in this Juncture; when a Monarchy is forming, which if permitted to take Root and be establish'd, will soon be an overmatch for all the rest of Christendom; when *Spain*, which is the most profitable Branch of our Foreign Trade, is wholly under the Influence of our most inveterate Enemies, and who will soon be in a capacity to supplant us in it; when the Ports of *Italy* are in Hands that will
total.

totally exclude us from all our *Levant* and *Mediterranean* Traffick ; when the Barrier of *Flanders* is so thrown down, that the United Provinces must be reduc'd, upon every Occasion, to to place their Security in laying their narrow Territories under Water, and to support themselves at such an Expence as their State cannot long bear ; when the Imperial House, which in conjunction with *Spain* was a Counterpoise to *France*, has been oppress'd and trick'd out of its Rights, by the Corruption of the *Spanish* Court ; and lastly, when Universal Empire, if the Project succeed, must end in forcing all Men to be of one Religion. By the Rules of Policy and Reason these Thoughts should bring us to be of a better Temper one towards another, and to Unite for the Safeguard of our own, and the Liberties of all *Europe*. And 'tis upon these Considerations, that, before I come to handle the main Question, I conceive it may be for the Service of my Country to paint out Faction in all its Colours, to show the Mischeifs it produces, and to offer what according to my poor Apprehension of things, may most conduce to heal our Breaches and restore Peace.

And

And while the Pens of other Men are employ'd in defending their own side, as they call it, in accusing those who are not of their Opinion, or in Cavils and Recriminations, my weak Endeavours shall be shown in proposing what may help us for the future.

I should be glad some of those who pretend to be so intirely exempt from all sort of Prepossession in Matters that have relation to the Publick, would undertake the Task; but seeing they are silent, I shall, with great submission, show my Thoughts upon this Subject; which indeed requires much an abler Hand: And if I can in any manner, be instrumental in perswading a brave and warlike People to carry that Fire abroad which consumes 'em here at home; if I can be the means of promoting that Unity, which alone can enable us to oppose the Power of *France*; if what I shall offer can any way contribute to make us at least suspend our mutual Anger, and Resentments, 'till we are free from the fear of Foreign Dangers; I shall think my Time well and happily employ'd.

Great

Great Empires, in the beginning well constituted, might be Immortal but for civil Dissentions. The Romans, tho' their Commonwealth was frequently divided into Factions, for a long while preserv'd themselves, partly by the Gravity and Wisdom of the Patricians, and partly by the Modesty and Temper of the Commons: But their State was overthrown, when afterwards in their Turns both sides came to take extream Courses. *Aeternae esse opes Romanas nisi inter semet ipsi seditionibus saeviant; id unum venenum, eam labem Civitatibus opulentis reperiunt, ut magna Imperia mortalia essent. Diu sustentatum id malum partim Patrum Consiliis, partim patientia Plebis, jam ad extrema venisse.* For Extremities, mutual Affronts, and Injuries, beget such Hatred at last, as is never to be reconciled; and must either quite subvert the State, or produce a total change of the Constitution.

Nothing likewise more contributed to save that People, for some Ages, from the ill Effects intestine Discord occasions, than their laying it aside, as they constantly did, whenever they were

were threaten'd by dangers from abroad; when they had any Prospect of a Foreign War, but much more when they had it upon their Hands, all Animosities, their Differences with the Nobility, and all Questions concerning Power stood for a while suspended: There are also frequent Instances in their History, that in such Junctures they postpon'd to a more quiet Season, Inquiries, Accusations, and Punishments of a high Nature; and this did not only give 'em more Strength to oppose their Enemies, because the Thoughts and Councils of their Great Men were then more sedate, and of a piece, as not being diverted by domestick Troubles; but these Intervals, this Suspension of Hostilities between the clashing sides, very much conduc'd to qualify the Heats that were among 'em. For Men when they have had leisure to consider and to be cool, grow to have quite different Thoughts and Opinions in all Affairs, as well Private as Publick, from what they had when their Minds were newly agitated, and when the Provocations were fresh, and recent: And in the beginnings of Anger we think of nothing but Revenge, without weighing its Consequences, and
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how far we may thereby hurt our selves; but Time among other Benefits it brings with it, makes us quit Passion, and hearken to the Voice of Reason.

In the same manner perhaps it would be happy for this Nation, if the Disputes that are among us, should be for a while postpon'd. A Claim of Right is very far from being lost or yielded up, because it is for the present suspended. Whoever looks over our Histories, will find that the People have held to this very day such Rights as they asserted in Times of Peace and Quiet. Whereas such have been wrested from 'em afterwards, which they claim'd and obtain'd at other Seasons. And indeed one part of the State will always have a remaining Pretension to what the other part seems to have extorted, at a Juncture, when Necessity may be thought to have forc'd Compliance.

That the Peoples Representatives ought never to give up Fundamentals, is beyond all Dispute: Nor can they do it, because as to Fundamentals, they are but the Peoples Trustees, and
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can do no Act that shall bind their Principals to any thing that will be to their utter Destruction. But without doubt, by the Rules of Reason, and according to the Principles of Government, they have a discretionary Power committed to 'em, to bring on or reserve to another Season, any Question relating to their Rights and Privileges; and to inquire, accuse, and punish, or to let all this sleep for a while, as they shall believe their Proceedings will be most advantagious to the Publick, and best sute with the Posture and Condition of Affairs: Nor can this be interpreted receding from any Point, or breaking into the Constitution: For they who are the Guardians of Liberty, are the best Judges when 'tis to be asserted, and when 'tis convenient that Claims relating to it should be suspended. As they are a part of the Legislative Authority, they may intermit the Exercise of their part as to certain Points, or put it in immediate Execution, as they think most conduces to the Publick Good: And as the Sword of the Legislature was chiefly instituted for their Defence, against the Excesses of Power, so our antient Constitution seems to have made them Judges, when
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it should be kept sheathed, and when is the proper Season to have it drawn upon Offenders.

And when this Suspension of great Claims, and these Intermissions in the Acts of Justice happen, Mankind will be so far from thinking that any Right is thereby lost, that it will be deem'd a Mark and Effect of the highest Wisdom, in those who suffer one weighty Affair to give place to another that is yet of more importance: Therefore in appearance the most prudent and safest course in these Cases is to imitate the Conduct of the *Romans*, and to take all reasonable Measures that may lead to Peace at home, when we are engag'd in a War abroad.

Part of these Discourses have been written some time, and were design'd to be made publick against the meeting of that Parliament which was to sit the 13th of *November*, 1701. and which, to the infinite Grief and Surprize of many, who lov'd and consulted their Country's Quiet, was Dissolv'd upon the 11th day of the same Month: But the Author not being able to judge what kind of Ferment this sudden Dissolution

olution might produce ; and apprehending in general, from divers Symptoms, that on both sides, the Passions were so inflam'd, as not to be capable, at that Season, of list'ning to Terms of Moderation, he resolv'd that for the present these Tracts of his should not be published.

For as 'tis impertinent and in vain to endeavour to appease a single Man just at the Moment his Anger is wrought up to the extreamest Pitch, and 'till he has had a little time to cool and recollect himself ; so when the Arts of wicked Men have infected the whole Body of a People, with mutual Hatred one towards the other ; when Sedition is so loud, that even the Voice of the Laws is not to be heard ; when civil Discord is at the height ; when Parties are so animated by their Leaders as to stand ready to engage, and only as it were waiting for the Word to fall on, and begin the Battle ; 'tis then to no purpose to interpose with the calm Precepts of Philosophy, 'tis then fruitless and out of season to show from Precedents and Examples drawn out of your own and the Histories of
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other Nations what dismal effects Faction has and ever will produce. The Drums and Trumpets of Sedition make such a Noise you cannot be heard; you must lie by for a better Opportunity; you must then raise your Banks when you observe the Waters begin to ebb, and that the Spring-Tides are over; you must give the angry Parties leisure to cool; you must expect the Returns of right Reason; you must let Honour, care of Religion, sense of Duty to their Prince, Reverence to the Laws, and Affection to their Country, regain that Ground which is ever lost when Discord rages; you must await 'till both sides find their Errors, and 'till they see the Dangers that are impending; you must stay 'till they themselves grow to despise the Follies and mad Parts they have been acting, and 'till they become ashamed of the Wounds which each, to get the better over the other, has in its Turn given to the Constitution. When all these Objects have begun to make some Impression on the Minds of Men, then is your proper time to offer to the Publick the Result of your Reading, and Observations upon so good a Subject.

And

And tho' 'tis to be feard'd our Breaches are still very far from being heal'd, yet there is at least some Disposition towards a better Union: The Minds of Men are not quite so exasperated, as they were for several Months before the late King died. We have now had a little Time to cool in: 'Tis not improbable but both sides may see they made some false Steps, and that having been wrought up by their mutual Heats and Provocations, they did Things, which were neither to be justify'd by the Rules of Policy, nor of Prudence.

And believing Foreign Dangers, the Mischiefs threaten'd from the Conjunction of *France* and *Spain*, with the War we have upon our Hands, may at least so far suspend the Remains of former Animosities, which peradventure do still subsist, as to incline both sides to hear what they have to say who are desirous to contribute their Endeavours towards allaying those Passions; and imagining this Juncture to be favourable for an Attempt of the like kind, he therefore now resolves to offer to the Publick these Essays,

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upon PEACE at Home, and WAR Abroad.

And I shall proceed to treat upon several Points. As, Whether a good Member of the Commonwealth may remain Neuter in Times of Faction? Whether an honest Man may leave the Party he is engag'd in? and, Whether a wise Man should at any time whatsoever meddle in publick Affairs? I shall show, that in a Kingdom divided within it self, there can be neither Secrecy, nor Dispatch in Business. That Ministers of State, but more especially Princes, should use their utmost Care to hinder the Growth of Faction, and to heal Divisions. There shall be shown what sort of Measures are best for Great Men to take when they lie under publick Accusations. That Misgovernment is as well redress'd, by looking into Things, as by accusing Persons; or as by retrospective Inquiries. I shall endeavour to show that Factions in a Kingdom are not such Diseases as admit of no Cure; some Remedies shall be propos'd, which will lead me to speak, of pursuing National Interest, of Arbitrary Power, of Religion

gion and Liberty of Conscience, of Frugality in managing the publick Treasure, of the executive Power, and of Ministers of State.

The Design of this First Part is to recommend that Moderation, which tho' it heals a sick Commonwealth but slowly, yet at last seldom fails of restoring it to perfect Health.

C 3 S E C T.

SECT. I.

The Danger of Appealing to the People from their Representatives in Parliament.

BEFORE I enter upon my main Work, I think it absolutely requisite to examine into some Doctrins which have been lately spread abroad; indeed in a more open manner than ever, unless in Times when the Sword of Civil War was drawn: And they are; *That, in reference to the Publick, the People and their Representatives may have distinct Rights; That the People have not devolv'd their whole Power in Government upon their Representatives; That Parliaments are accountable to, and to be comptroll'd in all their Doings by the People; That 'tis always lawful, and often expedient, to appeal from a House of Commons to the People.*

All which Notions were not convey'd about in Whispers, as heretofore, but Printed in Books, Arraigning
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ing the whole Proceedings of the House of Commons, calling their undoubted Priviledges in question, and, as it were, appealing to the Rabble from all their Resolutions: And at that Time License was even converted into Rage. But 'tis to be hop'd all this was private Folly, or private Malice; that it receiv'd no Encouragement from, and was not the declar'd Sense of any Party. 'Twas in Truth strange to see some Men, blind like *Sampson*, and like him full of Revenge, pulling down Pillars, tho' they themselves were sure to be overwhelm'd, as well as others, in the Ruins of the Building.

But a Vail should have been drawn over all this, were it not apparent that the same Doctrine is still propagated; that there are still those who censure the Majority, whenever the Majority acts not according to their Sentiment of Things; and who at every Turn are making these Appeals to the People, so destructive to the Nature of our Constitution; and this not modestly, or in secret, but in loud Clamours, and with all the fierce Methods Sedition is wont to make use of,

when she aims at giving Authority some mortal Blow.

Heretofore the Commonalty of this Realm have rais'd Tumults against the Men of Estates, and Substance; the Barons have appear'd in Arms at other Times, to assert their Rights, some of our Princes have attempted to be above the Laws, and the Sword of Civil War has been drawn upon various Pretences and Occasions; Private Men have frequently found Fault with the Management, and have attack'd the Ministers, who have had Power enough to embroil the Kingdom for a while; and in the Reign of King *Charles* the First misgovern'd Zeal was carry'd to great Extremities, however it was in favour of a House of Commons: But it would be monstrous to see one Part of the People endeavouring to incite the other, to overthrow the Priviledges of their own Representatives.

Nor does mentioning these Matters contradict the Design in hand of attempting to Unite the Minds of Men, nor can it be thought a renewing of
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former Quarrels. On the contrary, it seems evident that nothing will sooner lead to Peace at Home, or be more the Interest of both sides, than to have these dangerous Principles examin'd, and refuted. They are sore Places, or Tumors in the Commonwealth, which ought to be laid open, lanced, and probed; for if they are suffer'd to fester and corrupt, they must produce Inflammations; which perhaps shall turn to such a Gangreen, as may at last threaten the very Being and Life of the Body Politick.

The Harmony that is to make *England* subsist and flourish, must have its Rise from a due Respect, and Obedience to be Paid by the whole People, to that Authority with which the Laws have vested the different Parts that compose this Government: As first the Prince, who is Head of the Republick; then the two Pillars supporting the Royal Dignity, which are the House of Lords, and House of Commons. When by the Arts of wicked Men the Multitude are brought to slight the Regal Power, in a little time Sedition begins, and Civil War
fol-

follows, and our Histories are full of such popular Commotions. In the last Age the Multitude were incited against the House of Lords, and they were excluded from their Seats in Parliament; and as soon as this was done, the Scepter was wrested from the Prince. The Instance is indeed new among us, of the People being stir'd up to lop off the other Branch of the Constitution, by trampling upon the Rights and Priviledges of a House of Commons. But it will not be difficult to foretel, what would be the Consequence of such an Attempt, if ever it should prevail; it must either terminate in the absolute Rule and Tyranny of a single Person, or it must end in Anarchy, or the wild Dominion of a Rabble.

As all the constituent Parts, aggregately consider'd, ought to have their due Weight, so no one Part is to invade the others Rights, much less to join it self with any who are attempting such Invasions: When they respect one another, they become awful to the People, whom they ought to lead, and not to follow: Where there is this Agreement

greement in all the Parts, the State is sound and perfect, and can act at Home or Abroad, with Strength and Vigour: But when they clash, every Thing must stand still; the Executive Power remains impotent, and unregarded; there is a kind of Break or Chasm in Government, and first one Wheel of the great Engine stops, and then another, till the whole is out of Order.

However it has been often seen that a King has differ'd, sometimes with the Lords, and sometimes with the Commons, there have been likewise Disagreements of a high Nature, and carry'd on with much warmth, between the two Houses of Parliament, and yet the publick Peace was not disturb'd; all ended calmly, and those Breaches were soon heal'd; but this happen'd in Ages when our Ancestors were so wise, as not to appeal to the People in these Disputes, and not to let them mingle in the Quarrel.

In the same manner there may be Divisions in the Kingdom; Men may differ about Civil or Religious Matters,

ters, and have various Thoughts concerning Government ; Parties may thereupon grow up, and mutual Heats arise, and yet the Commonwealth may remain unwounded in the Vitals, and in no immediate Danger ; but Discord grows then fatal, and can hardly conclude without a Civil War, when a strong Faction is form'd against any one Part of the Constitution, be it the Prince, House of Lords, or House of Commons.

What other Intention could some Men have, but to raise up a Faction that should be strong enough to pull down one of the Estates of Parliament ? when in Pamphlets hardly to be number'd, and dispers'd round the Nation, they accus'd the House of Commons, that was dissolv'd in 1701. as not mindful of their Kings Honour, as being in the *French* Interest, as wanting Affection to their Native Country, and Zeal for its Religion, and as not intending to do what was needful for the Kingdoms safety. Nor were these Invectives levell'd only against single Persons, but the Proceedings of the whole collective Body were cen-

cenfur'd ; Their Power was also question'd, and the Multitude were, in a manner, call'd upon to Assume to themselves the whole Administration of Affairs ; at least to wrest from their Representatives that Part of Government they held. 'Tis true they who might have had these bad Intentions, did not find sufficient of bad Matter to work upon ; for the People were wiser than to pull down their own Fences ; but the unthinking Rabble were brought very near some such Attempt ; And that the Sword was not then drawn, will perhaps be thought a Wonder in future Ages.

And the Boldness of these Incendiaries was the more astonishing, because at the time I am speaking of, all Things went on smoothly between the King and his House of Commons: They did what he desir'd, as to the Supplies and the Alliances ; and he thank'd them from time to time, for their Labours in the Publick Service. But now and then there is a real clashing. The Prince may think his Prerogatives struck at, or the Guardians of our Civil Rights may think their Liberties in-

invaded ; but how dangerous it is to make the Multitude Judges in these Disputes, will appear to those who consider the Reign of King *Charles I.* In the Messages and Declarations he Publish'd, he appeal'd to the People ; the House of Commons in their Answers and Remonstrances did the same ; and what did all this end in, but giving the Rabble such Head, so much Power, and Strength, that the King was depos'd and put to Death ? Not long after the Doors of *St. Stephen's* Chappel were shut up, and for a while the Sword was the only Law we had.

The Art of Governing is to Rule the Many by a Few ; but when the Many are suffer'd to sway, direct, and lead the Few, which way they please, 'tis quite returning into the wild state of Nature, and giving to Force that Empire and Dominion, which Reason and Wisdom ought to have.

Nothing could be of more dangerous Consequence, than to establish, that in reference to the Publick, the People of *England* and their Representatives have distinct Rights. The Prince is
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Head of the Common-wealth, and has his Prerogatives: The Lords Spiritual and Temporal have their separate Priviledges: The House of Commons have their Rights: And these altogether are what some have stil'd the *Three Estates of Parliament*. But to set up a Fourth Estate, consisting of the People, with distinct Rights, and to leave the other Three remaining, would be a strange sort of Government, resembling none of the Models *Aristotle* describes to us. Which part of the Constitution was to be subordinate to this Fourth Estate? Their Representatives only? This would hardly have prov'd the Case; for we all have seen by Experience, that when the People get the Power, they soon lay aside both King and Lords; and if they fall into the Hands of a Tyrant (which generally happens to be their Condition who depart from their old and true Establishment) that Tyrant will not long let 'em have a House of Commons freely chosen.

The Rights and Priviledges of the House of Commons, are the Peoples Rights and Priviledges; but transferr'd

ferr'd and pass'd over, from the Persons Electing, to the Persons Elected. 'Tis true, the People may have a Right to give Instructions to their Members; but these are not such Dictates, as their Members must not depart from; for when they enter into the House, they are not so much to pursue the Interest of this or that Burrough, as to promote the general Interest of *England*: As indeed when they are Assembled all together, not properly representing their respective Counties and Corporations, but representing the whole Kingdom.

The Members likewise, in new and important Matters, may have recourse to, and consult their Principals or Electors; but there is nothing to be produc'd in the original Form of our Government, or from it's modern Practice, that compels 'em to it. Among these Writers one tells us indeed, *That anciently the Achaians and Etolians did, and now the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and the Cantons of Switzerland, do transact all things relating to their Associations, by Delegates; but that it would be improper to reckon these People*
free

ree, without supposing that the Power committed to their Trustees remain'd still in them. But what's this to our Case? 'Tis notorious the Estates of *Achaia* and *Etolia* were compos'd of Cities and Provinces confederated together in Force and Council, for their common Welfare; but still remaining Sovereign within their respective Precincts and Jurisdictions: And to speak properly, the particular Members whereof such Assemblies were made up, were rather the Legates or Ambassadors from these several People, than their Representatives: And being vested with a Trust delegated by an Authority Sovereign within it self, and over them, no doubt they had but a limited Commission to Assent or Dissent in framing new Laws to bind the whole, in making War or Peace, and raising Taxes, and in all these Points they were oblig'd to consult their Principals, and to follow their Instructions. And this is the Form of Government in the *Netherlands*, the *Switz-Cantons*, and among the *Grisons*. But can any Man in his right Senses say this is or ever was our Constitution? Do any of our Burroughs, Cities, or Counties, remain Sovereign

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and independent Common-wealths within themselves, only Confederated with the whole for mutual Defence, and by consent? Is there any Supream Authority among us, but that of the Prince, at the Head of both Houses of Parliament? Is not the ultimate Power lodg'd with them, and have not the Laws placed the last Resort there?

Wherever the last Resort or Appeal lies, there is the Sovereignty; and if among us the People have a Right to it, then are we a Democracy, and not a Kingly Government.

To pretend that the People have distinct Powers or Rights not included in, or indeed above the Priviledges of those who Represent them, is a Doctrine as dangerous to publick Peace, as it would be absurd and impossible in the Practice. And to Appeal from their Representatives to the Multitude, is setting the Axe to the very Root of this Constitution. But those Libels Appeal'd to them with a vengeance, which not content to find Fault with what this or that Member of the House of Commons did, endeavour'd with
utmost

utmost Malice and Virulence, to bring that part of the Legislative Authority into Contempt and Hatred. When the Commonalty have once made their Choice, their whole Power is devolv'd and delegated; and whether their Representatives do well or ill, their Princes only are to judge; who by the Prerogative they have to call 'em together and dissolve 'em, as they and their Council shall think expedient, can rectify any material Error in their Proceedings.

It was the Wisdom of the *Gothic* Models, to contract Multitudes into a small number, by which they might be represented, to avoid that Confusion which must certainly arise in great popular Assemblies; but when upon all Occasions, you make the intire Body of the People Judges of what their Representatives are doing, or have done, and when the Vulgar is perpetually call'd upon, and incited to censure their Proceedings, you run into that Disorder your Ancestors endeavour'd to prevent.

'Tis dangerous even in pure Democracies to leave too much to the Judgment

ment of the common People; therefore *Harrington, Sidney*, and all the best of the Republican Writers, say, That in a well-form'd Government the People are to have no more Power than to Assent or Dissent. If to commit too much to them be of dangerous Consequence, and not to be tolerated in a Democracy, it must certainly be unsafe in a Kingly Government, limited as ours is; where each constituent Part has its distinct Rights and Priviledges, which are all lost, when by constant Appealing to the Rabble, they are constituted supream Judges over the whole.

They who in their Books took upon 'em to censure the intire Conduct of a House of Commons, to prescribe to 'em when and in what measure Supplies were to be granted, to charge 'em with want of Duty to their Prince, and to Arraign 'em as having neglected the Nations Interest and Safety: They who pretended to determin as to their Power and Authority, and to call in question the Priviledges they have so long exercis'd, and ever claim'd: They who equally pronounc'd against their deliberative, and judicial Proceed-

ceedings : They who took such Pains to expose all their Debates and Resolutions, with the most malicious Remarks they could possibly devise ; what other Meaning could they have in the Appeals they thus made in such a publick manner to the People, but to submit every thing to their Debating ? and to leave to their giddy Judgments the supream Decision in all the important Affairs of State, whereby they would quite have chang'd our anti-ent Government, and have reduc'd it from a Form well and wisely establish'd, to a meer Anarchy, which is the Corruption of Democracy.

Whatever Party has the upper hand, and is trusted with the principal Administration of Affairs, the Realm may possibly subsist. One side may peradventure be less selfish, less greedy, less designing, and have more Temper than the other : However Government it self may go on, tho' the Ministerial Part of it may not be in such Hands as this or that side desire. But if we once come to lose the distinguishing Mark which makes us happy above the rest of Nations, if the Boundaries are

remov'd, if the Constitution is alter'd, and Parliaments are laid aside, or their Authority weaken'd; we are no longer a free Country, and that Building and right Model is thrown down, which our Ancestors at the expence of so much Blood and Treasure have erected.

They who broach'd this Doctrine that the People have not devolv'd their whole Power in Government to their Representatives, and that a House of Commons is from time to time, to receive Dictates from the Multitude, would have set up a strange sort of Liberty, in which neither the Senate, the Magistrates, the Laws, the Manners, nor the Institutions of their Fathers were to be regarded : *Ea demum Roma Libertas est, non Senatum, non Magistratus, non Leges, non Mores Majorum, non Instituta Patrum vereri.* But these new Politicians had not perhaps sufficiently consider'd, that Liberty is equally unsafe where Parliaments are to be frighted and influenc'd by popular Clamours, as where they are to be corrupted by the Ministers.

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What could they who advanc'd these Notions intend else than quite to have abolish'd their Use, when they endeavour'd to divest 'em of their Privileges, and when they would not have left them so much Authority, as might have sufficed to preserve 'em from being insulted by the meanest of the People?

Most certainly they did not consider how miserable a Nation must be where Parliaments are brought to make such a Figure, and to be without Weight, slighted, despis'd, safely trampled upon, and affronted with Impunity. 'Tis not the Name of a House of Commons that makes a Nation free, but their Efficacy, Power, and Authority, and the Respect and Reverence their Consultations and Proceedings meet with. But where all this is taken from 'em, the Subjects are in a worse Condition, than if they were govern'd by the Sword. For where there is nothing but the Appearances of Freedom left, the severest Bondage is intended: *Quantoque majore Libertatis Imagine tegebantur tanto eruptura ad infensius Servitium.*

The Guardians of Liberty have ever been held in the highest Veneration. He who injur'd the Tribuns of the People, his Head was devoted and accurs'd, and what he had was forfeited. *Qui Tribunis Plebis nocuisset, ejus Caput Jovi Sacrum esset; Familia ad Aedem Cereris, Liberi Liberæque venum irent.* If this Magistracy was inviolable, which was establish'd to defend the *Plebeians* against the Power of the *Patricians*; with as much Reason ought that Body to be had in high Reverence, which is such an essential Part of our Government, and by which the whole People are represented.

Whenever the Case happens that a House of Commons shall either be frighted by an Army, or corrupted by the Intrigues of a Court; or be influenc'd and aw'd by a Multitude, to go out of their old Ways; and in material Points to quit their regular and ancient course of Proceedings; and when at any time they shall be brought to give up Fundamentals; the Constitution will be so lost that it will be utterly impossible to recover it at another Season.

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But here it may be Objected, was it not in a manner quite chang'd in the Parliaments of the 20th, and 21st. *Rich. II?* Was it not then obtain'd, That the whole Clergy should be represented in Parliament by one Proxy and he a Layman, and this at a time when the Clergy were great Assertors of publick Liberty, *Rot. Parl. 21. Rich. II. No. 9?* Was not a Commission, and a Statute thereupon made the 11th of that Reign repeal'd, *As having been made Traitorously by constraint and compulsion against the King's Will, his Royalty, Crown, and Dignity. Rot. ibid. No. 10?* Was it not then endeavour'd to establish Iniquity for ever, by imposing an Oath or new Test to bind the Consciences of Men, making them swear not to Repeal, nor suffer to be Repeal'd, what had been done and establish'd in that Parliament, *Rot. ibid. No. 38?* And that there might be a good Precedent of Impunity for future Crimes, did they not make void the Attainders of the two *Spencers*, *Rot. ibid. No. 55?* And to compleat all, the last day of the Sessions was not an Act made to devolve the Legislature
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for a Time upon private Persons, *Rot. ibid.* No. 74, 80? Was not all this done, and did not all these Motions come from a House of Commons, pack'd, aw'd, and corrupted? and besides were not all the irregular Steps made that could almost be thought on? And yet tho' these Wounds were given to the Constitution, it had then such a stock of Vigour as soon to heal again. This Design against the State did hurt it but for a short time, it's Contrivers perish'd, and the Commonwealth was in two Years restor'd to all her former Strength.

But the Case is now very far from being the same. The Body Politick has not at present a Spring of inward Health, sufficient to resist and overcome Attacks of this Nature made upon it. 'Tis old, decay'd, and worn out; we are in a manner quite departed from our original Institution, and the *Gothic* Model is become so defac'd, and alter'd, that 'tis hardly to be known. Heretofore the Prince's Strength depended upon his own Vassals and Tenants, who could not easily be brought to hurt the Publick; or who at least could not be

be long persuaded to entertain mischievous Thoughts against it. Formerly the Spiritual and Temporal Barons had vast Estates, and great Dependencies; and there was hardly a Time in which three or four of them were not strong enough of themselves to oppose any Invasion made upon the Nations Rights. The Barons had the largest share of Property, and by consequence of Power, and therefore were such Bulwarks to Liberty, that it could not be well over-run: So that what attempts in past Ages had been made against it, were short liv'd and soon defeated; whereas now the Balance is quite alter'd, Property is elsewhere center'd, and if they who have this Property should agree to give up Liberty, who is there to defend it?

And look upon the *Gothic* Institutions round about us, for Example *France, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden*, you will find that the Barons first had the Property, a great Part of which in Process of Time devolv'd upon the Commons; and that all these Nations continu'd free till the Commons themselves came to surrender their

their own Liberties, either actively or passively; but when this was once done, their Nobles and great Men were never afterwards in a condition to oppose the Growth and Progress of Arbitrary Government in these respective Kingdoms.

Most certain it is, that as Matters now stand here, as the Establishment is chang'd from its Original, and as Property and Power is now fix'd, Liberty once lost is hardly to be retriev'd; because upon the present Foot of Things, and all Circumstances consider'd, there are none who can so well protect the People in their Civil Rights, as their own Representatives. If therefore the House of Commons is made contemptible, if their Authority is weaken'd, if their Priviledges are suffer'd to be invaded by Seditious Rabbles, incited by Male-Contents; if at every Turn they are driven upon such a Precipice by hot and hair-brain'd Men, that either the State must be disturb'd, or they must depart from Fundamentals; And if the Fences and Outworks are thus thrown down, it will be utterly impossible to
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maintain the Cittadel, the strong Hold, Keep, and last Refuge, upon which we have depended for these last Ages: And in a few Years we must expect to be in no better a Condition, than all the rest of our unhappy Neighbours.

But 'tis to be hop'd that in no future Times any Man will be so sway'd by Anger, Revenge, or Inclination to this or that Person, nor let his Partiality to what Faction soever so mislead him as to be thereby perswaded to enter into Measures that may be destructive to the Constitution; whoever reflects seriously, will find it a very difficult Business to wrest from the whole Body of the Gentry, Priviledges they have long enjoy'd; for deriving Power from Property, as certainly they do, they must be divested of their Property before they can be depriv'd of their Power. And 'tis observable that in all States where an Aristocracy made one part of the Government, the Commons as they encreas'd in Riches, ever got Ground upon the Nobles; and so it was in *Rome*, where as often as the *Plebeians* struggled with the
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Nobility, they still were found to get more by that time the Difference was fully ended, than at first they thought of asking. And the Commons when they are compell'd by Injuries to consider of exerting themselves, have a Strength so superior to that of the Aristocratical part of the Constitution, that it must be ever prudent to avoid all Occasions of wrestling with them; because these Contentions, in which they seldom fail of prevailing at the long run, bring 'em to be so well acquainted with their own Force, that they come at last to demand, and actually to obtain, more than peradventure well consists with the Preservation of the Ballance.

In handling this Point the Author hopes he has himself observ'd that Moderation which he recommends to others, tho' it be difficult enough for a Man not to run into some warmth, when he reflects upon what was doing in this Kingdom from the Eighth of May, 1701. (which Day may be justly deem'd the Epoche of these Disorders) and when he contemplates the strange Licence of the Press for several Months,
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and how much the audacious Attempts then made upon the Publick were wink'd at, if not encourag'd.

Perhaps in a free Country it was neither right, nor safe, so to restrain the Tongues and Pens of Men, as that the Actions of private Persons might not be examin'd, in order to publick Censure. The liberty of the Press is peradventure some kind of Check upon Vice, Corruption, and Misgovernment: Libels hurt innocent and good Men very little in their Reputation; and indeed they are dreaded by none, but such who are conscious of some secret Guilt, which they would not have come to light: Therefore there can be no great Danger to let Wit work upon its proper Objects.

If any Man betray'd his Country, if he touch'd Foreign Mony, or if he were brib'd at home; if he held treacherous Intelligences; 'twas fit and just he should be detected, and expos'd. They upon whom these Crimes were wrongfully charg'd, tho' they might be clouded for a brief space of Time, their Innocence was sure to shine

shine out soon, and be visible to the whole World : Besides these Sallies of the Brain were the smallest Persecutions which Truth and Vertue might expect to meet with ; and as good Men thereby receiv'd no real Injury, 'twas no matter what became of those who were rightfully accus'd ; and it was no harm, if the Pens and Voices of all Mankind persu'd 'em till they were brought to Justice.

While Men employ'd their Talents this way, they could not prejudice the Publick. If they wrong'd the Innocent they only brought Confusion upon their own Heads at last ; if they detected the Guilty, they deserv'd Thanks. But our late Divisions did produce Writers of another Sort, who, not contented to find Fault with those they did not like, struck at Fundamentals ; and were not so angry with private Persons, as they seem'd to be with Parliaments in general. And it was against such, that the Laws ought to have been pointed with all their Rigor.

However, tho' these Libels rais'd so high a Ferment, as brought the Body
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Politick into a raging and malignant Fever ; yet it had still one favourable Prognostick, marking that the Disease was not Mortal ; which was, that the very Persons preserv'd most Temper, who had receiv'd the highest Provocations.

'Tis to be hop'd notwithstanding the Attempts desperate and designing Men may have made to disturb their Country ; that the generality will concur in this Point, neither side to do any thing that may blast or wound the Constitution ; if that remains untainted, all Disputes of what nature soever may come to have a quiet Issue : And as to maintain the Safety and Honour of the Publick, and the Strength and Dignity of the Laws, is the common Interest of both Parties ; so it ought to be the principal Object of their Care.

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S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Whether a good Member of the Common-wealth may remain Neuter in Times of Faction? And of Faction in general.

IT has been long a Question, Whether a good Citizen and a virtuous Man, is to be allow'd to withdraw himself in Times of Danger, and whether he may quit the Business of the Commonwealth, and meddle neither way, when civil Discord rages, and when his Fellow-Citizens are divided into strong and powerful Factions? That he ought to use his utmost Endeavours to calm these Tumults; That he should be an active Mediator to reconcile Differences; That he should bend all his Faculties to reduce the People to their Senses, and to persuade 'em to sacrifice to their Country's

try's safety Resentments of any kind whatsoever, is beyond Dispute; but if this cannot be compass'd; if their Passions are wound up to such a Pitch, as to be incapable, for a while, of list'ning to the Dictates of Reason; if their Minds are so ulcerated as not to bear the Application of present Remedies, is a just Man, and a good Patriot, to get out of the Storm, and to join himself with neither of the contending Parties?

Solon the *Athenian* seems to have given a full Decision in this weighty Point, when he made a Law which noted with Infamy, such as in any civil Sedition pretended to stand Neuter; whereby *Plutarch* says he design'd, That private Men should not so regard their own Affairs, and the security of their own Persons, as to abandon their Concern and Passion for the Publick; nor think it wise Caution not to participate in the Miseries and Misfortunes of their Country; but that rather in the beginning of the Sedition, they should declare for those whom they conceiv'd to have the justest Cause; and to help that

side, and to run the same Fortune with them; and not to wait an Opportunity of joining without Danger, with the Party that should remain victorious.

These were some Inducements for the framing such a Law. But our Philosopher might proceed upon other Motives; perhaps he thought, that when the Minds of the common People were under any violent Ferment, such as produces popular Tumults and Divisions, they were not to be trusted with themselves; That good Men should then stay and mingle in their Councils, and not leave 'em to their own giddy Conduct, or to be headed by those who may have an Interest to bring 'em into further Mischief and Disorder; and peradventure he judg'd that while Factions are forming, or when they are form'd, the few who are honest and wise, could not be able to make a third Party, strong enough to oppose and suppress the Madness and Folly of the other two; That therefore it was better they should join with the one or with the other side, as their Judgments, or their Inclinations (which

(which in these Cases will in some measure sway the Judgment) should lead them.

No doubt there is nothing so false, so jealous, so imposing, and so unreasonable as all Parties are, when they come to be wrought up to any height; and 'tis to be presum'd they give hourly distast to the Men of worth, whom Choice or Accident has link'd with 'em; but to bear all this is a Debt they owe the Publick: For if the best Men should so consult their own Quiet, as to quit the Service of their Country because it happens to be divided, they deliver over the Administration of Affairs to Hands that will never seek its Peace.

When wise and honest Men are not strong enough (as they seldom are in any Nation) to withstand and break the Madness or Folly of the People, they must go along with 'em, and lead those whom they cannot drive, least they commit themselves to more designing and worse Guides: And this Conduct is warranted from Precedents even in the most virtuous Times of

Rome ; many there are, I shall cite here one only: *Sextus Tullius*, a Roman Officer, famous for his Exploits, and strictly obedient to Military Discipline, did once put himself at the Head of the Soldiers in a Mutiny of the Camp ; and being ask'd by *Sulpicus* the Dictator, how he that was so good a Man should come to join in such Councils ? answer'd, He headed the Camp that a more dangerous Man might not undertake the Business. *Tulliumque secreto, quam hac res sit, aut quo acta more, percunctatur. Tullius magnopere a dictatore petere, ne se oblitum disciplina militaris, ne sui, neve Imperatorie Majestatis, crederet : Multitudini concitata, quæ ferme auctoribus similis esset, non subtraxisse se ducem ; ne quis alius, quales mota creare multitudo soleret, existeret.*

Impending Dangers, Want, or too much Wealth ; Oppression, Corruption in the Ministry, ill Conduct in the State, and Ambition in the great Ones, have in all Ages, and will now and then produce Factions in a Country ; nor perhaps is Liberty safe in a perpetual Calm. There never was a
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Country whose Peace contending Parties have not now and then disturb'd, and this Opposition has sometimes contributed to the Preservation of its Liberties. In *Rome*, without doubt, they were call'd a Faction who retir'd to the sacred Mountain by reason of their Debts, occasion'd by the intollerable Usury and Extortion of the Patricians. They probably were brand-ed also with the same Mark of Distinction who made the second Secession to *Mount Aventine*, when the Decemvirs were establishing their Tyranny, and when the Tribunician Magistracy, and the Benefit of Appealing, had been wrested from the People. 'Twas likewise call'd Faction and Sedition when the Commons so warmly insisted upon Liberty of Intermarriage with the Patrician Families, and to participate with them in the highest Dignities of the Commonwealth; both which they obtain'd at last. 'Tis plain while these Conflicts lasted the Minds of Men stood very much divided, as well in the Forum as in the Capitol; some declaring for the Peoples Rights, others being of the Senatorian Party. But had not the *Romans* degenerated

into an impotent Aristocracy but for these frequent Disputes for Power which did arise between the People and the Senate ?

Nor do these Discords absolutely interrupt the right Harmony of Government, unless they happen in Times when the main Body and Mass of the People is corrupted: For if they are not quite debauch'd by bad Examples from those above 'em, if they are not thoroughly poison'd by the wicked Arts of great Men, if there remains in 'em any sense of Virtue or of Affection to their Country ; however inflam'd their Thoughts may be, and let 'em seem to be possess'd with Passions never so violent, they are to be calm'd, and easily reduc'd to Terms of Reason ; and as soon as their Fury is abated, they return to give Proofs of their Modesty and Greatness of Mind ; as the *Roman* People did, who after the high Disputes we have here instanc'd for *Plebeian* Authority, and when they had gain'd the Point, rejected their own Candidates, and chose all the Military Tribunes from among the Nobles. Nor 'till they are utterly deprav'd

prav'd, do they want a true Insight into their Aims and Designs who pretend to be their Heads and Leaders. They discern well enough who they are that stir 'em up, and promote popular Things only to gratify their own ambitious Ends; and who it is that desires no more but to awaken 'em to look after their own Interest and Safety: Thus when several Laws were offer'd at a general Assembly of the *Romans*, by their own Tribunes; some they ratify'd, others they refus'd: *Apparuit quæ ex promulgatis Plebi, quæ laboribus gratoria essent nam de fenore atque Agro rogationes jubebant, de Plebeio Consulatu antiquabant.* That is, the first of those Laws was for the Peoples good, the last was set afoot by *Sextius*, and *Licinius*; only to make themselves, who were Plebeians, capable of being Consuls.

But if the People have been long under the Discipline of wicked and designing Men, if they have been for any time inured to Faction, if it be suffer'd to become a Habit in 'em, they begin to lose the Faculties they had of judging between Right and Wrong: the
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Gate Reason was won't to enter in at is barr'd up, but all sort of wild Passions have free entrance. All Care and Consideration of the Publick is abandon'd; they examin no more whether such or such a Thing is advantagious, or hurtful to the Commonwealth, but each side looks singly upon what seems to make for them, and for their present Interest. Will the Rules of Prudence bear us out in persuing such a Measure? Is such a Council just or honest? Will it not be attended with fatal Consequences? All this is no longer ballanc'd where Parties are grown violent. Will proceeding this or that way make us stronger, tho' but for a moment? Shall we be thus and thus Superior in the Debate? Will advancing this or that Proposition, true or false it matters not, carry the Question? Will this best Captivate the Vulgar? Will this serve the immediate Turn? Will this most conduce to carry on the main Design? Is not the Juncture such that is more requisite we should prevail, than Truth it self to get the upper hand? When we are thus press'd our selves, is it seasonable to consider of the publick Good? What will

will best please our Heads and Leaders, and most gratify them, and best tend to embroil, or disappoint the adverse Side? Let us stick to that, whatever Mischief it brings to the Commonwealth. Has the Adversary offer'd what is right and fit? We must oppose it, and not yield to them in any Point. Have we advanc'd what is unsafe and wrong? Let us push it on; 'tis always dangerous for a Party to be baffled. Thus when a Country has been long divided into two powerful Factions, and when their mutual Anger is become inveterate, both sides in their Turns take Measures, and give into Councils equally destructive to the Publick: So it was in *Rome*, where the civil Dissentions between the Plebeians and the Nobles lasted, with very short Intermissions, to the days of *Cæsar*; while the great Ones led the People blindly on to certain Ruin. Both sides cover'd their Designs with pretence for the Publick Good, but each side in their Turns sacrificed the Publick to their own Ambition. If any of either Party did arise who desir'd to be the Authors of Peace and Concord between their Fellow-Citizens, they were

were not regarded ; for Affairs were brought to that pass, that Men did not so much weigh the Business propos'd, as they consider'd from which Side it came. They did not ask, is the Matter right or wrong that was offer'd by *Cæsar's* or by *Pompey's* Friends ? but the single Question grew at last, was it promoted by *Cæsar* or by *Pompey* ? And to the Side their Affections led 'em, thither they made their subjected Reason follow ; 'till at length, in the struggle for Power, they lost their Liberties.

Whoever joins himself in the beginning to a Party, with any other Intention than to moderate, as much as in him lies, the Heats he shall find among 'em, and to calm their Passions, and to take all Opportunities of reducing both Sides, as fast as he can, to Terms of Union and Concord ; whoever does not object to his own Side when they are in the wrong, and strive to enforce whatever comes from the others when they are in the right ; whoever does not give a fair Example of himself, which may recommend him for his Temper, Probity, and Justice, in order

der to obtain such Power and Credit with the People, as may keep out, and hinder bad Men from being their Heads and Advisers. And lastly, whoever continues in a Party with any other Meaning than to use his best Endeavours, as soon as he can, to bring both Sides to embrace the true Profit, Honour, and Safety of the Publick; if this be not his only End and Aim, he is not an honest Man nor a good Patriot: And whatever Shape he puts on, be it Zeal for his Prince, or let him pretend a Care of the Peoples Rights, if he does not strive to heal Breaches, if he lets the Wounds widen or fester, his Designs at bottom are wicked and corrupt; and he pursues the Game of his own Interest or Ambition, and helps on the Ruin of his Country.

For supposing the Persons who are the Heads and Leaders of Parties to be adorn'd with all kind of Vertues, which they seldom are, and granting them to have all sort of good Intentions towards the Publick, which happens rarely to be the Case, yet Faction it self (abstracted from the ill use the great Ones make of it to serve their own Turns)

Turns) is in its Nature pernicious ; and produces more fatal Mischiefs than Foreign War , Sicknefs, Famine, or any other Evil the Anger of Heaven brings down upon us: *Factiones, quae fuere, eruntq; pluribus Populis magis exitio, quam Bella externa, quam Fames, morbiue, quaeque alia in Deum iras, velut ultima publicorum malorum vertunt.* It ought therefore to be the Concern of every private Man, to put as quick an end as possible to what is so destructive to the whole.

But when a Nation is divided, many Things lye in the way of Peace. While the Factions, repute themselves equal in Power and Force, Pride will not suffer 'em to shake Hands for their common Preservation: If one Party gets any notable Advantage, the defeated Side does not lose Courage and think of yielding ; on the contrary, Sedition is then fortify'd with Council: They try to fight with other Arms; they hope Diligence will make up for what they want in real Strength ; they intrench, keep strict watch, and are ready to sally out and surprize their Enemies whom Conquest renders secure

cure and careless; but most commonly they expect to fall upon 'em while they are quarrelling among one another, about dividing that Booty which happens to become the Prey of one, and for which both Sides contended with such Fury.

Besides, the Heads and Leaders in both Factions are generally against reconciling national Differences: They think Peace and Union put 'em too much upon a Level with their Fellow-Subjects; They are loath to descend, tho' but a Step or two; a quiet and private Life seems irksome to them who have been all along at the top of Business; they are unwilling to lose their Dependencies, and perhaps they apprehend that the high Opinion conceiv'd of their Parts, Abilities, and Worth, will abate when 'tis no longer cry'd up by the Voices of their partial Followes.

These or the like Considerations have induc'd many great Men to foment Divisions, which by their Authority with the People, they might for ever have appeas'd. But Ambition

tion has not Ears to hear, nor Eyes to see any thing but the Object that immediately flatters its sight ; for if otherwise there is certainly no Condition of Life which ought not to be preferr'd to that of being the Head of any Party ; whose Levity and Indiscretions, whose Folly and Madness, will give a wise Man eternal Matter of Aversion, or Discontent.

Besides, whoever rightly contemplates the Nature of those Numbers who compose a Party, will find they are not to be depended upon. That Favour of the Vulgar which the best Man has been endeavouring, for many Years, to obtain by a constant Course of Virtue, may be lost in a Moment, if he contradicts their immediate Passions ; and he may obtain it who has all along trod in vitious Steps, if he happens to gratify their present Humor : And as to those who seem to have had their greatest Favour, and to have carry'd 'em which way they pleas'd ; all Things duly weigh'd, it appears that they were rather led by, than that they led the People. And so it far'd in *Rome* with the
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Tribunes, popular Magistrates who were thought to rule the *Plebeians*, but indeed were compell'd to follow all Excesses of the Multitude: *Tribuni ut fere semper reguntur à Multitudine magis quam regunt.* 'Tis true, the beginning of a civil Dissention is calmer and more innocent than its further Progress, or than when it comes to its full height; for then Reason sometimes is heard, and those who are call'd the Heads have what looks like Authority and Power; but at last they are hearken'd to no more; and when Faction grows strong they must go with the Tide, and be contented to be their Slaves whom they hop'd to govern, that in common Estimation they may be thought still to hold the Reins, and to guide the unruly Steed, which in truth runs away with them.

It has happen'd rarely to be the Case, that they who have headed popular Factions have had 'em intirely under their Obedience, so as that they could lead 'em to good or bad, just as they pleas'd. Fortune has indeed plac'd some Men so much above the rest of Humane kind; early Victo-

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ries, the Opinion conceiv'd of their Valour, or their Wisdom, has given to some Persons such Authority, that with a Nod they could have appeas'd those Seditions and Tumults, which their Ambition did at first produce. As for Example; *Cæsar* and *Pompey* had such an Interest with their Followers, all their Partakers yielded so to their superior Merit, that they had it in their Power to have hinder'd the World from being Slaves to the Will of a single Person. They could have left Mankind free, if they had taken half that Pains to restore the Commonwealth, as they did to subvert it: For tho' the People were grown so corrupt as to be ripe for Bondage, tho' their Appetites were so vitiated by long civil Contests that they did not relish the Sweets of Liberty; yet these two great Men, if their Inclinations had been intirely virtuous, could have sav'd their Country. For tho' perhaps the Minds of the People were then too much exasperated to be capable of Perswasion, or to hearken to Peace and Concord, and so deprav'd as to abhor sound and wholesome Government, yet Force could have reduc'd

duc'd 'em to Terms of Reason; that Power which overthrew the State, might have been made use of in its Rescue. Nor let what is here advanc'd seem strange; for the Sword has modell'd many admirable Constitutions, when it has happen'd to be in the Hands of some Man of perfect and consummate Virtue, such as was *Lycurgus*, who by Force introduc'd the Laws of *Sparta*. In the same manner, *Pompey* and *Cesar*, could have compell'd their Citizens to have cast off their hostile Fury; the Terror of their Arms would have frighten'd the Disturbers of the State; their sharp Swords might have cut up Faction by the Root, or they might have fallen to work with the Hammer of War, and have forg'd a Government intirely new, if they had thought the old one so defac'd, alter'd, and decay'd, as never to be mended. It was in their Power, either to have estabish'd the Commonwealth upon its ancient Foot, or to have form'd another without those Imperfections in it which help'd to destroy the former.

But Accidents seldom concur to give the Heads of any Faction such an Interest as *Pompey* and *Cæsar* had with their Dependents: The World indeed hardly ever produces Persons adorn'd with the Qualities and Perfections that shin'd in them, contriv'd as it were by Nature to captivate the Hearts of Men. And though these might have perswaded their Followers to have embrac'd what was good, as well as they induc'd 'em to give into Councils pernicious to the Publick, it is not so with others who pretend to be Leaders of the People in a divided Country.

'Tis easy to blow the Coals of Discord; 'tis not difficult to inflame a Nation; and we have frequent Instances in Story of Men who had nothing but the Appearances of Worth with false Virtue, false Parts, and false Eloquence, who yet became so popular that they were able to disturb their Country's Peace; but then they could not allay the Storm which they themselves had rais'd: For they must be very powerful who can
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say to their Party, so far you shall go and no farther. And to appease Troubles, to reconcile Differences, to heal Wounds that have been long wrangled, to calm the People when their Minds are under a violent Agitation, and to work Order out of Confusion, requires a Genius much above the common level.

No Man therefore should keep up and foment Divisions out of an Opinion he can put an end to 'em when he pleases; the Business soon grows too big for him, and he will find he cannot quench the Fire he himself kindled, when it has reach'd further Matter: Besides, Discord seldom ends in the Point where it first began; fresh Subject of Dissention still arises among those who are already dispos'd to hate or envy one another; and at last new Persons come to have the Power, as being thought more willing or more able to carry on the Work in hand; so that instead of continuing to command, they grow in length of Time to be but neglected Members in it, who were the Authors and Beginners of the Faction.

S E C T. III.

Of the flying Squadron. Whether an honest Man may leave the Party he is engaged in? And whether at any time whatsoever a wise Man should meddle in publick Business?

IT happens sometimes to be the Case that the Leaders in both Parties are unwilling or unable to heal the Breach, and that the mutual Animosities are too high to admit of an immediate Accomodation : What is a Man to do who does not pretend to Rule, and who has taken upon him no other Part than to join with those who he believ'd had the better Cause? There has been something offer'd to show that it is not consistent with the Duty we owe our Country to remain neuter, and idle Lookers on, while
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She labours under Difficulties: But the Question is, whether 'tis honest, and truly wise, to incline sometimes to one, and sometimes to the other Side, and to Trim (as we now call it) between the Parties; to endeavour so to act as to ingratiate with both Sides; to bear ones self evenly between both, to declare for neither; to judge sovereignly by ones own Lights upon all Occasions; In all Councils and Debates to repair thither where we think at present there is the greatest show of Reason; and to be number'd with the flying Squadron, without which there hardly ever was a popular Assembly.

May it not be best to tread in the Steps of *Servilius* the Consul, who in a hot Contention that lasted a great while between the Nobles and the Commons, bent himself sometimes one, sometimes the other way, in hopes to win the Favour of both; or at least to displease neither: But this his Conduct and Temporising had an Effect quite different from what he aim'd at, for he came at last to be thought well of by neither Party, and grew as hateful even to the People as his Colleague

Appius, who had always fiercely adhered to the Patricians. Ita medium se gerendo nec Plebis vitavit odium, nec apud Patres Gratiam iniit. Patres mollem Consulem & ambitiosum rati; Plebes fallacem, brevique apparuit equasse eum Appii odium.

Without doubt he that has a very superior Judgment, he who is so inquisitive as constantly to know the true Bottom of Things, he whose Reputation is firmly establish'd, he whose Virtue is arriv'd to such a Pitch as to be above the reach of Envy and Detraction, may now and then constitute himself a Moderator, and a Judge how far one Side is in the right, and how much the other is in the wrong. He may abate from the Pretensions of 'em both, he may take the middle way, and give a Suffrage tho' just and true yet grateful to neither Side. In important Points he may traverse his Ground, forsake those with whom he has always join'd, and go over to their Opinion with whom he is not us'd to mingle; nay farther, where he has a full Conviction of being in the right, he ought singly to stand in Opposition

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to all the rest: But he who pretends to do this upon all Occasions, he who at every Turn will think himself wiser than all the rest of his Friends, who is so wedded to his own Opinion that he makes it the only Standard by which he tries Things, who is so self sufficient as to think his own Judgment incapable of Error, and who upon this Presumption takes upon him to see further than his Companions, and to be at Liberty to change Sides as often as he pleases, does certainly set a higher value upon the Strength of his own Understanding than is to be allow'd to one that is not very much above the vulgar Make of Men: Therefore in a Country that unhappily is divided into Factions, they who affect this Impartiality must take care that it does not arise from being Partial to themselves; and 'tis seldom seen that such as would thus be thought disengag'd and disinterested, and who assume to be the flying Squadron, can escape the Imputation of Levity, or Arrogance, if even their Honesty is not question'd, and suspected by both Parties.

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By what is here laid down, we would not be understood to advance that when a Man has once espous'd a Side he is not to forsake it upon any Account whatsoever; on the contrary, he who sees his Party intirely in the wrong; if he finds they carry Things much higher than he intended, or than they themselves at first propos'd; if they are deaf to Accomodation; if they visibly obstruct their Country's Peace; if 'tis plain they cover ill Designs under Pretences of the common Good; if their Ambition is become manifest; if Self-Interest appears in all their Doings, and Passion in all their Councils; if their whole Proceedings tend to subvert the State, or to undermine its Constitution; and if all this is apparent beyond Contradiction; it cannot be deem'd Inconstancy or Desertion in him who abandons such a Side, and betakes himself to those whom he thinks more moderate, honest, more disinterested, and to have righter Intentions towards the Publick,

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And when a wise Man does this, it cannot be so properly said he changes his Opinion, as that the Parties themselves are alter'd; which often happens to be the Case. For where Factions have long reign'd, nothing is more frequent than to see those who in the beginning had the juster Cause, and were innocent, temperate, careful for the Common-wealth, and studious of its good, quite corrupted by Prosperity and Power; and on the other hand to see those who at first were in the wrong, made wiser, more moderate, better, and honefter, for having been humbled by Adversities; inasmuch as to become the Side to which a good Patriot may join himself with the best Prospect of doing Service to his Country.

But what is a private Man to do when both Sides are in the wrong, and when almost the whole is corrupted? which sometimes happens to be the Case. Are the few who remain untainted to absent, to quit the Stage of Business, and to fly from what they cannot hinder? Are they to be silent,
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to assent slightly, or to withdraw? *Thrasea Patus* is blam'd for having left the Senate at such a Season, because by provoking the present Power he brought Danger upon himself, without doing what effectually promoted the Cause of Liberty. *Thrasea Patus silentio vel brevi assensu priores Adulationes transmittere solitus exiit tum Senatu, ac sibi Causam periculi fecit, ceteris Libertatis initium non praeuit.* In these Occurrences good Men are to take that Course which they think will be of the best Example, and make the strongest Impression, since they ought to be always ready to do or suffer any thing, for that Common-wealth of which they are Members. But generally speaking it seems more noble, and more virtuous, not to quit the Field, and to stand embattled tho' with but thin Squadrons, boldly to combat those who would hurt or betray the Publick. Besides, the People think the Valiant both wise and honest, and are hardly brought to believe they can be unsuccessful; and Men must be very much deprav'd indeed if they do not at last range themselves on the side of the smaller Numbers, when they see 'em stre-

strenuously contending for Truth and Liberty.

The Bad likewise begin to imagine they are in the right when they meet with no Opposition; but their Guilt makes 'em tremble, break their Ranks, and scatter, when they are perpetually charg'd with a small, but a fearless Band: Nor is it easy to instance a great Nation totally reduc'd to Bondage by any domestick Power, where there has been a constant Succession (tho' but of a few Patriots) always appearing in defence of their Freedoms, with undaunted Courage.

To despair of the Publick is the last thing that should enter into the Hearts of wise and honest Men: And tho' they see their Country miserably rent asunder by Factions, in appearance deaf to Terms of Reconcilement, and both Sides warm, high, and unreasonable, blasting one anothers Fame in Whispers, virulent Libels, and angry Speeches, and consequently fighting and wounding each the other with invenom'd Darts, and poison'd Weapons, which is or ought to be against the
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Law of Arms; yet good Men are not to be dishearten'd at all this: 'Tis then the proper Season for them to exercise their Industry and Courage; 'Tis the Field in which they may best show their Wisdom and Conduct; 'Tis then they should watch with Eyes ever open, to find some lucky moment (which Time seldom fails of producing) when both Parties may be willing to hear Reason: 'Tis then they should be awake to lay hold on all Occasions of softening Things, of removing the Lets that hinder 'em from meeting, and of abating from the Claims, Terms, and Pretensions of both, that they may be less distant from each other; which Opportunities they can never meet with, who in Times of Trouble retire from Business, thinking they do their Country sufficient Service if they join with neither of the Parties, who are bringing on its Ruin by their mutual Heats, Rancour, and Divisions; whereas in Truth the Actors themselves are not more guilty than they who sit still, if they have it in their Power to prevent the raging Mischief. Instead of starting at, and flying from Disasters of this Nature, Persons of
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Worth should at such Times embrace the Commonwealth more warmly, which then stands most in need of their Help ; and perhaps Fortune may have contriv'd these Broils as Matter of Triumph for their Virtues ; according to the Notion of *Machiavel* who lays down, That sometimes 'tis necessary a Country should be without Order, harrafs'd, spoil'd, overcome, over-run, and overflown with all kind of Calamities ; that there may be room and opportunity for Men of a great Genius to exert themselves in its Redemption.

But when Affairs are in a disturb'd Condition some are loath to meddle, being unwilling to involve themselves in Danger ; as if this Caution would any thing avail, since Experience daily shows us, that they who at first refus'd to suffer for their Countries sake, have of Necessity been at last brought in to perish with it. *Sapiens nullum pro Republica Periculum vitabit, ideo quod saepe fit, ut cum pro Republica perire noluerit necessario cum Republica pereat.* 'Tis therefore more generous, in the
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beginning to face those Perils, which in the end must overtake us.

Yet some have been of Opinion that a Man truly wise should in no Juncture whatsoever enter upon the Stage of Business, and whether his Country be embroyl'd, or at unity, that he should shun the Corruptions of a Court, the Noise of the Bar, and the Intrigues of popular Assemblies, and remain collected within himself, obscure, safe, and out of the Hurry of the World. Many are imbibed with these Sentiments, flowing at first from the School of *Epicurus*; and they who take this Course peradventure consult best for themselves. But if they are in the right, 'tis what they ought not to propagate; and tho' perhaps it be most true that a wise Man should not engage in publick Affairs, yet 'tis a Doctrine that should be held secret, and as a Mystery to be reveal'd but to very few; for if they who make Profession of it should so prevail as to drive all the best sort of Men into their Gardens and Retirement, how madly would Human kind be soon govern'd?

vern'd? And how long could these Advocates for Pleasure enjoy even that Leisure, Quiet, and that Peace of Mind, in which they think the supreme Felicity consists? *Ea Philosophia quæ suscepit Patrocinium voluptatis, & si cui vera videatur, procul abest tamen ab eo, quem quarimus, & quem Auctorem publici Consilii & regenda Civitatis Ducem, & Sententia atque Eloquentia principem, in Senatu, in Populo, in Causis publicis esse volumus. Nec ulla tamen ei Philosophia fiet injuria a Nobis. Non enim repelletur inde, quo aggredi cupiet, sed in hortulis quiescet suis, ubi vult, ubi etiam recubans molliter & delicate, nos advocat a Rostris, à Judiciis, à Curia, fortasse sapienter, hac præsertim Republica. Quare istos sine contumelia dimittamus. Sunt enim & boni viri: &, quoniam sibi ita videntur, beati: tantumque eos admoneamus, ut illud, etiamsi est verissimum, tacitum tamen tanquam Mysterium teneant, quod negant versari in Republica esse sapientis. Nam si hoc nobis atque optimo cuique persuasierint, non poterunt ipsi esse, id quod maxime cupiunt otiosi.*

The Philosophy that brings Men to despise the World, and to withdraw

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from it is perhaps good, but that without doubt is much better, which teaches us to be useful to the Common-wealth we were born under: Nor, while we are acting in the Scene, must we have a stoical Contempt of Things, we must think it worth the while to labour in search of Knowledge, or in the pursuit of moderate Wealth, Fame, and Power. All which, if we should weigh in the true Balance, and if we do not endeavour to deceive our selves as much as ever we can, we shall not be enough in earnest to act out our Parts upon the Stage.

As the Good of Human kind is peradventure the only Justification a wise Man can have for concerning himself any way in the Management of Affairs, so the Good of Human kind ought to be his principal, if not only Aim; in pursuing which he must suffer much, and over-look many Things; he must not be frightened at the Vices of the Age he lives in; he must bear with the Corruption of Manners, and the Pravity of those he has to deal with;

with; he must look to be accus'd of Singularity, Morosness, and Affectation; and if he happens to breath the Air of a divided Country, (if he be conspicuous for any eminent worth) he must expect to be the chief Mark at which all the Arrows of the adverse side shall be levell'd; and at the same time he must prepare to see himself frequently betray'd, given up, or at best to be but coldly supported, by the Friends in whom he trusted.

He must expect Detraction from such as he opposes, and to be envy'd by those he joins with; to have his own Party take advantage of his least Failings, and soon forget his greatest Merits; and by his Endeavours for the publick Service to create strong Enmities, and but faint Friendships.

He must not be alarm'd to find Subdivisions among his own side, nor to see his Acquaintance running precipitately to make their own Terms: He must wink at the separate Trea-

ties he shall see constantly carry'd on : He must rather pity than be angry with those whom he observes to desert upon the least Fright, and to be seduc'd by the smallest Hope: Without being able to help it, he must often go along with many whom he knows to mean nothing but driving on their own Designs, while he has no other Aim but to promote the common Welfare. This and much more a wise and honest Man must bear, and be contented to taste all these the bitter Fruits of civil Discord, and not refuse to mingle with the infected Crew, if he has any Hopes to reclaim and cure 'em ; and if there is a Prospect that his disinterested Conduct, his calm Temper, and his good Example, may work upon others, and contribute to restore Peace to his Native Country.

Whoever has this End, and this Design sincerely, unmix'd with Ambition, and without intending other Honours and Advancement to himself than as his Virtues lift him up, may declare for this or that Party

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as he believes it to have the juster Cause; but he cannot stand justify'd, unless he gives continual Proofs, visible to the whole World, that all his Councils, Endeavours, and Labours, tend to pacify Things, to heal Divisions, and at last quite to root out the very Sound and Name of Faction,

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S E C T.

S E C T. IV.

*That in a Kingdom divided
within it self, there can
neither be Secrecy nor Dis-
patch in Business.*

WHere Enterprizes of Moment are to be taken in hand, where you are to enter into New Alliances or have old Ones to maintain, where you have a great War to support, where you have frequent and sudden Expeditions to make, or where Invasions are threaten'd and must be oppos'd, two Things are absolutely requisite, Secrecy and Dispatch, neither of which are to be expected in a Country divided within it self.

Secrecy is the very Life and Spirit of Action ; where Government is so negligent and loose that it cannot be preserv'd, great Designs never take Effect, and are like a Mine full of Holes
and

and Vents, which you can never spring so as to annoy your Enemies. It has been ever observ'd of great Princes and Captains that they have been impenetrable that way; their Actions are like the effects of Thunder, the Blow comes before you hear the Noise. Nor can there be a perfect States-man that does not so contrive Matters as to keep private the Affairs of his own Master, and to dive into the Secrets of other Nations he has to deal with. The *Romans* had this Skill, or Virtue, call it which you please, to such Perfection, that when King *Eumenes* in a solemn Manner came to complain before the Senate of the Proceedings of King *Perseus*, and to show the Preparations that Prince was then making against the Commonwealth, as well what he had open'd as the Answers made to him from the Senate, were all kept private till the Conclusion of that War. *Cæterum in præsentia nihil, præterquam fuisse in curia Regem, scire quisquam potuit: eo silentio clausa curia erat. Bello denique perfecto, quæque dicta ab Rege, quæque responsa essent emanavere.* And yet about that Time, as appears from *Livy*, there were not fewer in the As-

PEACE at Home,

sembly than one hundred and fifty Persons. But where Factions reign, Secrets of State are seldom preserv'd. 'Tis a very antient Observation, *Nihil occulti esse in intestina Discordia potest.* For where there are two Parties form'd in a Country, they mutually strive each to defeat the others Councils, and to bring what Mischeifs, Disgraces, and Disappointments they can one upon another.

First, in such Junctures the Administration it self is neither careful nor steady, and if they who are at Helm are back'd and supported by Factions, they rather study how to humour them than how to do their Prince's Business, and to keep his Designs and Intentions private; or they have Correspondencies with the other Side, keeping well with them, for fear of a Change; and to create Confidence and give Marks of Friendship, communicate with 'em, and so the Secrets of the State come to be laid open.

Secondly, where there are Divisions the weaker Side are restless, prying, and inquisitive, nothing escapes 'em; and

and where many are upon the Hunt 'tis odds but some one starts the true Game, and by meer guesſs finds out what indeed was never reveal'd to him; and ſo as it were by Accident the Secrets of the State are diſcover'd.

But one way or other, there is hardly any Inſtance of a Country divided at home, whoſe moſt important and moſt private Affairs have not been immediately made known Abroad; and the weaker Side commonly believing it imports them that nothing ſhould proſper which the State takes in hand, and that not any Action or Council ſhould ſucceed of which they have no Participation, and indeed that the Government it ſelf ſhould be weak and ill adminiſter'd in which they are not ſuffer'd to make a Figure, and hoping the bad Fortune or bad Conduct of others may bring them into Play, they do what lies in their Power to diſtreſs the Publick, by making thoſe abroad Maſters of your weak Parts, and by letting them know your Preparations, Deſigns, and Expeditions; and beſides their being the leaſt ſuſpected, they are the beſt and moſt active Spies and
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Intelligencers your Enemies can have, because Engagements with a Party, Revenge, and Ambition, are stronger Incitements to bring Men to betray their Country, than Rewards or Pensions. And so far as to the ill Effects Factions have upon that Secrecy in Councils, which is so necessary for the carrying on of great Affairs.

As to Dispatch in every important Business of a State, without it a large Empire is like an unweildy and giantick Body, which having to do with an active Combatant, tho' of less Force, receives twenty Wounds before he can return one, and so waists his own Strength, and bleeds on, while his Enemy remains fresh and without a Hurt. To enter deliberately upon any Council, maturely to weigh all the Objections to it, and not rashly to engage in Enterprizes of the highest Nature, and of which but few of the Consequences can be presently foreseen, is without doubt wise and safe: But at the same Time 'tis certainly full as prudent and adviseable, to be vigorous and quick, in the Execution
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of what, upon good Grounds, and solid Reason, you have once resolv'd. We may advance yet farther, and lay down, that 'tis less dangerous to a Government, now and then to go upon Undertakings suddenly, and not with all the Caution that perhaps were requisite, than to be perpetually slow, both in deliberating, and in the Execution of great Designs. And whoever considers the Conduct of the *Spanish* Monarchy for these last hundred Years, and the Success with which their Conduct has been attended, will peradventure be of this Opinion,

The Accidents that befall a State which is now and then too rash in Enterprising, are like Fevers or some acute Distemper in the Natural Body, from which the Patient may very well recover, and be restor'd to all his former Health. But Irresolution, continual Delays, and slow Councils, follow'd with long protracted Action, produce a far more desperate Disease; and are a lingering Consumption, which in Time exhausts the Body Politick of all its Blood and Strength.

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The Attempts that have most succeeded in the World, are such as have been first maturely consider'd, and then swiftly executed. You take your Enemies unprepar'd, you deprive 'em of the Benefits of Time which you your self have had; and with Council and Order you come to encounter them surpriz'd and in confusion, than which nothing can place you in a better, and them in a worse Condition.

But this Dispatch, this Celerity, and Vigour in Action, which Fortune seldom fails of crowning with Success, is rarely the Result of a divided Council. Never any War had a more prosperous beginning than that which *Hannibal* maintain'd against the *Romans*: He gave them three such Overthrows, at *Trebia*, the Lake of *Thrasymene*, and at *Canna*, as must have sunk any other Common-wealth: But while he was so victorious Abroad, civil Discord prevail'd in *Carthage*, so as to defeat all that he could do, either by his Courage, or his Conduct. Had his Citizens been unanimous in carrying on the War, in all probability he might

might have reduc'd the Power of *Rome*, and had gain'd that sovereign Empire for which these great Opposits contend-ed. Or had they been unanimous to promote Peace, at least he had sav'd his own Country from Destruction. But the Senate was then divided into two powerful Factions; The *Barcine* Family, and *Hannibal's* Adherents, were for pushing on the War, *Hanno* headed those who inclin'd to Peace; but these Parties could not agree among one another, to promote what was truly for the Publick Good. There were two Councils, either of which, if they could have agreed in, might have sav'd the State of *Carthage*. The War was to have been carry'd on with Vigour, and the necessary Supplies of Men, Provisions, Mony, and Ships, were to be sent to *Hannibal*. Or a Peace was to have been concluded after the notable Advantage they gain'd at *Canna*, which was the Advice of *Hanno*. But the Factions obstructed both these Measures; for where they Reign, right Reason is never heard. What *Hanno* said was oppos'd, and had no weight, because it was thought to proceed from his Hatred to those of
Han-

Hannibal's Party: Haud multos movit Hannonis Oratio, nam & simulas cum Familiâ Barcinâ leviozem auctorem faciebat. And when the other side call'd out to have the War supply'd, it met with the like Opposition; as being thought to arise from their Affection and Partiality to *Hannibal*. The *Barcine* Faction was strong enough to hinder Peace, and they of *Hanno's* inclining, could interpose such Delays in the Senate, and raise so many Difficulties in the Supplies which an invading Army wanted; they could so withhold Men and Money, as might slacken the Nerve of War, and make it ineffectual. Thus each side was strong enough to contradict the other, and to hinder the Measures that were good for both; but neither Side had Authority sufficient to prevail, in what was certain to prevent the Ruin of their Country. And thus this flourishing Commonwealth, headed by so great a Man, was forc'd at last to undergo the Yoke of a People whom they had so often subdued in Fight, but who govern'd themselves by better united Councils.

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And this generally is the Condition of divided Countries. Your *Hannos* and your *Hannibals* had rather the Publick shoul suffer than lose Ground themselves. Nor does it avail to have the Superior Number, for they who are not strong enough to carry Things their own way, are yet able to do Mischief: the weaker Side can perplex, where they cannot Govern; tho' they have not Strength quite to ward the Blow, they can break all its Force; and they can ly a heavy Weight upon the Wheels of that Chariot, which they are not allow'd to drive. Thus where Faction reigns, that Time is spent in vain and endless Debates which should be employ'd in Action. They are more solicitous to get a domestick Advantage, than to reduce a foreign Enemy; what one Side has well laid, the other is glad to disappoint, tho' at the Expence of both; 'till at last for want of Dispatch at Home, nothing succeeds well Abroad; For where Councils languish, Action of necessity will become faint and impotent; and your Ardor cools while
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that of the Foe increafes. He profpers, and you decline, becaufe he is doing, while you are in Difputes what to do, and lofe Time and Opportunity; which in War, and in all other great Affairs, is of the moft Importance.

S E C T.

SECT. V.

*That Ministers of State, but
more especially Princes,
should use their utmost
Care to hinder the Growth
of Faction, and to heal
Divisions.*

WHen M. *Æmilius Lepidus* and
M. *Fulvius Nobilior* were
made Censors, whose Hatred to each
other had heretofore broke out into
such Violences as to disturb *Rome*, the
Senate thought this a Matter of that
Importance as to interpose in their mu-
tual Reconciliation; and *Cæcilius Me-
tellus* who was to take the Work upon
him, clos'd his Speech to 'em both
with this memorable Saying; That
our Enmities ought to be short liv'd,
and our Friendships immortal. *Ami-
citas immortales, Inimicitias mortales*
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esse debere. If 'twas judg'd of dangerous Consequence in a City not yet polluted with intestine War, that two of their great Ones should remain Enemies; how much more pernicious must it be for a whole People to continue divided, and inflam'd with Animosities, whose Ancestors have so often met, and charg'd one another in the Field of Battle?

And every private Man in his Station should follow the Example of *Metellus*, but especially they who are in Posts of Trust, and to whose Hands the Management of Affairs is committed; but Ministers of State generally take a Course quite different; and because it sometimes happens to be their Case to have been first introduc'd by the Interest of a Party, they think they cannot preserve themselves but by keeping Parties still afoot. Perhaps, according to the wicked Rules of human Policy, they may be in the right to foment Division who are fallen from Greatness they once enjoy'd, to which they may have a Prospect to be restor'd by the Aids and Voices of their Faction; but this cannot be the
true

true Path for those to tread in who are in actual Possession; who hold the Reins, and to whom Power is already acquired; for tho' Factions may give a false Appearance of Strength, they are but a rotten and deceitful Foundation to rest upon; it being obvious to every Man's Experience, that if such as are call'd their Heads do not follow 'em in all their extravagant Humors, and gratify all their irregular Appetites, Demands, and Pretentions, their Kindness and good Will is lost immediately.

There is nothing they expect not from those they believe the Creatures of their Favour; and each particular Member of the Party so much overrating his own Merits, there is not wherewithal to please the whole; the Majority rather after a little Time find themselves disappointed, and they who are thus fallen from their Hopes become indifferent, if they do not grow to be quite alienated: So that Ministers of State (if they consider nicely) are so far from receiving Advantage or Security from Divisions, that 'tis for them the most dangerous

Condition of a Country: For at such Seasons they are certain to be hourly attack'd by their Enemies; and let their Station be never so high, 'tis impossible they should have sufficient Means of securing all those of whose Interest and Friendship they stand in need, who meddle with the Business of a Nation, in governing of which the People by their Representatives have any share.

They who covet Power should endeavour to obtain it by honest and noble Arts, or they will find it but of short continuance: They should desire rather to direct a People well united and obedient to the Laws, than to be the Leaders of an incens'd and giddy Multitude: 'Tis Men only of an inferior Genius that think to be considerable by stirring up domestick Wrangles. But the People should be wiser than to listen to such a sort of Men, or than to think that these Flatterers and Courtiers of the Rabble, who are always adding Fuel to the Fire of Discord, intend them any good, or that they have any other End than to carry on their own Designs. These intriguing
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Medlers and Disturbers of the Publick, are finely describ'd by the Consul *Cinnatus*, in an Oration where he perswades the *Romans* to lay aside their Dissentions at home, and to prepare to arm themselves against the Dangers that were threaten'd from abroad.

Nisi forte assentatores publicos, plebicolos istos, qui vos nec in Armis, nec in Otio esse sinunt, vestra vos causa incitare & stimulare putatis. Concitati, aut honori aut questui illis estis: & quia in Concordia ordinum nullos se usquam esse vident, male rei se quam nullius, turbarum ac Seditio- num, duces esse volunt. There is no Country without such a Race of Men, very dextrous to mislead the People, but unskillful how to Rule 'em; grasping at Power which they know not how to keep; with restless ambitious Spirits, at any Time ready to subvert that State which they are not allow'd to govern.

Ministers are apt to think themselves Pilots good enough to Sail in any Weather, and perhaps their Skill is very great, but when popular Storms rage high, we see 'em frequently thrown upon Rocks, or founder'd by

the violence of the Tempest ; but most often the Partiality of human Nature hinders 'em from weighing the Rancour of their Enemies, and the Affection of their Friends, in a right Balance ; they think the one less, and the other more, than upon Tryal it proves to be ; and thus deceiv'd they take not due Care to put an end to Factions, as presuming they can by their Authority make 'em determin when they please, and that such Breaches in the Publick, are rather Matter for their Abilities to work upon, than real Objects of their Fear ; whereas in Truth the most discerning, and most innocent Man, that ever took upon him to meddle with the Business of a State, cannot be safe till Wounds of the like Nature are in a way of being heal'd ; which ought to be the first Point good Statesmen should take in hand ; and if they do not make this the Groundwork of their Ministry, and if they cannot bring it about, they will find they enjoy but a brief and precarious Greatness.

But above all others it most imports
Princes to subdue this many headed
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Monster. Is not all Duty, Respect, and Allegiance to them, in a manner suspended while Factions Reign? Do not they share that Power between 'em of which Princes have such Reason to be jealous? While a River is suffer'd to divide it self into different Streams is not the main Channel left dry and easy to be foarded? So long as the League subsisted who could be said to Rule in *France*, *Henry III*, or the Princes of *Bourbon* and the Duke of *Guise*? Did not all the essential Strength center in them, while he only bore the empty Name of King? Do not both Parties quickly grow to incline more to their own Leaders than to their Sovereign who is the true Head of the Commonwealth? And what is it they generally contend for? 'Tis not who shall best serve him, but whose Service he shall be compell'd to make use of. If he thinks by dark Arts and Policy to make both Sides subservient to his Ends, and to remain a safe Umpire between 'em, he may do it for a while; but besides the infinite Difficulties that arise in this Conduct, 'tis a Game that cannot long be play'd, and they who have try'd so to govern,

and who by leaning sometimes to one, and sometimes to the other, have thought to command the whole, have been found out to that Degree at last, as to become contemptible or odious to both, and brought in the Conclusion to declare against their Will for one or the other Side; which in Effect is reducing a Prince to the Condition of a private Person, or at best but making him a Ruler over half his People,

But in a divided Country, which way can a Prince incline with safety, supposing his Wisdom and Interest to be such as compel either side to seek his Countenance and Favour? Is he to join with those who have the appearance of being strongest? But will not they endeavour to awe him with that Strength? Will they not be insolent, and imposing? And is he not in a manner the Slave of their irregular Ambition? Or if by putting himself into the Scale with the weaker side he thinks to make the Ballance even, does he not as it were submit to Fortune the whole Decision of his Affairs? For by so doing he makes but an Equality
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of Force, which at last is to determine of his Condition. Is he to let the clashing Parties break and destroy one another? But in the Interim, do not these strivings hurt that Commonwealth which is under his Care? And will not he be the first that comes to want the Strength that is thus consum'd? Or is he to continue Neuter, and, as *Henry* the Third said of himself, *Dry between two Rivers*, without Power, Respect, or Dependencies, while the Leaders of Sedition sway the whole, are the only Persons thought on and regarded, and dispose of all Things at their Discretion?

Each of these Courses is attended with its particular Danger. The Method generally follow'd by Princes in Cases of this Nature, when they cannot bring both to Terms of Accommodation, is to head that Party which is strongest in Interest and Numbers; but this almost inevitably leads to Civil War: For they who are thus strengthened with the Royal Name, think themselves such an Over-balance for the rest, and become so proudly confident of Success, that they will listen
to

to no equal Propositions, nor be brought to hear of those Concessions which of Necessity must be made on both sides, when Differences are to be fully reconcil'd. They are for a compleat Victory, for trampling down their Enemies, or for making them pass ignominiously under the Yoke; as the *Sabins* serv'd the *Romans*, contrary to the Advice of old *Herennius*, the most moderate, and consequently the wisest Man among 'em. Such as imagin they have the upper Hand, slight the Advice of dismissing the vanquish'd safe and untouch'd: *Omnes inde quam primum inviolatos dimittendos*. They think they have not conquer'd unless they triumph. Thus the side that has their Prince, the Laws, and the governing Part with 'em, believe the Game sure, are deaf to temperate Councils, and often drive Things to that Extremity that at last Arms must decide the Quarrel. And thus it far'd with us in the Reign of King *Charles* the First. The Nobility, most of the Gentry, and the high Church-men of one side, and the main Body of the Commons on the other, produc'd two powerful Factions. The King was per-

perswaded to declare for the first, who by their Quality, Wealth, and Interest even with the Commonalty, and in many other Circumstances, appeared to be much superior both in real Strength and Numbers. When they had him with them they thought themselves above treating, and that 'twas needless to make any Advances towards the People, whom small Matters would have at first contented; Instead of Lenitives they apply'd corroding Medicines. Had half the Pains been employ'd in quieting Things, as was made use of to inflame the Parties; had both Sides receeded as far as Justice and the publick Good requir'd, all had been soon at Peace: But these two hard Bodies were so often struck one against the other that Fire came out at last; and the angry Men in Parliament of both Factions, promoted those warm Debates, Disputes and Altercations, which not long after were determin'd in the Field.

Moreover it often happens to be the Case that the Side discountenanc'd by their Sovereign, insulted by their Opposits, distress'd, push'd at with vio-

violence, and driven to despair, are at length compell'd to have Recourse to foreign Aids for Protection and Support. Thus when King *John* headed the Commons against his Nobles, the Barons, unable to resist him with their proper Forces, call'd over the *French*; and the Duke of *Guise* when he saw the King resolv'd to ruin him, his House, with those of his Dependence and by his Authority quite to suppress the League, he and they threw themselves under the King of *Spain's* Protection. Of this many more Examples might be given, and some Nation or other will be always sure to countenance such a desperate and discontented Band: Nor indeed does this hardly ever fail happening to a Country that has Neighbours jealous of its Power and Greatness; for it costs your Enemies much less to keep you embroil'd at home, and to feed a Civil War, than it does to be Principals, and to fight wholly at the Expence of their own Men and Treasure: 'Tis in Prospect therefore of these dangerous Defections that *Machiavel* exhorts Princes not to suffer Factions in the State. He says they never do good: That
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when the Enemy approaches and the Country is divided, it must of necessity, and that suddenly, be lost, because the weaker Party will always fall off to the Enemy, and the other singly is not strong enough to defend it. That the *Venetians* were at the Brink of Ruin for having encourag'd the *Guelphs* and *Gibbelins* to form their Parties. That such Methods of Ruling argue weakness in the Prince ; for no Government of any Strength, or Consistence, will endure such Divisions, because they can be useful only in Times of Peace, when perhaps they may contribute to the more easy Management of his Subjects ; but when War comes, the Fallacy of those Councils is quickly discover'd. This was the Opinion of our wise *Florentine*, who was no incompetent Judge of these Matters ; *Italy* having been for the Age before, and the Times he liv'd in, the true Theatre of State Intrigues, and the School in which these dark and subtle Lessons were Taught and put in Practice.

Great Princes give the truest Proof of their Wisdom, and Conduct, when they

they govern steddily, without these sinister Arts, which are commonly suggested to 'em by weak Ministers, the meer Creatures of Popular Favour, who have no intrinsic Worth in themselves, who could never be taken Notice of, nor come at Power, but as they are cry'd up by the Voices, and usher'd in by the Strength of their Followers of one or of the other Party. But tho' States-men may sometimes find their Accompt in Divisions of the People, 'tis otherwise with Sovereigns, whose Authority is always thereby impair'd and lessen'd; however the Posture of Affairs is often such that they cannot be subdu'd nor reconcil'd. In such Cases without doubt a great and wise Prince (if the Circumstance of Things will possibly admit of a perfect Neutrality in him) is to incline nor to one nor to the other; for which Reason *Hemer*, who is the Fountain of Policy as well as of all other Knowledge, shevvs *Jupiter*, the supream Ruler, reproving the Gods and Goddesses for siding some vvith the *Greeks*, and some vvith the *Trojans*: And vvhen he vouchsafes to descend upon Mount *Ida*, he takes Part vvith neither,

ther, and is describ'd holding the golden Ballance in which the Destinies of both are weigh'd. But when Necessity compels the Sovereign to declare himself, which now and then becomes unavoidable where Factions have been of long continuance, and are grown so powerful as to shake the Throne by their mutual Fury ; in such a Juncture a Prince leaning that vway vvhether he thinks his ovvn Dignity safest, and the publick Welfare most consulted, is to do it vvith that Moderation, Mercy, and Compassion, that there may be room left for Repentance, that the Arms of the Common-vvealth may remain still open for those vvho desire to return vvith righter Inclinations to her Service. Nor is he to suffer those vvho are either strong in themselves, or so made by his Declaration in their Favour, to be implacable to the Side that is brought under, so that the past Errors of their Mannagement are to be eternally remember'd, never forgiven, and alvvays upbraided to 'em. On the contrary, 'tis agreeable to his Goodness, and suiting vvith his Character of Common Father, to interpose for such, especially of the Unfortunate, as
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show Minds dispos'd to embrace peaceful Councils, who desire to be quiet and to quit all Thoughts of returning to that Administration where they have not been successful; who pretend not so to insist upon their own Innocence as to insult the Publick, and who think they cannot be absolutely free from Blame in that they so behav'd themselves as to incur the Displeasure of their Country. Where Men are of this Temper, the Prince, beyond all Dispute, does Nobly in endeavouring to abate the Edge of any Anger that may be against 'em: But it becomes an Act of necessary Prudence rather fairly to invite 'em to consent with others in Measures for the Common Safety, than to leave 'em to the Resentment of those whom perhaps they have justly provok'd: If the Posts these Men have been in, if the Power they have formerly had of obliging divers Persons have procur'd 'em many Followers and Adherents, if either by good or bad Arts, by Skill or some real Worth, they have so wrought as generally to be esteem'd Heads and Leaders, tho' but of much the weaker Party, with whose Help they will be
always

always able to disturb his Affairs, for they who think themselves or their Friends in danger will never join heartily in assisting the Common-wealth; they will apprehend they cannot be safe but by Confusion, and consequently must endeavour to promote it: They will clog the Wheels of Government, perplex Matters, and delay publick Business; nothing in great Assemblies being more easy than for the joint Councils of a Few, to obstruct or frustrate the Wisdom and good Intentions of all the rest.

In Countries therefore that are engag'd in a Foreign War, or threaten'd with Invasions or other Perils of the like Nature, 'tis an Evidence of the highest Sagacity for a Prince so to bear himself that the Wishes, Hearts, Hands, and Affections of his whole People may center in one Point, which can never be where any considerable number of Men are render'd uneasy, at best doubtful of their own Condition, if not quite desperate: For such must be look'd upon as Members lopt off from the main Trunk, they will have diffe-

rent Hopes, Fears, Inclinations, and a different Interest from the rest of their Fellow-Subjects; they will be afflicted with the Prosperities, and rejoyce at any Disasters that befall the State, whose secret Enemies they are sure to continue; Fear always begetting Hatred; and 'tis well if at last they do not enter into all the other bad Measures which Dispair produces.

And upon this Score, the Lenity of that Prince is to be applauded, who desires past Faults may be as far overlook'd, and forgotten, as is possibly consistent with the Being of the Constitution (for total Impunity brings Contempt upon the Laws, and begets a lasting Succession of ill Government) and who thinks it Punishment enough to remove those from Power, who were thought to abuse it, interposing so, as that when fallen from their former Greatness, they may be obscurely safe, and not totally abandon'd to that Indignation of their Country, which at least their Accusers may think they have deserv'd.

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And tho' to act thus is not without its Dangers, since to see others fall so gently may encourage succeeding Ministers to tread in the same Steps, and to fear making no Attempts upon the Publick, which are first attended with Profit, and then with Safety; yet perhaps this Conduct is excusable in a Nation long rent asunder by Divisions, where Men not content to think their Friends always in the Right, grow at last to that Warmth, or rather Madness, openly to defend and espouse the very Crimes of their own Party.

But Faction it self is more pernicious and worse than any other Disease good Patriots and State-Physicians can propose to heal in the Body-Politick; all Methods therefore leading to its Cure are in Reason to be try'd, but it seems not so well to be dealt with by rough as by gentle Remedies.

Insolence, Treachery, Misgovernment, Rapacity, Profusion, Negligence, braving of publick Justice, and whatever else Ministers are commonly

charg'd with whose Administration is so unfortunate as not to please, are without doubt all hurtful to a Country, and of a bad Example to be forgiven; but the Age may be so corrupt as not to bear the correction of such Abuses, and so deprav'd that Guilt may be upon better Terms than Innocence itself. And 'twas a Saying of *Porcius Cato* before the Senate, It was safer that an ill Man should not be accus'd, than that he should be acquitted. *Hominem improbum non accusari tutius est quam absolvi.* The Question therefore will be, Whether 'tis not of more dangerous Consequence to make a fruitless Attempt to conquer Vice, than to let a bad Man go unpunish'd for a while? And if the Laws and Government are at any time truly impotent, and unable to cope with powerful Iniquities, 'tis when Faction reigns: From whence may be argu'd, that it more imports the Common-wealth to root it out, than to animadvert upon any Crimes whatsoever that may have been committed in the State.

Male-Administration does, its true, deform a Government, but not so de-
face

face it as that its former Beauty can never be restor'd; succeeding Care may mend all that was amiss; Errors may be redress'd, future Wisdom and good Management may set that right which was wrong before, and the Laws will recover their antient Force: But 'tis difficult to give a single Instance of any Country that has not come at last to lose its very Constitution where Factions have been long kept up, and eagerly fomented.

For contending Parties either! so shake the Bulwarks and Fences of Liberty, that a Breach is made wide enough for Arbitrary Power to enter in at, and take Possession; or they vie who shall flatter most to that degree, each going farther Lengths than the other, in order to get the upper hand, and to gratify their Passions of Revenge and Ambition, that from one step to another, they come in time to give up the whole, and are both brought under the Yoke of Bondage.

Nor indeed is there any thing that more disposes the Minds of Men to

Slavery, or to whatever else is bad, than the Game Factions play for Power; in which, as in common Gaming, all false Arts are made use of: It teaches 'em Circumventions, sly Tricks, or to cheat openly, and to think nothing foul that may turn to their Advantage; while the few that would be honest and play upon the Square, are sure to come off Losers, and to be but the *Dupes* and a Prey to all the rest.

Seeing then what a variety of ill Consequences are thereby produc'd, all Men ought to concur in their Endeavours with the Prince, when by a mild and benign Course of Ruling, he labours to reconcile the Animosities that divide his People,

But if the Sovereign and the Ministers observe that Lenity is slighted, that Impunity for past Crimes does not beget Repentance, and has no other Effect but to make Offenders bolder, and more enterprizing; if they see ambitious Men forming among themselves a Strength wherewith they may
be

be upon Terms to oppose the Government and outbrave the Laws; if nothing but Power will content em; if they seem determin'd to force the Administration into their own Hands, and to do it even at the Hazzard of their Countries Peace; if in order to this they cabal at Home, and misrepresent the Management of Affairs to the Princes Confederates Abroad; if they receive with a kind of fullen Pleasure any Misfortune that befalls the Publick; if they give an ill Turn to all the best Actions, and appear to be sorry when Things prosper; if they hinder all Business which they are not allow'd to manage; if they foment Divisions in a false Hope to be safer by Confusion than in quiet Times; if they are trac'd contriving dark Mischiefs; if they tread in the known Steps that lead towards Sedition; if they give visible Proofs that they design to disturb the State; if private Persons, or any of the Parties are doing all this, at such a Season, and in such a Case, gentle Courses are to be laid aside; they who govern are to rouse up and exert themselves; they are to apply

strong Remedies, and to take all the legal Methods that may conduce to their own Preservation.

Nor can Men of turbulent Spirits easily gather to such a Head but that a stand may be made at all times in Rescue of the Laws, if they who have the Power, and hold the Reins, have Courage to face the Danger; but where this is wanting, and where the Ministers are so disarm'd by their own Fears, that they are neither in a Posture to oppose their Enemies, nor to protect their Friends, there Faction may range freely, and bear down all before it. But if they who set at Helm have that bold Virtue which Truth and Justice should inspire, the Government has always so many whom Interest, Inclination, or their Duty, link together in its Defence, that it is not difficult to defeat their Designs who may perhaps desire to disturb its Peace.

But where there are these Jealousies, and where they seem not to be ill grounded, yet even in this Case a great deal

deal is to be overlook'd, and we are not presently to be so alarm'd as to let Discord be revived upon every slight Occasion. We are not always to take for Designs to embroyl the State, a few angry Resentments which Men may show that are fallen from an Eminence, and who have been harrafs'd and attack'd. When they cabal and endeavour to stirr People up in their Favour, they intend perhaps no more than to carry on a defensive War, and will be glad to sound a Retreat when they think themselves quite out of Danger; and the Bustle they seem to make at such a Time, is peradventure nothing but the Struggles and Convulsions of departing Ambition, then in the very Agonies of Death.

S E C T.

S E C T. VI.

*What sort of Measures are
best for Great Men to
take when they ly under
publick Accusations.*

TIS a foolish and desperate Thing for single Persons, let their Interest be never so great, to think of contending with the Representatives of a People. For there is hardly any Government, that in the Revolution of a little Time, does not come to stand in need either of the Hands or Purfes of the Commons, and when this happens, those bold Men are sure to be made a Sacrifice to publick Necessity. In such Cases therefore he who is so unfortunate as to have offended by his Conduct, is not to stand his Ground, but to withdraw till that Anger is appeas'd or qualified, which increases by Opposition.

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'Tis likewise as vain and rash for a Man struck at, and once accus'd, to think of facing his Enemies by the Strength and Faction of his Friends: For if you are still in the Post of Power, you know not whom to trust; because you know not who, even of your own Side, is secretly designing to supplant you. If you are quite out, they who were the Friends of your Prosperity, when you can be no longer useful to 'em, will soon grow cool in your Concerns, and leave you to wrestle by your self with the Indignation you have provoked. But suppose a Man has a Number of Followers resolv'd to run all his Dangers, and so strong a Party for him as that by their Help and Interest he has fair Hopes of surmounting all Difficulties, and to keep the Power he has, or to recover his lost Greatness; so fortify'd, is he to contest the Point? Is he to hold up Faction that upholds him? And is he to endeavour his own Preservation tho' at the hazzard of the publick Peace? Or is he to quit the Stage of Business, and to retire, rather than be the Cause or Matter of
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Diffention? No doubt an honest Man and a good Patriot is to take the last Course, and not involve the Publick in his Troubles or Misfortunes; for we are to suffer for our Country, but our Country is not to suffer for us: *Equidem pro Patria qui Letum oppetissent sæpe fando audiui: qui Patriam pro se perire æquum censerent, hi primi inventi sunt.* And he that stands Accus'd, if he be Criminal, this Modesty abates the edge of his Prosecution. Nor on the other Hand does giving way to popular Displeasure argue Guilt. Many famous Men have chosen voluntary Exile rather than the State should be disturb'd by Interpositions made on their behalf. *Furius Camillus* and several other great Men did so, whose Virtues were as much without a Blemish as they are beyond Imitation. And he who makes such a Retreat, and who conscious of his own Worth and Innocence, yet consults the common Quiet more than his own present Fame, seldom fails of being call'd back with a higher and more establish'd Reputation.

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No doubt it must greatly conduce towards healing Breaches in the Commonwealth, to preserve such a Temper in the Prosecution of Offences, as may render no considerable number of Persons desperate: Not to be implacable against any who ly under the heavy weight of Accusation: At the same time not to oppose or obstruct Justice, by openly countenancing and espousing their Cause who are indeed criminal, or who at least are thought so, is the best and safest Course. Persons accus'd should be advis'd to that Modesty in defending themselves, and to that Respect and Deference towards those with whom the Power of inquiring into, and animadverting upon Crimes of the like Nature is intrusted, as may tend to allay and soften the Heat and Anger that is conceiv'd against them. Whereas the Conduct opposite to this, to outdare and insult their Prosecutors, or right or wrong to defend Persons accus'd in defiance of Government, must in time bring the Constitution it self to be the Subject of your Quarrel; which is of such dangerous

gerous Consequence that it can end in nothing but perpetual Discord, and a total Subversion of the Laws. But when one Side comes with Moderation, and the other with that Submission which is always decent in those who are upon the defensive Part, such Expedients may be thought on, and such middle Courses taken, as shall at least secure the publick Peace, and preserve the Constitution from being violated.

There is no truer Symptom of a distracted State, thoroughly infected and ripe for Innovations, than to see Persons publickly accus'd, courted and follow'd: If some think 'em innocent, 'tis at least a high Disrespect to that part of the supream Power that is most concern'd in the Proceeding; which Part when despis'd and insulted, 'tis a Mark your Government is loose and weak, and that your Laws are impotent: But if they are guilty, 'tis a Sign that Guilt has many Favourers and Protectors; than which there cannot be a more melancholy Prospect. The *Romans* till they were quite corrupted,
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behav'd themselves in another manner towards those who lay under popular Accusations, of which *Machiavel* gives a very remarkable Instance in the Case of *Manlius Capitolinus* : who began to make Parties and raise Tumults in *Rome* both against the Senate and the Laws. In which Passage it was evident how well that Government was constituted, and how well that People was dispos'd ; for in this Case (tho' the Nobility and he were great Friends, and fierce Defenders of one anothers Interests) none of them, not his very Relations, appear'd in his behalf ; and whereas at other Tryals, the Friends of the Criminal us'd to accompany him to the Bar in Mourning, and with all other Circumstances of Sadness that they could think of, to work if possible the Judges to Compassion ; *Manlius* went alone, without so much as one Friend to attend him. The Tribunes of the People, who were in other Things always opposite to the Nobility, and created on purpose to ballance their Power, when they found the Design tending to the Ruin of them all, they join'd heartily with them

them to remove so common a Distrustion: And the People of *Rome*, who were zealous for any thing that made for their Advantage, and Lovers of any thing that cross'd the Nobility, (tho' they had also their Kindness for *Manlius*) nevertheless when the Tribunes cited him, and referr'd him to the Judgment of the People, they condemn'd him to Death, without any Consideration of his former Services. And our Author adds, That in the whole Tract of the *Roman* History, there is not an Example that with more Efficacy demonstrates the Justice of that Common-wealth in all its Orders and Degrees of Men than this; seeing there was not one Citizen appear'd in the Defence of *Manlius*, who was a Person of known Virtues and Endowments, and had done many honourable Things both in publick and private; and the Reason was, because the Love to their Country had a greater Influence upon them than any other Respect; and the Consideration of the present Danger of their Affairs being stronger than the Memory of his past Merits, they chose

to free themselves by decreeing his Death.

This was the Deportment of that People where the Person was thought guilty. Brigues and Cabals were not made in his Favour, there were none so desperately deprav'd as to be willing rather to give up their Constitution, than not to bring off their Friend. Nor was there less Modesty, Deference, and Submission to the Publick, shown by those who were truly innocent. *P. Scipio Africanus*, tho' he gain'd the noblest Victory that ever Man had over his Accusers, when quitting the Place of Judgment, and ascending the Capitol to thank the Gods for the prosperous Condition into which the Affairs of the Commonwealth had been brought by his military Skill and Valour, he was accompany'd by the Senate, the Magistrates, and the whole Body of the Commons, so that the very Clerks and Lictors left his Enemies the Tribuns to follow him, which was thought a greater Glory than when he triumph'd for the Conquest of Sy-

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phax and the *Carthaginians*: Yet he was not so puff'd up with these Marks of general Love and popular Affection, as to out-dare the Justice of his Country. He wisely saw this was his last happy Day, that he had contracted Envy, that he should be engag'd in perpetual Disputes with the Tribuns of the People: Some small Errors of Negligence had escap'd him, and his Mind was too great, and he had been us'd to higher Fortune than as a Criminal to plead his Cause, and to submit to that Humility which is so needful at the Bar; he therefore retir'd to *Liternum*, with a Resolution not to stand his Tryal. *Hic speciosus ultimus dies P. Scipioni illuxit. Post quæm, quum invidiam & certamina cum Tribunis prospiceret, die longiore prodicta, in Liternum concessit; certo Concilio ne ad Causam dicendam adesset. Major animus & natura esset, ac majori fortunæ assuetus quam ut Reus esse sciret, & summittere in humilitatem Causam dicentium.* But perhaps this great Man, and others who have trod in the same Steps, whose Virtue and Merit so infinitely outweigh'd whatever

ever could be censur'd in their Conduct, might yet have a farther View in thus withdrawing from that Displeasure, which, with a little Labour, they could have overcome: And considering the general Sanctity of their Manners, and how deeply Love to the Publick was imprinted in their Minds, 'tis not improbable but they did so in order to give more Strength and Vigour to the Laws.

There hardly ever was a Man who did long mannage the Affairs of any large Empire, whose whole Actions have been intirely blameless. Either multiplicity of Business makes him err, or those about him are corrupt, or he himself is surpriz'd in his soft Hours, or Love, Pity, or some other Passion works upon him, but still something happens that cannot bear the Test of a severe Inquiry. Taking this for granted, which is not to be oppos'd, if he who has thus fail'd comes to be call'd in Judgment, where full Proof is made, if he escapes by Power and Interest, the Laws are in-so much despis'd and trampled under; a Breach

is so far made upon the Constitution ; a Precedent is establish'd for Impunity ; and past Merit commutes for present Crimes ; which by the Rules of Justice is not to be allow'd : Nor can it be deny'd but that all this is of dangerous Consequence to the Publick. Therefore when *Scipio* declin'd his Tryal upon the pretence of Sickneſs, and went into voluntary Exile , 'tis not at all impossible but that he knew himself not wholly innocent ; through his Neglect the Treasure of King *Antiochus* might peradventure have been imbezzel'd, which was the Fault the *Petillii* charg'd upon him, and for which his Brother *Lucius* was afterwards condemn'd at the Suit of *Porcius Cato*. However as to *Publius* this would have weigh'd little put in the Ballance with all his brave Exploits in *Affrick*, *Spain*, and *Asia* : And though the Administration was then severe, 'tis not unlikely but that so small a Failing would have been forgiven in so great a Man : But 'tis rather to be believ'd he did not appear, as unwilling to give the Constitution of his Country such a Wound as his Acquittal must

must have prov'd, the Example of which would have hurt the State of *Rome* more than Banishment could hurt him; for it had open'd the Gap, and authoriz'd all the Corruptions that were to follow. Thus a Man truly Virtuous, will not work his own Safety out of that which must be a real Mischief to the rest of Mankind; but rather suffer in his Fame, Ease and Fortune, than make a Step which may tend to weaken the Laws, and whereby the Dignity and Majesty of the Common-wealth may be lessen'd and impair'd.

Heretofore Men were so far from countenancing the Guilty, and from making Factions on their Behalf, and the Guilty were so far from braving Justice, that he upon whom a publick Censure had once pass'd, did seldom afterwards think it decent to intermeddle in the Affairs of Government, even tho' he had been wrongfully condemn'd: For which Reason *M. Livius Salinator*, at the end of his Censorship, laid a Fine upon all the Tribes of *Rome*, except the *Macian* (which had neither

pass'd Sentence against him, nor given their Voices to confer Dignities upon him) because while he remain'd under a Condemnation, they had chosen him, first Consul, and then Censor. In as much as that either formerly they had wrong'd his Innocence, or that if he were guilty, they had committed two Errors in suffering him to fill two such important Posts: That one way their Injustice, on the other their Levity deserv'd Censure. *M. Livius in ararium venit & prater Maciam Tribum, quæ se nec condemnasset, neque condemnatum aut Consulem aut Censorem fecisset; Populum Romanum omnem, quatuor & triginta Tribus, ararios reliquit, quod & innocentem se condemnasset, & condemnatum Consulem & Censorem fecissent: neque inficiari possent, aut Judicio semel, aut Comitibus, bis ab se peccatum esse.----- Castigatio inconstantie Populi censoria & gravitate Temporum illorum digna.* Which Punishment of an inconstant Vûlgar suited with the Gravity of those Times, and of that Magistracy.

In Kingly Governments 'tis always dangerous to the Prince that a Faction
should

should buoy up and support private Men against his Authority, but more especially where the Marks of his Disfavour are both well grounded and apparent. If his Displeasure is sufficient to recommend a Man to the Peoples liking, 'tis a Sign the State is very much distemper'd. 'Twas reckon'd ominous to *Julius Caesar* when *Marullus* and *Cæsarius*, whom he had newly disgrac'd, had a great many Voices to be Consuls. But it is yet worse when Men are followed, cry'd up, and countenanc'd, who are under Accusations of the highest Nature, and who are obnoxious not only to him but to the State: For it is then a Sign that there is a Party endeavouring to contend with him even for Dominion, or who at least would set up *Imperium in Imperio*, which a wise Prince is not to suffer; and whatever Side is strong enough to condemn the Innocent, and acquit the Guilty, in opposition to what passes for the governing part of the State, may be truly said to hold in a manner the Reins of Empire, to rival the Prince's Power, and indeed to have set themselves above the Laws:

And where this happens that Nation is so deprav'd and divided that it cannot long preserve its Constitution.

But in some Governments Ministers are frown'd upon, cast out, and persecuted for opposing wrong Measures, for adhering to the Laws, for maintaining the Peoples Rights; and are such Men to be forsaken? Must none take their Cause in hand? Are we to give 'em up to Ruin and Oppression? And are we so to flatter the present Times as to be of Fortunes Side in the War she often makes with Virtue? No doubt to do so is mean, treacherous, and base; it countenances the Bad, and the Good are thereby discourag'd. As far therefore as is consistent with the publick Peace, Endeavours should be us'd that Right may be done to such as suffer upon the like Accompts: But this ought to be the Care of the whole Common-wealth, and not the Business of any Party. And frequently the whole Publick does come at last to concern it self where real Worth and Merit are oppress'd: And the fallen Minister who thus has the general
Suffrage

Suffrage of the People for him, seldom fails of being restor'd to his Princes Favour; or at least he makes such a Retreat as ought to content an honest Man. But his Merits are very doubtful, that is, some think he deserves Reward, others Punishment, whose Case becomes the Concern and Business of a Party only.

'Tis plain enough we ought to lay to Heart the Cause of oppress'd and injur'd Merit, but a Man that is truly good does not desire you should espouse his Interest as to disturb the Quiet of your Country: Therefore nothing more denotes the true Worth and Virtue of a Man than his Behaviour in Declension. He who bears Disgraces of this Nature with a noble and constant Mind; he who is unwilling any Noise should be made about him; who calmly expects the Return of that Favour he has lost; who thinks it indecent, even in his own Defence, to struggle with the Publick; who modestly receives the Honours the State confers upon him, and lays 'em down without Reluctance;

stance: He who thus demeans himself deserves to sit at Helm, and be restor'd to the Greatness from which he fell. But they who bear the Wounds of Fortune impatiently; who in their private Ruin would involve the Commonwealth, or ravish from her her Honors and Preferments; who are so partial to themselves they would arm all Mankind to fight their Battles, and who in order to this keep up and foment Divisions: Whoever in their general Conduct shew such a sort of Spirit, let their Pretences be what they will, they are more concern'd for something else than to clear their own Innocence. In State-Matters Time and future Events seldom fail to justify the Innocent without such impetuous Motions, which in Truth are Arguments of Guilt. They who would thus raise an universal Storm rather than be themselves for a while clouded, cannot be true Patriots: Ambition lies at the Bottom of their Hearts; Self-Interest sways their Actions; and whatever Appearances they, who act in such a manner, may have of Worth and Abilities,

ties, 'tis not what will bear the Test of discerning Judgments. It can never be wise for a Man, upon his own Accompt, to disquiet his Prince or Country; it may do for a while, and he may have a false Show of Strength; but they who in order to their own Security, take upon 'em to play this Game, and who seem to have drawn in many to be concern'd for 'em, will find at last that instead of real Friends, they have made two sort of Enemies; those whom they have provok'd, and those whom they have deluded.

The Moderation here mention'd, as a good Expedient to heal Breaches in a divided Country, must be reciprocal. Violence in Accusation, or in Defence, are equally to be laid aside: as where the Publick is offended, no Man is to dwell too much upon his Innocence, so peradventure several Faults may be overlook'd in modest and resign'd Offenders. And as Laws are establish'd to preserve the publick Safety, where the Guilt or Innocence of Persons, by mutual Indiscretions, is made a Party-Business, both Sides are
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to weigh with equal Prudence what Effect their Proceedings may have upon the Constitution; for when they come to consider coolly, both Sides will find they have the same Concern that it should not be overthrown. Besides frequently to contemplate the publick Good, and to make it the sole Object of their Thoughts, naturally brings Men to agree in the Means that lead to it, and prepares 'em to be reconcil'd to one another.

S E C T.

S E C T. VII.

That Misgovernment is as well redressed by looking into Things, as by accusing Persons ; and concerning retrospective Enquiries.

PRIVATE Men in the Attacks made upon 'em would scarce be able to raise Factions, and to interest a Nation in their Quarrel, if they who set themselves to correct Abuses in the State, would show a Disposition to mend Things rather than to meddle with Persons ; and the Attempt is stronger, and surer to take Effect the one than the other way : For tho' Persons have been sometimes brought in Aid of Things, by the Greatness of
their

their Names, Power, and Interest, to obstruct Inquiries, and tho' they have been held up as Shields for inferior Criminals to fight under, yet the Assembly must be very Corrupt where this succeeds; 'tis an Artifice that can hardly be made use of more than once; and they who let their Party thus set 'em in the Forefront of the Battle, instead of protecting others find it difficult to save themselves: Besides this Craft is easily defeated by overlooking the Person, and steddily persuing to correct the Fault, which is always the safest Course; for Men grow asham'd of defending what is in it self a real Crime, nor can it have perpetual Advocates; but Friendship, Acquaintance, Kindred, holding the same Opinion, with several other Reasons and Excuses, are pretended for making a vigorous Stand to bring Offenders off, when Persons are aim'd at and in Danger; and often such a Stand is made, that Misgovernment, instead of being check'd, comes to receive a Sanction. However when you strike not so much at Things as Persons, tho' you happen to prevail, the Contest be-
gets

gets such Rancour as keeps the State for a long time after divided and in Dissention.

This way of reforming a State disturbs the publick Peace, and the Events of it are uncertain; for many great Men thus question'd, have by the Strength of their Friends and Adherents escaped popular Anger, which instead of shaking has confirm'd their Power; but the Instances are very rare of Ministers that have been able to support themselves for any Time, whose Actions (without naming them) have receiv'd a thorough Condemnation.

Perhaps nothing can more contribute to restore Peace and Order in a Government, than to overlook the Persons of Men, either in Contempt or in Compassion, and to fall to work in earnest upon mending Things. A Man may without Imputation of Blame profess a Friendship, and adhere to this or that great Man, pretending to believe him innocent when accus'd, and consequently join with those who
for

fort together in his Defence. But can any Party be form'd, and can any be so insolent to go along with them who shall openly declare for such Crimes, and for such and such Corruption and Mismanagement? Nor indeed can any thing more disappoint the ambitious and wicked Designs of corrupt Men, than to take away their Pretences and false Colours, and to leave 'em without Excuse; which you do, when without expressing Anger or Prejudice to the Persons of Men, you make it manifest that your only Aim is to put it out of their Power, or out of the Power of such as will tread in their Steps hereafter, to bring any further Mischiefs upon the Commonwealth; and where these Measures are taken, 'tis difficult, if not impossible, to form or keep up Parties that shall combine to protect and countenance the Vices of the Age: For it being the Interest of much the major Part to be well govern'd, where the People plainly see all Affairs carry'd on calmly, and without Piques, and personal Enmities, they let Faction drop, and the good join to suppress the bad, which Union pro-

nitions, that without 'em Law it self and the Law-givers become the general Subject of Contempt, yet 'tis difficult to engage the People in Prosecutions, which aim by punishing the Past, to mend the Future.

For they can seldom be angry in earnest but with those who are in the actual Possession of Power, such only being in a condition to hurt and oppress them; for which Reason they are rather inclin'd to pity great Men (whom their own Voices and Complaints first pull'd down and humbled) than to call 'em to a severe Accompt for their former Actions.

And whether it be greatness of Mind that leads 'em not to lay the unfortunate too low (which Magnanimity will sometimes reach the whole Body of a People) or whether the present Object only strikes their Sences, and employs their Care, it has been observ'd, that Reformations of the State, carry'd on by rigorous Inquiries into past Miscarriages, have been
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unsuccessful, and instead of mending Things, have given Rise to new Troubles and Divisions. In Kingdoms where the People is divided, extream Rigours of this Kind are hurtful, for they beget new Ferments, and fresh Motions, are apt to make the Body Politick bleed on, and hinder the Wounds from healing: Lenity in relation to what's past, and a strict Care of what's to come, may at last bring the Offenders and the Offended to unite in promoting the common Good.

Nor is it prudent in any Party to entertain such high Thoughts of their own Strength as to slight this Moderation. For (besides that the People are in their Nature subject to change, and to make sudden and unaccountable Starts from one Opinion to another, to hate those they lov'd, and to love those they hated, as the Toy takes 'em in the Head) the Union, Zeal, Industry, and Malice of a few, driven by their Fears, or concern'd in Interest to embroil the State, is al-

ways to be apprehended. Most of the great Changes and Disturbances in Government have been brought about by a small but active Number : Proofs of this you have in all Nations, and in all Ages. A small Number of Preachers who gain by the Separation, keep the Dissenters from joining with the Church. And are there not perpetual Instances that a Few have misled great Councils, and that a Few have been the first Authors of Revolt and Sedition in great Armies?

That which gives the Few such a Weight in Countries that have a mixture in 'em of Popular Government, is that if their Intentions are truly honest to the Publick, they have secret Friends even among the corrupt Majority, and Truth, Virtue, and good Sense, are reverenc'd tho' outvoted. And if the Designs of the smaller Number are ambitious, corrupt, and interested, yet they so cloath 'em with Pretences for the common Good, and with the Name of Liberty, that very many are deceiv'd, for whoever
calls

calls out for it with a loud Voice, let his inward Aims be what they will, never wants Followers; for 'tis it self so desirable that hardly any Hands are suspected by which it comes recommended. And tho', as *Tacitus* makes the *Cherusicans* say, this sacred Name is falsly Usurp'd by those whose private Lives are infamous, whose Behaviour is dangerous to the Publick, and whose Condition nothing but Discord and Disorder can amend: *Falso libertatis vocabulum obtendi ab iis, qui privatim degeneres, in publicum exitiosi, nihil Spei nisi per discordias habeant.* Yet they never want Adherents who have it often in their Mouths tho' it be distant from their Hearts, and tho' they are ready to give it up whenever they are bid what they think a sufficient Price. But few Nations are without such a sort of Men; the Prospect therefore of such a Party, restless, undermining, and always at work, should keep those who seem to have the upper hand, within the Bounds of Moderation;

PEACE at Home,

for tho' this Faction cannot perhaps overturn a State, yet they will be able to embroil it: and upon this Score they should rather be allur'd by gentle Usage, than by Severities be provok'd to hurt the Commonwealth.

And 'tis feldom in large Kingdoms but that there are some who are willing to be Heads, tho' of the smaller Number: 'Tis the Nature of Ambition to think the Command, tho' over but a few, great and pleasant. To qualify a Man completely for this Station he must first have made a very considerable Figure in the Court, for upon this Eminence his Parts shine, there he has gain'd Knowledge and Experience in Affairs of State, and there he has had Opportunities of making Creatures and Dependents. After this he must be turn'd out, and in Disgrace, which often creates him an Interest with many of the People; in divided Countries nothing being more frequent than to see the Prince's
cast

cast Favourits become Favou-
rits of the Vulgar; the discounte-
nanc'd and weaker Side being glad
of all Helps, especially to have a
Leader of Importance. The two
most remarkable Instances of this
kind were the Duke of *Guise* in
France, and our *Herbet de Burgh*
Great Justiciar of *England* in the
Reign of *Henry* the Third. These
from being Instruments of Tyran-
ny, oppressive Ministers, designing
States-men, and Darlings of the
Court; when Fortune frown'd,
and their Power was declin'd, threw
themselves upon the People, and
became the highest Objects of their
Affection, pretending to be the
warmest Assertors of their Liber-
ties. Both of 'em had Parts, Dex-
terity, and Courage; and when
Men so endow'd meet with Matter
dispos'd to receive bad Impressions,
they are able to work much Mis-
chief in a State: If they join with
the strongest Side, in a manner they
over-run the whole; but with the
weaker Party they are yet in a Con-
dition to render their Discontents

pernicious to the Publick. When those great Men were discarded, their Princes had the governing Part, the Laws, and many of the People declaring on their Sides; and both these Ministers were guilty, and both deserv'd Punishment; their Machinations were manifest, their Insolence was intollerable, and their Pride wanted Correction: but the one in *France*, and the other in *England*, found combustible Materials prepar'd to take Fire, they discern'd the Seeds of Sedition ready to Spring out, they saw Factions forming, which tho' not considerable in their Beginnings, might be so improv'd as to be a safe Retreat for them, and a strong Hold out of which they might securely make their own Terms, and perhaps impose Conditions upon Regal Power it self, and upon all those who were Adherers to it as far as it's due Rights extended.

Great

Great Men by their Birth, Parts, Wealth, Eloquence, by their having been oppress'd, or by any other Circumstance that recommends 'em to be the Heads of a Party, are not so dangerous in themselves as they become formidable from the Disposition of the Times: for which Reason *Machiavel* says, That an ill-dispos'd Citizen can do no great Hurt but in an ill-dispos'd City. The Persons we have cited found the Ages they liv'd in fit for their Designs. *France* had been agitated by the Storms of two Minorities, and was divided about Religious Matters. *England* for many Years had been under a loose Administration, out of which the Weeds of Faction sprouted. But had the Duke of *Guise*, and our *Hubert de Burgh*, liv'd in Reigns where there had been a long Series of good and steady Government, they could not have made such a Figure; they could not have had so many Followers; they could not have form'd
so

so great a Strength ; and they could not, to the Degree they did, have disturb'd the Peace of their respective Countries : their Authority, Greatness and Interest, might have here and there misled a few, but such Adherents are an unequal Match to cope with the Power of a well establish'd Government ; and many Accidents might have interven'd that would have laid them open, and by which their Ambition would have been defeated.

In engaging to bear down and quite root out a Faction, and in endeavouring totally to suppress its Heads and Leaders, respect is to be still had to the Times, to the Manners, and perhaps to the present Humors of the People. If the Age is uncorrupt, if the Laws have their full Force and Vigour, or where there has been a long Course of good and wise Mannagement, such an Attempt may be safely made, and where Perswasion will not prevail, Compulsion may be us'd

us'd without Danger ; the Sword of Justice may be drawn upon those who will not hearken to the Dictates of the Law, and they whom right Reason, and common Utility, cannot contain within the Bounds of their Duty, can be kept in Awe by severe Examples. But otherwise where the Reins of Government for many Years have been held with slack Hands, where Men have suck'd in with their first Milk the Spirit of Division , where each Man has been rank'd under some Banner , where Civil Discord has had Dominion for near a whole Age, where it has got Consistency, Discipline, and Order, and where Men are so far from being by the Laws deterr'd from Faction , that they intrench themselves within its Bulwarks , out of which they are not to be forc'd but with hazard of the publick Peace ; there and in such Cases Lenitives become necessary, and where there is in a Nation abundance of ill-dispos'd Matter, and many ill Men ready to work upon

upon it, such Measures in all appearance are to be taken as by Degrees may gently bring the Whole into one Bottom, and to have one common Interest ; which Course perhaps, in the Event, will be found safer, than to think with a high Hand to overbear, and suppress any Party, because their Numbers may be thought small, which their Craft and Industry, or peradventure the ill Conduct of those in Power may soon increase.

Upon the whole Matter it seems highly reasonable to think that it may very much contribute towards putting an End to Parties not to alarm the Minds of Men with angry Retrospections : And in a Country, long corrupted, divided at home, and hard beset abroad, rather to provide for their future Security, than to inquire into the Authors of those Calamities they labour under : Or where these Inquiries are of absolute Necessity, that they be made with such Moderation

tion as may imprint in the Guilty Sense of Shame for their bad Conduct, and not with such Violence as may push Offenders to seek Impunity and Safety from the Strength and Interest of a Faction. Looking far backwards creates them who would mend Things more Enemies, and more Opposition than they can well deal with; 'tis true Inquisition should now and then be made into past Crimes, and Punishments should be thereupon inflicted, but this is to be done with great Temper and Caution, because Experience shows us that in a vicious State Examples of this Nature exasperate a greater Number than they tend to reform: And perhaps in these Cases so much, and no more should be done, than what is just needful to assert the Power and Dignity of the Laws, and to fix the Government upon a firmer Basis for the Time to come. But above all Things it imports those who happen to have the present Administration of Affairs to be intire-
ly

ly passive in all these sort of Inquiries. For if they oppose 'em, 'twill be thought they do it in order to future Impunity for their own Failings, and as intending to tread in the same Steps. On the other Hand if they are active to promote such Proceedings, 'twill be believ'd they do it to secure their own Posts by quite trampling down those who stand in Competition with 'em. So that when such Matters are afoot, in all Appearance, the wisest, safest, and noblest Course for Ministers to take, is rather to prescribe severe Rules to themselves for their own Management, than to be any way Instrumental in having the bloody Letter of the Law read to those who went before them.

S E C T.

S E C T. VIII.

*That Factions in a Kingdom
are not such Diseases as ad-
mit of no Cure: Rem-
edies propos'd.*

FREQUENT Contemplations on the Publick, and to make its Prosperity one of the principal Objects of our Thoughts and Care, conduce very much to lead us into the right Paths of Virtue. Almost all the Vices Men can be guilty of, their Impiety, irregular Ambition, Envy, Malice, Lust, of Revenge, Hypocrisie, Fraud, and Intemperance, do, in some measure, tend to the Dammage of our Country, towards which, he who has brought himself to bear a true Affection, is in a fair way of learning how to correct his own Manners; for we are not willing to hurt what we love.

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He whose Mind is much bent upon the Publick, will learn not to set too high a Rate upon himself; a Knowledge full as needful in a Politick, as it is in a Religious Life: For, as to think but lowly of our selves, is the first step that leads us to revere the Deity, who is in such an immense Degree above us; so he who has consider'd of what little value his single Self is compar'd to the whole Commonwealth, will be soon brought to prefer its Interest much beyond his own, and so becomes a good Patriot, not by the Compunction of Laws, but from the Dictates of his own Reason.

Pride could even interrupt the Harmony that was in Heaven, bringing the Angels to rebel against the Most High; and the first Wars upon the Earth seem to have taken Rise from an Opinion the Old Heroes had conceiv'd, That either their strength of Body, their Wisdom, or their Skill to lead Armies, or their Eloquence which could move and guide great Assemblies, deserv'd to be rewarded with
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no less than Sovereign Empire over the rest of Humane kind ; believing they had a Right to Rule those whom they so much excell'd : And there being at the same time, many Persons who had the like Thoughts of their own Endowments, and Perfections, each strove to procure to himself a strength of Followers and Dependents, who should be able to fight his Battles ; these, at last, each led into the Field : Thus Wars began, and thus that Concord was broken, which, till Nature became corrupt, was by the Creator intended to flourish among the Inhabitants of the Earth, who, without doubt, by him were design'd to be all Members and Fellow-Citizens of One great Commonwealth, the World, which he had newly form'd.

In the Beginning, Nations only contended with one another, but Vices increasing as Mankind increas'd, particular Kingdoms and Commonwealths grew to have Disputes among themselves, and intestine Ruptures ; which still arose from the high Thoughts their great Men had en-

ertain'd of their own Merits and Abilities. One could bear with no Equal, another would admit of no Superior; they grasp at Power, and believe all Courses just that lead towards it: In process of time their Quarrels begin to divide the People; some take one, some the other side, and these, the Tools of Ambition, strike so long upon one another, till at last Fire comes out, and then is produc'd what we call Civil War.

Wrong Names have indeed been all along given to these wild Appetites for Power which have got the absolute Dominion over so many great Men; in some they are call'd the Game of Honour, Valour, Military Worth, and a Thirst after Glory; and in others a large Reach, deep Policy, and unfathom'd Wisdom. Thus Vice dress'd in the Robes; and adorn'd with the Attributes of Virtue, deceives the World, and has led several famous Persons to disturb their own, and the Peace of Mankind, whom they perswaded to follow them in their Pursuits after Greatness, and
through

through all the Mazes of their Ambition.

But a Man truly Wise, and who desires no Fame but what is deriv'd from real and not appearing Virtue, corrects within himself that Pride, which Human Nature is but too apt to suggest to those who have Perfections, be they of the Body, or the Mind, much above the rest of Men: He is not vain nor presumptuous from his rare Endowments: He expects the Reward of his Deserts from the maturity of Time, and does not snatch at Honours and Preferments with too precipitate an Ardour: If he surpasses all his fellow Citizens, either in Courage, or the skill of Governing, this does not render him turbulent in the State; but his Endeavours are rather to make the Qualities he most shines in subservient to the Uses of his Country.

Sometimes it happens that the intire Mass of Blood in the Body Politick has receiv'd the Taint, and that a whole Nation is divided; to cure this

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Distemper,

Distemper, the best way is for every Man to mend one, and to begin with suppressing his own vain Thoughts of himself, his eager chace after Power and Greatness, at least to keep his Ambition within such Bounds that it may have no bad Consequences, and never be hurtful to the Publick.

But for Individuals, thus to reduce themselves to the Terms of Justice, and right Reason, is a Work that goes but slowly on. Human Nature is too much deprav'd for such a self Reformation; and add to this that the Disease may be at such a Height, that Divines and Philosophers can do no good upon it. 'Tis true, where Discord Reigns, the Heads and Leaders on each side might, by their Authority, put an end to this Madness of the People, but perhaps they may think it rather their Interest, and more conducing to their Designs that it should continue.

'Tis very difficult, tho' not impossible, quite to root it out in Democratical Governments, as likewise in Aristocracies, where most commonly,
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when civil Diffenfions are become inveterate, they terminate in making room for Tyranny : But they are with much more eafe to be fubdued by the Application of proper Remedies, where a Prince holds the Reigns of Empire, provided he has Wife and Honest Men about him.

However it has been done both in Commonwealths and Monarchies. *Mecænas Agrippa* (a Man fo poor, that his Funeral Expences were afterwards forced to be defray'd by a Collection the Vulgar made among themfelves) was able, with the fingle weight his Virtues gave him, to reconcile the Senate, and the common People, who, in a manner, resolv'd to break from the Republick, had left the City, and were retir'd into the Sacred Mountain. *Germanicus* brought back to their Duty his revolt- ing Legions, only by making them afhamed of their Diforders ; which was a Mutiny of that wide extent, that had it not been appeas'd, it muft have been follow'd by a Civil War. And, to fpeak of times more Modern, our *Henry* the Seventh put an end to that Conteft be-

tween the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*, which had so long divided *England*. In the last Age our Swords were again drawn, and two mighty Parties for several Years contended with one another, but the Breach was heal'd in time, the King was restor'd, and the People of themselves quietly return'd to his Obedience ; which Peace might have continued to this Day, had Honesty and Wisdom been prevalent at Court. There was a Noble *Venetian* so revered for his Age, Knowledge, and the Sanctity of his Manners, that he alone could reclaim the *Citidani* from a Design they had form'd to destroy the whole Senate. *Henry* the Fourth of *France*, so rooted out the Holy League, that not the smallest Fibers of it were left remaining. Many more Instances might be given of Faction, either totally suppress'd, or so restrain'd from any further progress, as that without new intervening Accidents, it must have been at a full stop, and so had fallen of it self : But perhaps what has been offer'd is sufficient to shew that 'tis no incurable Disease

In

In Common-wealths generally the Cure is effected by the Endeavours of some great Man, in whose Wisdom and Integrity both sides acquiesce, and are therefore willing to admit of his Meditation : But in Monarchies 'tis to be wrought by the Prince's Authority, by his vigorous Execution of the Laws, by not letting his great Ones grow too powerful, by punishing Vice, and rewarding Virtue, by his careful looking into his own Business, by his making Justice and publick Good, the Rule of all his Actions, and by keeping a strict Hand over those to whom he has intrusted the Ministerial Part of Government.

Where this has been done, Was there ever a Kingdom divided within it self? 'Tis granted, that under the greatest Reigns that ever were, there have been little Factions in the Court ; some have follow'd one Favourite, some another ; but these Differences become matter of Diversion to an able Prince ; or suppose they give him any Care, the Mischief is seldom extended beyond the Palace Walls, and the People remain in quiet.

A

A great King at his first Accession to the Throne, if he finds Dissention among his Nobles so interposes with his Power as to make 'em Friends. If by Male-Administration the Body of the Commons have been so soured as to become disaffected to the State, by reforming Abuses, and redressing Grievances, he reconciles his Subjects to the Crown. If in the Church there has been a Schism, he keeps the Breach from growing wider, by recommending Moderation to one Side, and a peace-full Spirit to the other. If he finds Parties form'd within his Country, he presently discerns of what sort of Persons they are compos'd: If on one hand he sees they desire no more than to be well govern'd, if on the other he perceives they desire Misgovernment, because it makes best for them; upon such a View he joyns with the Good, by which the Bad become so weak a Side that they are no longer able to disturb Affairs: But if he is convinc'd that both Sides have corrupt Aims (which often happens to be the Case) by exerting his Power, by frowning upon their Heads and Leaders, by a constant Course
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of shewing that Parties are not the Road to Favour, by giving Proofs that he intends so to Rule as not to want their Aids; he disarms 'em of all their Force, he drives 'em into other Measures, they grow to have new Thoughts, , and Things so mend by degrees, that at last the very Name of Faction is extinguish'd.

Thus a wise Prince proceeds upon whose Head God has placed a Crown, not lin'd with soft Ermines, but full of sharp pointed Thorns. He establishes a Government of the Laws, and not of Men: His Mind is fully bent upon all the different Parts of his Estate, Religion, Justice, and the care of Trade: He puts an end to the Profusion and Corruptions of his Court: He removes from the exercise of any Power all such as are without Virtue, or Abilities, and who had no Merits to recommend 'em but a blind Obedience to whatever was commanded: He takes into his Councils none but those who are of known Probity, Skill and Experience; Men of Weight and Figure, not such who instead of being a help to him,
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he must support upon all Occasions. This Conduct brings a Necessity upon all sides to unite under him who has a Right to rule the whole ; and he who acts thus needs not fear that his Kingdom shall be long rent asunder by Divisions ; but a contrary Conduct, and the Reverse of all this, ever did, and ever will produce Faction and Civil Wars : For it is most evident, from the Experience of all Ages, and all Countries, that under a kingly Government, where there has been a continu'd Series of honest, careful, and uncorrupt Administration, no great Man, or number of ill affected Men, could ever create such Dissentions as might be able to disturb the State.

'Tis the Interest, as well as the Inclination of the People, to live in Peace, and enjoy the Fruits of their own Labour ; at least this may be said of *England*, for we have seldom had open Breaches and Divisions but they proceeded from some fatal Error or Weakness in those who rul'd ; which will evidently appear to any who takes a view of the several Reigns from the
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Norman Invasion downwards. *William* the Bastard, tho' he had the Title of *Edgar Atheling* to struggle with, and tho' he was to plant Strangers among the Natives of this Island, yet he kept it well united, during his time, by good Laws and a politick Establishment: For the Attempt made by *Edgar*, in conjunction with the *Scots*, and with the Earls *Edwin* and *Marchar*, *Hereford*, *Gospatrick* and *Syward*, with the Conspiracies form'd afterwards by the Earls of *Norfolk*, *Suffolk*, *Northumberland* and *Boloign*, may be rather term'd Insurrections than Civil Wars, and were soon master'd. The Comotions that hapn'd in the Reign of *William* the II. were the Effects of his own Misgovernment, for he was Sacrilegious and a Spoiler of his People. What his Successor *Henry* I. wanted in Title and Right he made up by well governing; he punish'd the wicked Instruments of the former Reign, and took off the heaviest Burthens that lay upon his Subjects; conducting his Affairs with such Magnanimity and Prudence, that his elder Brother Duke *Robert* could never get any Footing here

here. The next Reign of King *Stephen* was full of Storms ; but by wise Measures taken at first, by then contenting each Degree of the People, and afterwards by his own personal Valour, he held for near nineteen Years that Scepter which of right belong'd to *Maud* the Empress.

Henry II. would have had no Troubles but that he must needs associate his Son in the Royal Dignity, which taught his Eldest, and then his other Children to Rebel. *Richard I.* spent most of his Days in foreign Countries, and this Embroyl'd his Realm at home. *John* his Successor was as bad a King as ever Reign'd here, and no Wonder the Sword was unsheath'd in his time ; and yet, to shew that Allegiance to the Crown is deeply imprinted in the Hearts of English Men ; this Prince, in the greatest Defection of his Subjects, tho' he was a Tyrant and an Oppressor found many Followers. *

His Son *Henry III.* trod much in his Father's Steps ; was Profuse, Light, Perfidious, and extorted from his Country

try to enrich unworthy Persons ; all which Misgovernment compell'd the Barons frequently to appear in Arms against him. His Son and Successor *Edward I.* quitted the Measures of the two preceeding Reigns ; was Frugal, Brave, an Observer of the Laws, and a Lover of his People, fear'd abroad, and Idoliz'd in his own Kingdom : 'Tis true, *Robert* Archbishop of *Canterbury* confederated with some of the great Earls and Barons, and endeavour'd to raise Commotions ; but the Lords were soon reduc'd, and that insolent Prelate humbled, and at last depriv'd.

The Fire of Discord did break out again in the Days of his Son *Edward II.* a Prince, loose, effeminate, vicious, and a mere Slave to those who had him in Possession. His Son *Edward III.* adorn'd with all princely Virtues, during his long Reign saw nothing but domestick Peace and foreign Victories : But his Grandson and Successor *Richard II.* whose noble Qualities those about him had quite corrupted, in the Flower of his Age perish'd by the Hands of his rebellious Subjects. The succeeding
Prince

Prince *Henry IV.* tho' he restor'd Order in the Common-wealth, and gave it much a better face, yet had not a Reign entirely quiet; however his Courage and Wisdom easily defeated all the several Attempts, that were made to subvert his new erected Throne; whereon he plac'd his renown'd Son and Successor *Henry V.* who conquer'd *France*, and whose Reign at home was without any intestine Discords,

Then follow'd a Minority, wherein the Princes of the Blood and the Barons grew two Powerful. And when *Henry VI.* came to Years of Manhood, he wanted the Courage and Abilities that were requisite to reduce 'em within the Bounds of Duty; so that his whole Life was a continu'd Scene of Civil War and Bloodshed. The Fame of the next Prince *Edward IV.* maintain'd him in an undisturb'd Possession from the time his Competitor fell, till his own Death. *Richard III.* as Cunning as he was Wicked, Reign'd in Peace; for the Punishment that attended his inhuman

man Cruelties, was to fall upon him all at once.

The popular Commotions, which by the Arts of the Dutcheſs of *Burgundy*, were rais'd againſt the ſucceeding King *Henry* the Seventh, cannot properly be call'd Civil Wars: This Wiſe and Martial Prince did put an End to thoſe Banners of Diſtinction, the Red and White Roſe, under which the whole People had been ſo long Maſhal'd. Perhaps it may be affirm'd he laid the Ax to the very Root of thoſe Faſtions, which had diſturb'd moſt of his Predeceſſors, by putting Bounds to that mighty Power which heretofore the Barons had. Whether by ſo doing he did not place it in Hands that might yet be more uneaſie to the Crown, and whether he did not make the Ballance incline too much another way, ſhall not be here argued: However he provided againſt thoſe Miſchiefs which former Kings had known, and felt, and transmitted a peaceful Scepter to his Son *Henry* the Eighth.

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The Beginning of whose Reign was full of Glory, but the latter end of it stain'd with Blood, Tyranny, and Oppression of his People; which, with the Alteration he made in Church Affairs, at last brought on Rebellions, but they were soon quell'd, and the Reins were in such skilful Hands, and the Administration in the main was so strong, and steady, that notwithstanding his sanguinary Temper, the perpetual and heavy Taxes he laid, and the total change he made in Religion; yet no Party could be rais'd, that by its Numbers, Interest, and Strength, could be able to shake his Throne.

Then we had another Minority, which seldom fails of producing Factions among the great Ones; but the rare Virtues of this young Prince *Edward* the Sixth, had he liv'd, probably would have subdued all the Difficulties this Kingdom labour'd under, and might have settled a lasting Peace both in Church and State. Then follow'd Queen *Mary*, whose Match with King *Philip*, tho' it gave rise to the popular
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Commotion headed by *Wyat*, yet it strengthened her ; and the People were so restrain'd by their Fears of a Foreign Power, within call, and ready to oppress them in their Civil, as well as in their Religious Rights ; that tho the Protestants were perhaps the stronger side, yet they durst never take up Arms in their own defence, against her cruel Persecutions ; so that this Unfortunate and Bloody Reign, was, all the latter part of it, without intestine Jars.

Her glorious Successor Queen *Elizabeth*, who is a Pattern which Princes who intend to rule well and wisely, should ever have before their Eyes : Tho' at Home she had two opposite Religions to deal with, one in possession of all Offices Ecclesiastical and Civil, the other exasperated by the Cruelies of the former Reign, and justly pretended that their Sufferings should be rewarded ; tho' abroad she had to oppose the Power of the *Spanish* Monarchy, then at its Height of Greatness ; tho' neither the Arts nor Wealth of *Spain* were wanting to raise and foment Divisions within her Kingdom : Tho' she had a pretend-

ed Title (that of the *Queen of Scots*) to struggle with, which was secretly favour'd by the *French*, *Spaniards*, and the House of *Lorrain*: Tho' she had perpetual Exercises of her Patience, Courage, and all her other Virtues: Tho' she had Enemies Foreign and Domestick, animated from *Rome*, Sanguinary, Cunning, and Industrious; yet did she, with a Mind above her Sex, surmount all these Difficulties. She rooted out Idolatry, restor'd the True Religion, and Rul'd prosperously for four and Forty Years, during which time, she was a constant Spring of Help and Supply to the Princes and States with whom she was in League: She supported the Protestants of *France*, preserv'd the *Netherlands*, and defeated the Schemes laid by the House of *Austria* for Universal Empire. And all this while her People enjoy'd Plenty, Quiet, and a far extended Trade. The Commons were Obedient, her Authority was awful to the Lords, and the Church was rent asunder by no Schisms: A strict Observer of her Country's Laws, mild to her Subjects, unwilling to burthen them with Taxes, always consulting their good,
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and her own Honour ; and surrounded with a Set of Honest and Skilful Ministers, whom she knew how to chuse, and was her self able to instruct. She govern'd with as much Felicity as Wisdom. As long as she liv'd there were no Parties, no intestine Broils, nor popular Commotions ; and neither blind Zeal, nor wild Ambition could proceed so far as to interrupt the Peace of *England*.

But her Successor King *James* the First, through the whole Course of his Life, observ'd quite another sort of Conduct. He lov'd Peace more than suited with the Honour of such a potent Prince, or than consisted with the Nations future safety. He neglected his Allies, and let his Enemies grow upon him. He who might himself have held the Ballance of *Europe*, courted the Power of *Spain*. He discontented his Old Nobility, by his partial Kindness to new Men, on whom he heap'd invidious Wealth, Offices, and Honours. His unbounded Profusion to Favourites drove him into Wants, and those Wants into illegal ways of procuring Money ;

all which tended to disaffect the Gentry. Then, and not for many Years till then, did Parties begin to lift up their Heads and shew themselves : They who were angry with the State, shook Hands with those who disapprov'd of the State Religion ; some thought the Laws invaded, others pretended to fear Innovations in Religious Matters ; common Danger (at least so they judg'd it) made these have one common Interest, and thus Popularity and Zeal enter'd into a firm Alliance ; from whence there arose a Faction so strong, that it was soon able to bear down the Constitution. This Prince indeed had no War at Home, but the latter part of his Life was almost one continu'd Scene of Domestick Troubles ; and it may be truly said, That the Waste he committed in his Revenues, his Arbitrary Proceedings, his loose Government, and the Corruptions of his Court, laid the first Foundation of all those Misfortunes that afterwards beset his Son.

I shall pass over in silence the four ensuing Reigns only with this Observation, That the same Causes have still produced

produced the same Effects; and that Misgovernment has given Birth, Growth, and Strength to the Divisions that have been all along among us.

Whoever looks into the lives of all the Princes I have here mention'd will see, That as many of 'em as rul'd well and wisely, were bless'd with Peace at Home, and Victories Abroad; and that they who did either ill perform, or totally neglect the Duties of their high Office, or who did entrust the guidance of the Chariot to unsteady, furious, or unskilful Hands, were never without popular Insurrections, or such intestine Broils as made the Crown sit, at least, uneasily upon their Heads, if it was not thereby quite ravish'd from them.

But they who more especially contemplate the five last Reigns from King *James* the First downwards, will find the very Seeds from which Factions spring up and spread: When the Prince himself Rules amiss; when they to whom the executive part of Power is committed, and who are call'd the Go-

vernment, invade the People in their Civil Rights; or, when the Ministers burthen 'em with Taxes; when this Treasure is embezzelled; when they rob the Publick to enrich themselves; when they neglect its Honour and Safety, and when all this begins to provoke loud Murmurs, to defend such Male-administration, and to be fortified against Inquiries, Courts think it needful to form a Party. On the other hand they who are hurt by any illegal Exertions of Power, coming either from the Prince, or from his Ministers; they who find there is Reason to be jealous of their Liberties; they who feeling the weight of heavy Taxes, are desirous, that what is rais'd should be well employed, and are therefore willing to call those to an Account, whom they believe enrich'd with the Plunder of their Country: They who grow to fear some publick Ruin, when they see Affairs loosely, negligently, or perhaps treacherously manag'd, and so think it requisite to unite for their own Preservation: These altogether compose another Party.

Thus

Thus not a few busie Heads (whom the Laws can ever reach, and lay low enough, when there is no real Occasion of Complaint) but weak Princes, and weak Ministers, bring a Nation to be divided; and thus in most Places Factions take their Rise. Nor is there a Spirit of Sedition raging more at certain times than at others, as some are so foolish to imagin; but 'tis a Disease proceeding from natural Causes, and which wise and good Government will always cure.

'Tis true, in all States there will be some to find Fault right or wrong, who will make Work where there is none, and who, to render themselves necessary, will ever be finding out some Distemper or other in the Body Politick. *Tanquam Artifices improbi, opus quærunt. qui & ægri aliquid esse in Republica volunt, ut sit ad cujus Curationem a vobis adhibeantur.* This was said by Appius Claudius of the seditious Tribunes of his time. But where the Administration is sound and blameless, the Factions such Men can raise are but short liv'd,

liv'd, and their Clamours will soon be
filenc'd.

When we consider how safe, easy,
and pleasant it is to Govern well, we
may wonder how it has happen'd that
many Princes on whom there was be-
flow'd a large share of Understanding,
came to Rule amiss; but the Reason
is plain, they had not Minds honestly
dispos'd, and they wanted that Soft-
ness in Nature which inclines good
Men to love and cherish their fellow
Creatures, and to take Delight in see-
ing Mankind thrive and prosper: Or
Pride which is but too apt to insinuate
it self into Hearts not fully replete with
Virtue, might induce several Men of
great Capacities, such as were *Tiberius*,
Lewis the Eleventh of *France*, and our
Henry the Eighth, to think that the
People are no better than the Food of
Power to be devour'd out of Necessity,
or in Wantonness, according to their
Pleasure: Or such Thoughts might
fall into the Head of a single Person,
intoxicated with Sovereign Empire,
and by Custom and the Laws rendr'd
Sacred; fed with this Opinion might
he

he not be wrought to give his irregular Appetites a freer Course, and to have the less Regard in what manner he rul'd his Subjects?

But why did the lower Wheels of Government ever go wrong? What could move Ministers of State to act amiss? Why have so many of 'em lov'd Confusion more than Order, crooked and stony Roads rather than beaten and easy Paths, and to do by Tricks what might better have been brought about in the plain ways of Dealing? Why have they often taken Measures so visibly destructive, quite abandoning all Care of their Prince's Happiness or Honour? What has made such a number of 'em eager to run into all his worst Inclinations, and unwilling to cultivate any Seeds of Goodness and Virtue that were in him? Why have they lik'd he should be rather Effeminate than Brave, Profuse than Frugal, Vicious than Temperate, Careless than Vigilant, Crafty than Wise, Faithless than Sincere, and more an Oppressor than a Lover of his People?

How

How came it to pass that we have seen so many of 'em contrive that the Publick should rather be Poor than Rich, Weak than Strong, putting things upon such a Foot as they could not be supported by true Wisdom, and by nothing but false Arts? Why under almost every Prince have they chosen to perplex and embroil his Affairs, instead of letting him enjoy a prosperous quiet Reign? Why have they all along encourag'd Divisions, instead of promoting that Concord which must make a Nation flourish? And more especially in the last Age, Why have both Princes, and their Ministers, thought it impossible to Rule without what they call'd a Party for the Court?

The Reason of all this sort of Conduct in our Men of Business is apparent: There was a foul Game playing in *England* for many Years, which requir'd a Ministry, such as has been here describ'd; and bad Ministers were to endeavour at making the Prince worse than they found him, or they could not hope long to keep their Ground; for any Return he made to
right

right Sence, and his true Interest, was to them Fatal; in their Councils therefore they did not so much consult what was for the publick Good, as what would most please his Mind and Temper, giving to his Nature still a wronger Bent; if he hated War, they plunged him in all the Riots of Peace, and extinguish'd in him all the Thoughts of Honour; if he affected Power, they drove him to overthrow the Laws; if Negligent, they brought him to abhor the very Name of Business; if Cunning, they made him dishonest; if Amorous, they let him be abandon'd in his Pleasures. In the same manner they corrupted all his Virtues; if he was devout, they made him Superstitious; if Liberal, Lavish; if Martial, they fed that Humour without any regard how far the Country was able to supply these Sallies of his Ambition.

But above all things they desir'd to have Affairs embroil'd; publick Wants and an indebted Exchequer, being then in no danger of Rivals and Competitors. and the Field was more open to 'em; for wise and honest Men
would

would not be willing to enter upon an Administration so corrupted and perplex'd, nor to contend for Employments in the State with a sort of Men, who the worse Matters grew had indeed the faster Hold.

They introduc'd the Distinction of a Court Side, not that the Prince wanted such a Help, but they wanted his Countenance and Fellowship in what they were doing; and fomented Divisions, because in a divided Kingdom they govern'd, and not their Master, whose Authority stood all the while as it were suspended; for tho' he had the Attributes of Power, the true and essential Exercise of it was usurp'd by those who did head and lead the Parties.

'Tis to be fear'd this was the case of *England* for many Years: And is it not the Duty of a good Prince to put an end to these Disorders which eclips the Royal Name, deprave the manners of inferiour People, infect the Principles of the better Sort, and render Govern-
ment

ment unsafe, difficult, expensive and precarious?

But *Machiavel* seems to be of an Opinion that the Circumstance of the times may be such as to make it dangerous to tread in the best Path. *That Hatred is obtain'd two Ways, by good Works and bad, and that therefore a Prince willing to retain his Authority, is often compell'd to be bad, For if the chief Party (whether it be People, Army, or Nobility) which you think most useful, and of most Consequence to you for the Conservation of your Dignity, be corrupt, you must follow their Humour and indulge them, and in that case Honesty and Virtue are pernicious.*

This Doctrin may perhaps be good for a Tyrant to observe (who is indeed at bottom no better than a Slave to his Army, to the Rabble, or to the great Ones, who made him what he is) he may be bound to follow in all their vicious Appetites, them upon whom his Power depends; but 'tis quite otherwise where there is Liberty, and where the Laws have any Force; For in such Countries tho' Vice may have obtain'd

a strong Dominion, yet the Prince who is desirous to reform the State, to root out that Corruption from whence Disorder springs, and to cure the various Mischiefs it produces, will always find a part of the People left still untainted, willing, and of Strength sufficient, to support such Endeavours as shall be made to restore the Body of the Commonwealth to it's former Beauty, Health, and Vigour.

'Tis true, where there has been a long series of Mismanagement; where immense Debts have been contracted thro' Negligence and Profusion; where Frugality for the Publick has been long derided as unpolitick; where the Affairs of our Navy have been neglected to a Degree as if *England* was not at all to depend upon it's Fleets; where naval Discipline has been so new model'd that our antient Bravery at Sea is almost forgotten; where Crimes of any Nature have been shelter'd by Parties; where the People have been taught they are above their Representatives; where Impiety has been suffer'd to face the national Religion, and Criminals to brave the Laws; where Faction has been fed,
cherish'd

cherish'd and pamper'd at Court as a Favourite, instead of being frown'd upon, rated, and thrust out of Doors as the froward, deform'd, and misbegotten Issue of a wicked Age: In a Country where all this has been done, it must be the work of Time, the result of Prudence, and the effect of Courage, to irradicate Distempers so deeply rooted: To bring Order out of such Confusion, to mend what is so much defaced, and to subdue a Monster that has so many Mouths, Hands and Heads.

But we have Instances in our own, and the History of other Kingdoms; That Princes have recover'd Commonwealths labouring under Diseases far more desperate than ours can be said to have upon it, and who have restor'd Bodies Politick to sound Health, when by long Civil Wars almost all their vital Blood had been exhausted.

Tho' we may be sick, 'tis to be hop'd none of the noble Parts are yet affected. We are adenterous and skilful in Trade, by which both the Crown and People are supported.

O

We

We have a rich Soil, and shall have a powerful Navy. Learning and Arts flourish among us ; we have an innate Valour that is dreadful to our Enemies. We have Wealth wherewithal to defend our selves, with something left to assist our Friends. We enjoy a Constitution, though perhaps far from being perfect, however such a one as may render a Nation Great and Happy. We are Zealous for our Religion, without the Spirit of Persecution, which in time must add to us a strength from other Countries. Our Divisions at Home have not yet made us contemptible Abroad ; for all States and Princes court us : And 'tis manifest, we alone have hitherto interrupted those Designs the *French* had form'd for Universal Empire.

Since therefore we have none of those inward Decays which are so visible in Governments that are declining ; since Nature still is strong within us, able to exert it self, and work its own Cure, with the Application of needful Helps and Remedies ; since our Distempers proceed from ill Regiment, and as it
were

were a bad and unwholsome Diet in Politicks, and by having too much tamper'd with State Empricks ; and since the high Feavor of Faction seems a little to abate : 'Tis to be hop'd Things may so mend by degrees, that *England* out of Debt, increasng in Wealth, growing more powerful at Sea, Warlike, full of Domestick Peace, and Foreign Reputation, may be the head of the Protestant Interest, hold the Balance of *Europe*, and be in a condition to defeat the Councils, and oppose the strength of *France*.

Whoever looks into the Affairs of this Kingdom, will soon discern from whence all our Uneasiness, Heats, Divisions, Animosities, and at last Civil Wars did take their rise: For tho' *I*-landers have been of Old noted as of an inconstant Temper, impatient of Rule, and turbulent, yet it has not been so with us ; we were ever quiet under a right Administration ; and whenever a wise Prince, assisted with good Ministers has found us inflam'd at the Mis-government of a former Reign, he has been always able to ap-

pease the People, make the great Men agree, and to reduce 'em to Terms of Duty, without being compell'd to use the Hammer of War to bring all into a better Shape.

The Matter and Occasion of Discord here, has chiefly been when National Interest was neglected ; when the Prince and his Ministers have aim'd at Arbitrary Rule ; when Changes in Religion have been attempted, or when tender Consciences were under Persecution ; when the publick Treasure was so wasted as to bring heavy pressures upon the People ; when the Executive part of Power was impotently, and negligently, or unjustly mannag'd ; when the Prince took into his Councils, and employ'd in all the principal Business of the State, Men Odious, Contemptible, Obscure, Weak, or Corrupt ; and, as it were, driving from the Throne such as were conspicuous, and had Skill, Experience, and Parts join'd with Virtue. Many more Errors there have been in Government that might produce Heart-burnings, Murmurs, and Discontents, which were rarely follow'd
with

with open Breaches; but if any of the main Wheels were broken, the whole Engine was out of order, and ready to fall in pieces.

Thus King *James* the First, by favouring the House of *Austria*, and by thinking to fortify the Crown with Foreign Aids, and a high Marriage, lost the Affections of his People, to a degree, that a Party form'd it self in the House of Commons during his Life; which increasing daily, came at last to have strength enough to wrest the Scepter from his Son: And the Wounds that were heal'd upon the Restoration of King *Charles* the Second, open'd a-fresh when it was seen he so far neglected the Interest of *England*, as to connive at, if not assist the growth of *France*.

A few Innovations in Religious Matters, proceeding more from Folly than any bad Design; and too warm a Desire for Unity and Conformity in the Church, which the great Prelates, and weak Politicians of those Times believ'd might be brought about by Persecution, gave rise to that Party which began the

last Civil War: And in our own Days we have seen how fatal invading the Religion of his Country prov'd to King *James* the Second; a Prince who had many Virtues, and whom his worst Enemies could not justly charge with any material Fault in Government, but what he was first led into by Superstition.

Again, under some Princes, the Common-wealth has been tormented with a Complication of Diseases, as in the Reigns of King *John*, *Henry* the Third, *Edward* the Second, and *Richard* the Second; in whose times Arbitrary Power was push'd on with Violence. The Revenues of the Crown were wasted; the Laws wanted their Authority and Execution; and all the Offices and Dignities of the State were polluted by the meanest and most corrupt Hands; upon which follow'd popular Commotions, Parties form'd amongst the Barons and great Men, and at last, total Defections of the Kingdom.

Princes who avoid the Rocks here describ'd (upon which many have been

so apt to run) and who steering a better Course, consult the Honour, and promote the Intetest of their Country; who affect no more Power than is allow'd 'em by the Constitution; who make the establish'd Religion their principal concern, and yet are indulgent to the weakness of those who cannot comply with it: They who for the Publick good, are frugal of the publick Treasure, who have watchful Eyes to see that the Executive part of Power is well and steadily perform'd, and who take care to be serv'd by Honest and Able Ministers: Princes Ruling-so, tho' Fortune may not always second their just Intentions, and noble Designs; tho' to exercise their Virtues they may meet with Disasters, Troubles, and Disappointments; and tho' they must expect to find fierce Opposition in their Attempts to reclaim a Country whose Manners have been long deprav'd, yet Success will at last crown their Endeavours: And such a Prince shall be rever'd at Home, and respected in Foreign Nations, and of course will have faithful and knowing ministerial Officers, upright Judges, a

religious Clergy, valiant Soldiers, bold and enterprizing Fleets, wise Parliaments, dutiful Subjects, and a Kingdom so well united, that not so much as the Name of Faction shall be heard within its Limits.

When a Kingdom happens to be divided, its Breaches are not to be heal'd by complying with the Avarice or Ambition of here and there a Man, who is thought to make a Figure in his Party; in his Room another starts up, who soon grows as considerable; he must be likewise taken off: And when this appears to be the Game, who is there that will not be playing at it as far as his Parts extend? When he that can shew himself enough in Anger, is sure of being pleas'd, will not every one think it high time to be discontented? Who does not strive to enter that way, when a Court opens this Gate to Favour, since the Passage is wide and easie? For is there any one so unqualify'd, but that at least he can make a noise? And where is there a State that has Offices and Preferments enow for such as deserve well? Much less for all those who
believe

believe it to be Merit sufficient, that they are able to give Opposition. But if some are rewarded for so doing, does it not instruct others to take the same course? And where Faction becomes the only Road to Power and Greatness, is it ever to be extinguish'd?

Princes who would enjoy quiet and happy Reigns, are never to attempt getting over such Profelites; 'tis a dangerous, expensive, and an endless Labour. Nor indeed should they court Parties themselves collectively consider'd, unless it be by the noble Arts of Ruling well. For in what does the Strength of Parties consist? Without doubt in their Interest with the common People. And are the Vulgar easily to be incited against a Prince whose Government is without Reproach? On the other hand, can Male-Administration be long supported by the Voices of a Party, whatever it's Numbers seem to be? When Things are bad, Faction will be powerful; when they are well Govern'd it can do no Hurt; and the whole Body of the People range themselves about

about the Throne to guard it against the Assaults of wicked and designing Men.

Where there are Divisions, to take in the Bad of both sides, as most dangerous and active, is properly what may be call'd the Trimming Game, which is a Course full of Difficulties, and yet generally follow'd by those who intend to Rule amiss. But to shine upon, and countenance Men of real Worth and Merit, without Distinction of what side they are, or have been, is what they do who for their Conduct propose a juster Scheme, and cannot be accounted Trimming, but deserves much a better Name; which is that of prudent Moderation. For a Prince to court none but the Bad, is the effect of unsteady Craft driven to the Wall and then thoroughly frightened; but to receive all the Good with impartial Kindness, is the Result of bold Virtue, and of settled Wisdom.

I have endeavour'd in this Part of these Discourses to shew the Original of Factions, and that they are not such
Disease

Diseases as admit of no Cure; for as Maladies contracted by bad Diet, are remov'd by a more wholesome Regiment in Living; so the Distempers of a Common-wealth which first arose from Male-Administration, are to be heal'd by good Government; but to mention here all the various Parts of which it consists, to open the Remedies, and shew what is to be shun'd, and what embrac'd, would swell this Section to too great a Length.

Tho' the Invasion of Property was one of the principal Ingredients in the Differences that were heretofore between the King and the People, there will be nothing said upon that Topick, because we have had few Disputes of this Nature for these last forty Years. I shall therefore confine my self to those particular Points, which of late have been, and in future times may be the Bones of Discord, and seem the most peculiar matter for Faction to work upon: And they are National Interest, Arbitrary Power, Religion and Liberty of Conscience, Mannagement of the Publick Treasure, the Executive Power,

er, and the Conduct of Ministers. I shall endeavour to shew in the six following Sections what Rocks and Shelves are to be avoided, that steering the right, and not taking the wrong Course, but keeping to the Rules of legal and wise Government, will by degrees put an end to Parties in a Kingdom.

SECT.

S E C T. IX.

Of Persuading National Interest.

NOTHING can more displease a People than to find their Prince devoted to an Interest opposite to that of his own Kingdom, especially if they see him contribute to make another great, whose Greatness must be their Ruin. *Machiavel* lays it down for a Rule seldom or never subject to Exception; that in matters of Empire, *Whoever is the Cause of another's Advancement, is the Cause of his own Diminution.* One Nation cannot increase in Power without apparent Danger to it's Neighbours; for Ambition was never known to set it self any Bounds. A King who remains unarm'd, sits still, and suffers another Country to enlarge it's Dominions, shews a mean Courage; than which nothing is more odious to the Multitude, who love Valour in a Prince, tho' it be unsuccessful. By what is here advanc'd 'tis not meant he must always head his Army (tho' that

is

is popular) but there is a Bravery in Council as well as in Action; and Queen *Elizabeth* was thought to have as stout a Heart as any of the Plantagenets. Sovereigns therefore who would shine, and attract the Love of their Subjects, when the rest of the World is in motion, must not be passive Lookers on; they must make a Figure, and have a share in all Affairs Abroad, or they can hardly give Content at Home. But they who instead of taking these Measures, assist their Enemies, further their ambitious Aims, and furnish 'em with the Means and Opportunity of oppressing any Part to which they please to bend their Force, minister just Causes of Suspicion, that a Prince acting so is in another Bottom, and meditates some Design, either to change the Religion, or invade the Liberties of his Country; that he places his Hopes, not in the Affections of his People, but in foreign Aids; and from hence endless Jealousies arise, and thus a Kingdom comes to be divided.

For a King of *England* never to court the growing Power, but rather to throw

throw himself with all his Weight into the lighter Scale, is the most magnanimous, the easiest in relation to his own Government, and upon the whole perhaps the safest Course to take ; if it succeeds he is at the top of Glory, and if it occasions high Taxes the Subjects murmur not; if Misfortunes come they meet 'em with quiet Minds: And whether it be our natural Fierceness which leads us to attack what is strongest ; or whether it be the Care we take to maintain our Freedom, but in all times we have been less anxious in our own Calamities than at the growth of any foreign State; we could never bear it: In short, to oppose it is what the People best like, who in things reasonable and honest are always to be pleas'd.

Spain was, and *France* is now this formidable Power, which united becomes still more dangerous ; and all our Thoughts are to be employ'd: No Expence within our Compass is to be spared, and we must turn all our Councils to prevent the Mischiefs threaten'd to the rest of *Europe* from this Conjunction.

Rival-

Rivalship in Trade may make us now and then quarrel with the united Provinces, but we are soon reconcil'd : And as the Legat from King *Philip* said in an Assembly of the *Ætolians* ; *Leves ad tempus ortæ Causæ disjungunt conjunguntque* : Slight Occasions may separate and again unite Us and Them. But our Hatred to *France* is antient, hereditary, and peradventure will be perpetual : *Natura enim quæ perpetua est, non mutabilibus in diem Causis Hostes sunt.* A Prince therefore that would be happy, and Ministers who would be safe, must always keep aloof from that Court. Even in times of Peace their Behaviour towards it must be jealous, cool and cautious : They must watch every Step the *French* make. When Differences happen between the two Crowns, they are rather to lead, than follow any Inclinations the People seem to have of coming to an open Rupture with that Kingdom ; and when there is actual War, the whole state is to exert it self with it's utmost Vigour.

In former Reigns steering a Course quite opposite to this, produc'd Heats, Divisions,

Divisions and Animosities: But when they who govern here are seen to act sincerely for their Country, when it becomes manifest that they neither fear nor flatter the Power of that aspiring Empire; that they equally despise it's Pensions, and it's Arms; that all the Provisions are made, which can be expected from human Prudence, to break it's Measures, and oppose it's Growth; when in order to this no Endeavours are wanting, and no Expence spar'd to carry on the War, to maintain former Treaties, and to form new Alliances; when the whole Conduct of the Court is this way irreproachable, will not murmurs, at least upon this Topick cease? And will not such a general consulting true national Interest go a great way towards putting an end to what has been call'd a Court and Country Party?

P S E C T.

S E C T. X.

Of Arbitrary Power.

MEN are so different in their Notions concerning Royal Power, that they are apt to quarrel about it, tho' the Prince does not concern himself in the Question, and even tho' he be careless to preserve what is allow'd him by the Constitution. Some think he never has enough, others that he cannot have too little; and this variety of their Opinions proceeds from the various application of their Studies: They whose View is no farther extended than the last Age, and who only consider to what a pitch of Greatness an usurp'd Dominion, not circumscrib'd by Laws, did lately bring, first the *Spanish*, and then the *French* Monarchy will be imbib'd with Arbitrary Principles. On the other hand, they who contemplate nothing but Ancient Times, and the Common-wealths of *Greece* and *Rome*, are apt to carry the Thoughts

Thoughts of Liberty too far, and to form to themselves Schemes for ruling the World, of which Mankind is no longer capable: Either of these Extremities is to be avoided; the one leads to Tyranny, the other to Confusion; and as Things commonly are ill govern'd where the Prince has too much Power, so where he has too little, in process of Time, there will be no Government at all. A good Patriot should desire to be no freer than the Laws of his Country make him, and such freedom he ought always to assert. And as some Princes, by grasping at too great a Power, have lost their Crowns, so Subjects, by aiming at unbounded Liberties, have been reduc'd to Bondage.

Since the chief end of Government is Protection, wise Men in all their Councils, are to follow such a middle course, That as the Regal Authority should not be wound up so high as to be able to oppress, so on the other hand, that it be not reduc'd so low as to be unable to defend the People.

But tho' this middle way be easie, pleasant and full of Flowers, yet for this last Age our Princes have not delighted to walk in it, but have chosen rather to look out for Paths rocky, and choaked up with Thorns, where they and their blind Guides have been bewilder'd.

And tho' several of those Ministers who did most endeavour to whet the Sword of Arbitrary Power, sunk under it themselves; and tho' others of 'em were in danger to perish by it, and must perhaps have felt its Edge, had they not been preserv'd by those Laws they would have overthrown; yet the Game has been still play'd on; nor have the Punishments of some deterred others, but as one fell, another mounted on the Stage, with the same Intentions to make their Master absolute; and by these struggles in Defence of Right, against the Attempts of wicked and designing States-men, this Common-wealth has been often brought to the very brink of Ruin.

How

How comes it to pass, that the most valiant and wisest of our Kings were the greatest Friends to Liberty? As *Henry* the 1st. and 2^d. *Edward* the 1st. and *Edm.* the 3^d. *Henry* the 4th. and 5th. and *Queen Elizabeth*, who victorious abroad, obey'd at home, and uncompe'll'd, gave us the best and soundest Laws for its preservation. Whereas the weakest and worst of our Princes, such as King *John*, *Henry* the Third, *Edward* and *Richard* the Second, to whom Power was least to be trusted, desir'd it most, and invaded all our Civil Rights. The Reason of this is plain; a Prince truly brave, judges that his Enemies, not his Subjects, ought to feel his Valour, which is shewn, not in Civil, but in Foreign Wars; and he who is truly Wise, knows the Constitution and the inbred Reverence we bear to Sovereigns, invest 'em with as much Authority as is needful for those who have no other meaning than to govern well; but weak and ill Princes affect Arbitrary Rule, that they may do Mischief more securely: Their Fears make 'em Cruel, their Profusion brings

'em into Want, and Want throws 'em upon Oppression, which they think to uphold by Force ; Misgovernment drives 'em from bad into worse Hands, 'till at last both the Prince, and such as he makes use of, begin to think themselves unsafe, unless they can set up Absolute Dominion, which from time to time has been attempted ; but Liberty, the more it has been shaken, has all along taken the deeper Root ; while the Crown, instead of getting, has still lost ground by these pernicious Councils.

Ambitious Kings may pretend, that they desire to be great only to be the abler to do good ; that they would extend their Power, but in order to enlarge the limits of their Empire ; that mighty Actions cannot be wrought by One who is encumber'd with the Delays, Jealousies, Humours, and often bad Arts of a Popular Assembly ; that Secrecy and Dispatch are never to be expected but where all Authority is intrusted to a single Person ; that a limited Rule may preserve it self, and feed near
home

home, but cannot soar out and seek for Prey abroad.

Somewhat of this may perhaps be true; but a People that would continue free, must have such a form of Government as is calculated, not for Increase, but Preservation: And therefore *England*, to whom Foreign Conquests are neither desirable, nor safe, has ever been uneasy when the Prerogative was stretched; and to see Arbitrary measures taken, has been always Matter of Discord and Division here: And we are become more watchful and suspicious, from what we have seen done of late Years in *Spain* and *France*; where Encroachments on Liberty were soon follow'd with Invasions made-upon their Properties.

However, as tenacious as we are, and ought to be in this point, such of our Princes as had the Skill not to seek after Power, have had it thrown upon 'em: Was *Henry* the Eighth himself more absolute than his Daughter Queen *Elizabeth*? And yet to arrive at this high Authority, she broke through

none of our Laws and Customs ; but the unlimited Dominion she had erected, was not over the Bodies, but in the Hearts of all her People : Whatever she asked was granted , whatever she did pleas'd ; Acts of State that in another would have been disrelish'd, were in Her applauded ; because all her Actions were thought to proceed from a Mind intirely devoted to the publick good.

A Prince who lets the Laws govern, will be often call'd upon, and invited to assist the Laws with his Prerogative : The methods he takes for the Safety or Advantage of his Subjects, will not be censur'd : He will want no Power that is requisite for the maintenance of his own Dignity, or the Protection of his People. Thus all the Effects of supreme and unlimited Authority, which Kings so much covet, he will have without Murmur or Opposition ; the less he aims at, the more will be devolv'd upon him ; and if to act without Controll be Arbitrary Power, he will have it ; because all he does is receiv'd with Approbation. His Reign
will

will be smooth, his Person fear'd and lov'd ; they who serve him will have their due respect and weight ; His Kingdom will be without Divisions, and they who are desirous to find fault with the Administration of Affairs, will be a Faction thin in Numbers, silent and unregarded.

SECT. XI.

Of Religion and Liberty of Conscience.

M*Achiavel* attributes all the *Roman* Greatness, to the Care *Numa* took in seasoning the Minds of that War-like People with the Notions of Religion, which was so useful to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the People, to the keeping Men good, and to the deterring them from being bad ; insomuch that he says they were more oblig'd to *Numa*, than to *Romulus* their Founder. He adds, That one of the first Causes of that Cities Felicity was Religion, in regard it produced good Laws ; good Laws,

Laws, good Fortune; and good Fortune a good Conclusion to whatever they undertook. That Princes and Common-wealths who would keep their Government intire and uncorrupt, are above all things to preserve Religion in it's Veneration; for that in the whole World there is not a greater Sign of imminent Ruin, than when God and his Worship are despis'd: That the personal Piety of the Prince avails but little; for when he dies 'tis forgotten: That his Example does indeed some Good, but he must endeavour to establish it in the Hearts of his whole People, and then it will last.

'Tis no Wonder that Impiety got Ground in a Country, corrupted as *England* was by a long Civil War; where of one side their loose Lives who fought to defend the Church; and on the adverse side their Hypocrisie who pretended to be purer than their Neighbours, did both together give great Occasion to the Enemies of the Lord to Blaspheme; and more especially when all this was follow'd with the Reign
of

of a Prince, who being a Secret Roman Catholick, might perhaps be glad enough to see the reform'd Religion brought into Contempt through their Vices who made Profession of it.

However in that Reign Irreligion was not countenanc'd by the State; at Court 'twas more in Practice than in Doctrin: Atheism did not walk bare fac'd, it had no open Advocates, 'twas not a Recommendation; if any Man was blotted with it 'twas a Bar to his Preferment; he might be admitted into the Pleasures and Riots of the Palace, but he was not employ'd in any serious Business. And they who desir'd to rise in the World, if they had no true Piety, were oblig'd at least to take upon 'em it's Appearances; so that it was not held in Derision by the great Ones in such a Degree as utterly to deprave the Manners of the Common People.

And the Measures King *James* the Second took to change the Religion of his Country, rouz'd up fresh Zeal in the Minds of all sorts of Men; they embrac'd

embrac'd more straitly what they were in fear to loose: Courtiers did thrust themselves into the Presence to quit their Offices, rather than be brought to do what might prejudice the Church of *England*. Nor had the licentious way of living in Fleets and Armies shaken our Seamen and Soldiers in their Principles, they all stood firm, The Clergy shew'd themselves prepar'd to dye with, or for their Flocks, and manag'd the controversial Parts of Divinity with primitive Courage and admirable Learning; the Churches were every where crowded, and the Prospect of Persecution, tho' peradventure at some Distance, begot Devotion.

But as soon as this Danger was past, we forgot the God by whose Goodness we had been preserv'd, and Impiety began again to erect it's Head; and with more Boldness than in any former Age.

In great Changes of Government, or Revolutions, all Sects of Religion, and all the various Factions in the State, are in new Motion; each thinking the
Season

Season then proper to make some Attempt towards their own Establishment. If of these there are many (which often happens to be the Case) each thinks at first by it's own Strength to be superior to all the rest, but in this they soon find themselves deceiv'd; and then the Weaker joyn themselves to those who are thought more Powerful, till it begins to look as if there were perhaps but two different Religions, and two Parties in the State; but tho' they are thus united in Appearance, all of 'em have their distinct Aims, and each retains it's first Hopes, which were to have the upper hand at last. And at the same time the different Sects in Religion intermix with the several Parties in the Kingdom, and all apply themselves to that side which they think most willing or most able to Protect 'em.

Thus they who were Enemies to reveal'd Religion (if they may be call'd a Sect) and they who were possess'd with the impracticable Notions of a Common-wealth in *England* (if they are enow to be term'd a Party) herd-
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ed at first together ; but being sensible of their own Weakness, and how unable they were to carry on their Cause, they joyn'd themselves to a Faction then beginning to form it self, whose Pretences for a while were fair and specious, but who afterwards came to meditate other Designs, and whose Majority was well supported, resolute and active.

And all these growing to have one common Interest, came at last to favour and bear out one another: 'Tis true, they who were thought to have a Republican Tincture were the first that deserted so bad a Side ; but the other two Parties *viz.* They who would innovate in Divine, and They who in worldly Matters meant to govern corruptly, continu'd all along under the strictest Ties of mutual Aids and Friendship : From this Union, and out of this Forge, issu'd those impious Books, publish'd not many Years ago, arraigning all the most sacred Mysteries of reveal'd Religion ; which Blasphemies when our Posterity shall read, they will remain astonish'd to find no
Punish-

Punishment of their Authors recorded in our Courts Ecclesiastical or Civil.

If any of the great Men then in Power did countenance these Attempts made upon the Divine Majesty, they were but bad Politicians, and did ill consult the Welfare and Safety of their Prince; to whose sacred Person the Religion of the People is far a better Defence than Fleets and Armies.

If they who promote Innovations of this kind could shew us either in themselves, or in their Disciples, that Morality and Virtue increase as the Christian Religion looses Ground; they would have something to say in their own Excuse: But on the contrary since the People have been poyson'd with these old Heresies new vamp't up; they abound more than ever in Perjury, Circumventions of one another, Frauds, Extortions, Evil Faith, Corruption, Bribery, and Impurities scarce heard of here till of late: And for these last Fifteen
Years,

years, Vice has hurried on in a Course more precipitate than it was wont to do before in this Northern Climate.

And tho' peradventure it may be a long time before Atheism, and Irreligion can have so many Followers, as to be able, by their strength and numbers, to disturb a State; yet it cannot be improper to touch upon this Subject, when I am laying out the general Methods by which the Spirit of Discord may be allay'd; because Dissentions, Faction, and Civil Wars, are some of the Rods wherewith God is us'd to execute his Vengeance upon a prophane and wicked Country.

Princes therefore who would Rule happily, and over a well United People, are bound by the Duty of their high Office, and that superior Duty they owe to their Creator, to apply Remedies to this dangerous Poyson, by which, from small beginnings, great multitudes of Men have been heretofore infected: They should
punish

punish with utmost Rigour all such as endeavour to spread it: They should receive none into their Service whom they think Tainted with it; the Fruit of which will be quickly seen; for, in many, 'tis rather Affectation of pretended Wit or deep Learning than any grounded Principle; and they will soon lay it aside when they perceive 'tis discountenanc'd, frown'd upon, and handled with severity by those who Govern.

When Princes have thus rooted out this venomous Weed, in the room of it they are to plant true Piety, and sincere Devotion. Not content with their own Zeal for Religion, their Sanctity of Life, and all their other Christian Virtues; they are to use their utmost Care to bring their Subjects to be as near approaching to their own Perfections as possibly they can, and as far as they are imitable; and to make those, over whom they Reign, as Meek, Chaste, Compassionate, Charitable, and Religious, as they themselves are. But towards all
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this, their personal Examples operate but slowly ; they are therefore to interpose with the Regal Power in the suppression of Vice and Immoralities, not by Speeches only, to amuse the Vulgar (as formerly was practised) nor by faint Edicts, forgotten as soon as publish'd, but by obliging the Magistrate to put the Laws in stricter Execution, and by noting with Infamy, and the highest Marks of their displeasure, all within their Reach, whom they know to lead vicious and immoral Lives ; and by advancing and shining upon such who they see tread in the right Paths of Virtue.

But as a matter of principal importance, their Wisdom is to be exercis'd in providing that the Temple be not prophaned by the Intrusion of unclean Things or Persons. When the chief Prelates are without Learning, blemish'd in their private Lives, not given to Hospitality, too careful in their worldly Concerns, unsound in their Doctrin, Flatterers, and
Time

Time-servers, they lose their Weight, and that Authority which they ought to have over the inferior Clergy; who when this Check is no longer upon 'em, are apt to run into Excesses of all kinds. They exceed in Ignorance and Debauchery, Symony creeps in among 'em, they neglect their Cures, they grow Litigious with their Neighbours, Vicious in their Manners, Immoral in their Dealings, and a Scandal to their Profession; all which tends to produce Schisms in the Church: For 'tis natural to separate from those who do not fortify their Doctrin by the Example of their own Lives; and there are few Separations from the establish'd Religion of a Country, which had not their Beginnings from the Ignorance and Vices of the Priesthood.

And it being most apparent, that Schisms in the Church will intermingle with Factions in the State; that is, they who are prejudic'd against the Church, will join with those who are prejudic'd against the State; and

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since bad Prelates will have a bad Clergy; since a bad Clergy occasions Schisms; and since Schisms in Religion help to heighten Faction, it must certainly import Princes (who would preserve Union in their Kingdoms) to have the Ecclesiastical part of Government in Wise, Learned, and pious Hands; and where this Care is taken, it has a general good Influence upon whatever has Relation to the Publick.

When the Bench of Bishops is thus fill'd; when they have Learning to confute their Adversaries; when they instruct by Example more than Precept; when they have Courage mix'd with Prudence, and Zeal temper'd with a Spirit of Peace, they give a greater lustre to Parliaments; they strengthen the Royal Dignity; they beget Devotion in the People at Home, and abroad they gain Profelites to the Reform'd Religion.

All things, as well bad as good, thrive as they are favour'd by Princes;

ces ; if they promote, or but wink at Vice it increases ; if they shine on Virtue it prospers. *Numa*, in a few Years introduc'd Sanctity of Manners among a Band of Robbers, Out-laws, and revolted Slaves ; for of such did *Rome* consist at first. No Plant grows faster by Cultivation than Piety, and this does not only hold in general, but in particulars ; even Superstition is hardly to be avoided, if a King is addicted to it. But when Sovereigns, by their own Principles, are intirely firm to the Interests and Religion of the Church Established within their Kingdom, and consequently are inclin'd to countenance those who have the truest Zeal to support it, a Church so encourag'd can never fail to flourish.

And this Church appears to be upon a firm Foundation, when its future security has been as far consulted by the Government as lay within the Reach of humane Wisdom,

dom, by excluding for ever all Papists from the Royal Scepter ; when all possible Measures are taken both by the Prince and the Ministers to fix it perpetually in a Line of Protestant Successors ; and when the whole Body of the People concur so unanimously with their Rulers, in resolving to maintain this Limitation of the Crown.

As the Religion of the Church of *England* (if they who profess it live up to its Doctrin) is the purest, so it seems to agree best with the Nature of our Constitution ; it has not that blind Superstition which is necessary to those who are born under a Tyranny ; nor is it so impatient of all sort of Forms, as to think even Kingly Government but a Ceremony, needless and expensive to the People. The Reformations abroad were most of 'em begun in popular Commotions, and relishing too much of Anarchy, suit best with Governments meerly popular : Whereas Ours began and was compleated by the
Regal

Regal Authority, retaining still a Tincture of that mix'd or moderate Government, under which it was first modell'd, and therefore our Ecclesiastical Discipline seems most agreeable to such a Political Institution as we enjoy, which is a Monarchy bounded by the Laws.

So that Considerations purely Divine abstracted, for indisputable Reasons of State, and by the Rules of Policy, Princes who respect the Present or future Happiness and Peace of their Dominions, are to promote, and encourage the Doctrin and Discipline of the Church of *England*, and to countenance such whose Zeal, and real Opinion lead 'em to adhere firmly to it; as having always been the truest Friends to the legal Constitution of this Country: For as of one hand they have not such extended Notions of Liberty, as to render Government difficult, if not impracticable; so on the other side, of late Years, they gave an Instance that they did not think themselves

so bound by their Doctrin of Passive Obedience, but that they could shake it off, when they saw it made use of by their Sovereign, to introduce Arbitrary Power, and undermine Religion.

The Throne is not to be defended by giddy Multitudes, nor by the strength of Parties, who are more at the Devotion of their own Heads, and Leaders, than of their Prince; 'Tis to be guarded by those who act upon a steady Principle of Duty, Virtue and Honour: Nor has the Regal Authority any other solid Basis to rest upon but the Church, whose Body is compos'd of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, the Gentry, the Clergy, the richest Merchants, and the most substantial Freeholders of this Realm.

But the Piety of Princes, and their Care of the establish'd Religion, ought never to raise up a Spirit of Persecution in those who are favour'd and countenanc'd. The Returns indeed of
Power

Power are commonly follow'd with a Return of it's Excesses. But a wise Government is to restrain this, and so to interpose, that one Side may have no well grounded Cause to repine at the others Prosperity: Nor is it impossible to make Affection in the Prince to the establish'd Church, and Liberty of Conscience consist together.

One Side is to be indulg'd in it's just Pretences, but to be check'd in all it's Passions, and withheld whenever it offers to pass the Bounds of Reason: As one Side deserve Favour, the other have a Right to Protection. as Subjects, and as Men, not to have their Consciences constrain'd, perhaps they have a natural Right which human Laws are not to alter.

But some who are fully perswaded in their Minds that they maintain the Cause of God, and his true Religion, are apt to think they can never carry it on with too high a Hand, and so
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are brought to deviate from the Doctrin of their sacred Master, who came into the World to teach the Ways of Peace. And from misguided Zeal have flow'd those Acts of Force, which here, and in other Countries, the Church from time to time has us'd. to bring the whole People within it's Pale; and these Methods have been all along thought Expedient, Just and Pious.

But tho' the Cause of God is thus pretended, is not the Corruption of Nature at the Bottom of all this? Have not the best of Men still retain'd so much human Frailty that they are loath to take the Pains of subduing Sects and Heresies by their own Piety, Charity, devout Lives, painful Preaching, and holy Examples? And do not they desire to use Power and Force, the Arms of Flesh, because they are not strong enough in Virtue to weild Spiritual Arms? And has not all this been the Original of Persecution?

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And to shew it is not of God, it does not stand: Where has it ever compass'd the Ends propos'd? In what Nation has it prov'd Successful? And can there be scarce an Instance given where it has either rooted out the true or a false Religion? And in Countries where Opinions differing from the State-Religion have been suppress'd by extream Rigour, the Inhabitants may have been put to Death, or driven away, but can it be said to have wrought Conversions?

In all Ages, and all Places, Hereticks and Sectaries have rather been increas'd, than diminish'd by Persecution: It brings 'em to unite in a firmer Band with one another; it makes 'em fortify themselves with Industry and Council, and purify their Religious Discipline, which is always popular: They pay a blind Obedience to their Teachers; and Compassion, Acquaintance, Relation, Affinity, mutual Traffick, or Interest, create 'em many Friends among the Orthodox, till
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at last they are not only in a Condition to work Disorder in the Church, but they grow into such a Posture of Strength as is able to give Disturbance to the State.

But to be very careful to preserve and maintain an Act of Toleration, sets the Minds of all the People at quiet: It quite breaks the Measures of all separate Congregations whatsoever; their strict Union is at an End, instead of which each courts the State, and is for making it's own private Terms. They become careless when out of Danger, like Armies which will not take the Pains of intrenching when their Enemies are at a great Distance: Their Church Discipline slackens and decays, and their warm Zeal cools (both which are indeed purest in all Religions when under Persecution) they begin to mind their worldly Concerns, which when the Flock do, the Pastor can no longer guide 'em as he pleases. And such of the other Side as pity'd, and therefore were the Friends of their Adversity,
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think themselves no more oblig'd to appear with, or for 'em, when they see 'em unmolested, and full as much at their Ease as the rest of the People. Thus a Torrent swelling high with Opposition, when that Opposition is remov'd falls away gently of it self: And thus Sectaries moulder by Degrees into small and weak Particles, when they are not made considerable by being taken notice of, and disturb'd by those who Govern.

In the same manner a false Religion, in Countries where 'tis uppermost, will sooner suppress the true one by gentle than rough Methods: And the *French* Historians tell us, that the *Huguenots*, whose Numbers were rather multiply'd, than made less, by a Persecution of Forty Years, return'd in Crowds to the Church of *Rome* when *Henry* the Third abated the Rigour of his Laws against 'em. He gave 'em to understand that as they were to fear no Hurt, so they were to expect no Favour from him. He shut 'em out from the Management of Affairs by a general

neral Care in the Executive Power : He took none of that Perswasion into Familiarity or the Service of his Household : He excluded 'em from all Offices of the Crown, the Revenue, Courts of Justice, Government of Provinces and Places, and from all Employments in the Army ; and the Nature of Man is so interested, that this perverted more from the Truth in three or four Years, than all the Cruelty that had been before suggested, by Priests, to him and his Predecessors ; and it was then thought he would in a short time have reduc'd his whole Kingdom to one Religion, if the Warmth of the *Roman* Clergy, and the fiery Zeal of that powerful Faction, the League, had not by main Force compell'd him to change his Measures, revoke his Edicts, and to renew the Civil War.

What Event the contrary Course now taken in *France* will have, Time only can shew us ; however we see so far already that the Kingdom is thereby much depopulated ; and admit

mit it should succeed, 'tis a Pattern no Prince ought follow, 'tis a Spirit, which tho' the *Roman* Church still retains, ours seems to have quite laid aside, and 'tis to be hop'd will never resume hereafter ; it is generally follow'd with such Convulsions as an absolute Monarchy, supported by Armies, may perhaps be able for a while to bear ; but they must shake to pieces our Constitution, where there is no Basis to rest upon but the Affections of the whole People, and where the oppress'd in Religion are sure to intermix with, and fly for Refuge to some Faction in the State.

Unless it should hereafter become apparent that the Dissenters affect Superiority over the Establish'd Church, 'tis not probable that any will be so imprudent as ever to attempt a direct Repealing of the Laws which allow Liberty of Conscience in this Kingdom : But all those Heats which seem in the least to lead towards it are as carefully to be avoided, if we would
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preserve that Union, which alone can make us powerful Abroad, and strong at Home. Imaginary Fears often disturb Men as much as a real Danger, and they are brought to tumultuate upon meer Fancies; but they grow more alarm'd when they believe there is some Foundation for their Suspicions; so that not only an essential Infraction of what they think their Right, but what looks like it is to be shun'd, if you would keep a Jealous People quiet.

And Things should be manag'd with such Caution and Candour towards 'em, as they should not have Reason to urge that they are obliquely injur'd, or hurt by a Side-wind. Favourable and indulgent Laws granted by Princes to any distinct part of their Subjects, in one Instance, resemble Treaties between Prince and Prince, which when they grow to be interpreted *stricto jure*, or in the strictest Sense, come soon after to be quite broken: For, as among Princes, Cavils of this nature
beget

beget first angry Disputes, then high Resentments, then mutual Injuries, and at last produce an open Breach; so a strict keeping to the very Letter of the Law, may have somewhat a like Operation between those who Govern, and those whom a Government has thus indulg'd.

And tho' the Legislature may with Justice say to any Sect in Religion, you have these and these Liberties allow'd you by the Law, which shall be kept inviolate, but by the strictest Letter of it, we are not barr'd from doing so and so; you invert your pretended Zeal to downright Hypocrisie, you play fast and loose, you are against us in Principle, and with us for Advantage; you make an ill Use of the Indulgence granted; you mean to undermine us with it, and you give us just cause to exert that Authority of which we have not abridg'd our selves, even according to the written Letter of the Law; you shall therefore be so and so restrain'd, and thus and thus excluded.

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All this may be strictly Just, but how far prudential will be the Question. Will not the Dissenters be apt to reply, we are in possession of a Right to remain separate from the main Body, and yet approach your Communion? If we sin by Hypocrisy, there is a God to inflict his Vengeance on us. Is it not putting us upon a new Foot, if we may not, at one and the same time, have our Liberty of Conscience, and yet enjoy all the Priviledges, and Advantages of other *English* Men, qualifying our selves as the Law requires? Are we barr'd from this by any Law in being? Why a new Law to bind those who thought themselves free ever since the first Act for Toleration? You say 'tis a Caution necessary to oppose our Incroachments, and that you have not debarr'd your selves from so doing: But when you thus erect, tho' it be upon your own Ground, a new Citadel, just over against our Fortress, we cannot but suspect, you mean it at least, as a Bridle to us, if you have
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have not further Designs of making from thence Excursions into our Territories. And does not all this tend to infringe the Articles of Peace, which upon granting the Toleration, seem'd to be concluded between Both Parties?

Small Punctilio's are sufficient to renew antient Animosities; And thus a Thing perhaps in its own nature indifferent, offer'd or let alone, oppos'd or consented to, without any consequence to either side, may be so improv'd by their wicked Arts who promote Division, as to inflame a Country: It may at first occasion Disputes, those Disputes may raise Heats, and those Heats must have a general bad influence upon all other Affairs.

But all this may perhaps go higher; Tenacious Zeal in a wrong Cause (for so it must be, to justify Dissimulation with the God of Truth) may provoke the unlimited Power of the Legislature, to animadvert upon

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those who are not satisfied with modest Terms of Liberty; and who instead of being upon an equal Foot with others, insist for a strange kind of Latitude, and to have Privileges above the rest of their Fellow Subjects. If this Indiscretion arrive to a great height; if this unbounded Freedom is asserted as a Right; if it be justify'd by any other Argument than that a new Law in this Matter, may look like a breaking into what already is, almost by universal consent, established in favour of Dissenters; such an Arrogance may make it be thought, they contend not for Equality, but Dominion: The consequence whereof must be, that others will begin to think of Measures which may lead to their own Preservation, and that it becomes in a manner requisite, to reduce those, whose Ambition mounted on the Wings of Zeal, is so aspiring; all which must be follow'd by Attempts to take away, by Law, Liberties, by their Abuse grown dangerous, and such Attempts may awaken Dissensions

sions long since buried and forgotten, bring old Wounds to bleed afresh, embroil the Publick, and perhaps, at last, produce an open Breach.

But admit that none of this happens, suppose the Point quietly yielded, and that they who thus give Battle to Hypocrisie, are victorious, without any Hurt to themselves, or without an immediate wounding of the Common-wealth; tho' the Victory may be desirable, will it make us stronger and safer? Shall we be afterwards better united among ourselves, either in Civil or Religious Matters? On the contrary, are not Effects quite different from all this, to be rather apprehended?

Will not the Dissenters thereupon be inclin'd to take new Measures, and enter into new Councils? Is it not probable that they may think they are again divided from us, and that it will be necessary for them once more to have a separate Interest

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from that of the whole Publick? And may not all this raise Ferments in the Blood, and bring several acute Humours to float in the Body Politick, which now seem to lie quiet? May they not believe it imports 'em to seek for the Aid of Friends, which of Course must lead 'em to make fresh Application to those who, tho' firm to the Church of *England*, are yet by Principle, for allowing to others Liberty of Conscience in its full Extent? And may not the consequence of this tend to divide the Church it self?

When the Nonconformists fancy themselves to be attacked, is it not to be feared they will strike up a stricter League than peradventure now they have, with such Persons as are discontented? Of which there are many in all Countries; whereof some are angry, because their true Merits are not recompenced, as well as there are others, who from either a restless Temper, or from Pride, Ambition, or the Disappointment of

of immoderate Hopes, become disaffected to the State. Has not a Conjunction between such as Malign the Church, and such as malign the Government, been found by Experience, always formidable, and sometimes fatal? Does it not afford plenty of bad Matter for bad Men to work upon? Does it not give to Faction fresh Vigour, and long Life? And who will answer that deviating, tho' but a little, from the Principles upon which the late Revolution was founded, shall not produce new Accidents, and bring Mischiefs against which it may be hard to find a Remedy?

They who promote this Matter, think perhaps it will contribute towards creating Unity, and that so we may have here the Coat of Christ, which was without a Seam; That the Adverse Side finding themselves in some sense not to be compleatly Members of the Common-wealth, unless they are Members of the Church, will return into its Bosom.

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But are there not Reasons to believe they will rather harden in their seperation? especially when we contemplate them in their proper Form and Ranks, in a view of the whole People; when we reflect who, and what they are; and when we consider from what they are to be excluded.

They have in Communion with 'em, none of the Nobility, and but few among the Gentry; not many of the Substantial Free-holders frequent their Meetings; so that impartially speaking, they can be said to have but little strength in the Landed Interest. But a few of the rich Merchants are with 'em, or of the Men of Professions, such as Law and Physick, nor of the most substantial Trades-men or Retailers: However they seem very far from being despicable, as wanting Numbers. Except the first, in all the other Ranks, they have some, and not a few of the Female Sex. Of Sea-faring

ring Men we may reckon more than they, but they have a large Proportion. They have likewise very many in the inferior Clasis of Men, or what we call the Vulgar, such as are the lower Tradesmen, or Retailers, Artificers, Manufacturers, and Day-labourers, who altogether, are that Part of the People that subsists by and depends upon the better Sort, and in these Multitudes their chief Strength consists.

Having thus rang'd 'em in their several Degrees, let us consider 'em in their Persons, as their Persons may have Relation to their respective Circumstances. As in our Church, so in their Congregations, there are both Good and Bad: Without doubt many of 'em are Men of exemplary Lives, sincere Piety, and meek Zeal, and these will rather be confirm'd in their Devotion than shaken in it by any Troubles they meet with in this World. Of these such as are Poor follow their Handy-crafts and Manufactures, think of nothing else, and because of their Sobriety, thrive faster than other Men.

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On the other hand such of 'em as have Wealth addict themselves to Trade, inasmuch as their Education has not fitted 'em for the Court, the Bar, or Armies; to all these it will be no Hurt to be shut out of Employments, that are more a Burthen than a Profit. 'Tis true, the purest in any Sect may be well enough pleas'd with Power, but will not prostitute their Consciences to attain it, and consequently cannot like to be distinguish'd from their fellow Subjects by a new Law, tho' it only debars 'em from what perhaps they do not covet: Therefore as to this sort of Men, the Consideration of their worldly Interest will not make many Profelites.

Indeed among the Bad there may be a plentiful Harvest, and they will all of 'em by degrees be for creeping into the Bosom of the Church, so that they may be warm and well nourish'd in it. Such as have no true Sence of Religion, meer Hypocrites, whose pretended Godliness is no more than Singularity and Pride, will crowd in
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apace; for Spiritual Pride is one of the Bastard Children of Ambition, resembling it's Parent in many Features, and like Ambition, will descend to act any kind of Part, and to do whatever is Wicked, False, and Base, to bring about it's own Designs and Ends: Of these divers may be willing to take any Oath or Test that can be tender'd, and also to abandon their separate Meetings, with a Resolution never to return thither any more, provided they have such a Call as may make it worth their while: But this cannot go very far, there are not Offices for all that will desire to be so brought over.

Besides the Executive Power may think it decent to interpose. When the Administration is as it ought to be, the Government may not judge it safe to employ Persons of such abandon'd Principles, to whom Religion is indifferent, and whom Interest can carry to a Church which they say is full of Errors. What must then be the Consequence? Will
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not these Men thus argue with themselves? The Law takes from us the convenient Priviledg we had to be of both Sides, to traverse from one to another as we saw it most for our Profit, but we are no longer suffer'd to continue upon these Terms of Neutrality; they will not allow us, at one and the same time, to enjoy the Offices, Trusts, and Emoluments of the Publick, and yet hold Intelligence with, and preserve the Countenance and Favour of our own Party: If we aim at Business, Power and Greatness, we must declare for one or the other Side, and then stick to it; we cannot halt between 'em both. But what will it avail us to go over? We are not cut out for a Court: Arms bring Honour, but no Wealth, which is what we seek after. The Clergy suspecting the Old Leaven that is in us, will take us to be Wolves in Sheeps Cloathing, and do their utmost to shut us out of their Folds. And in general, will not they who Govern esteem themselves bound rather to encourage those of their
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antient Following, whose Integrity has been so long tried, than us who are new Friends, and whose Faith stands suspected?

What then will be the Effect of our Conformity? A few of us only can get by it, the rest will be unregarded: It is better therefore to remain as we are, and continue in our Separation. Let us refuse to be Members of the Church, tho' it exclude us in some Sence from being Members of the Common-wealth. But if we cannot get our selves into the State, why may not the State be brought to us? If we can be the Superior Religion, we shall have all the Power: Who knows what a resolute Perseverance may produce? The Attempt once succeeded: Covering our Designs under the Veil of Reforming Zeal, and by our Arts, Boldness, and Industry, did we not overthrow a Government strongly supported? And why may not the same be done again? But suppose we fail in this, if we cannot compass our Ambition,
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let us endeavour to gratify some of our other Appetites. A Separation from the main Body well united within it self, is attended with many Advantages. If a new Law shuts us out from profitable Employments, we shall not be troubled with those that are Burthenfome; so that what we loose one way we get another: Let our Dealings be confin'd as much as possible to those of our own Persuasion: Let us Sell to the Adversary, and Buy of none but Friends: Let us by Thrift, and a perpetual bending of our Thoughts to Business, grow Rich apace; for Wealth begets Respect, and much Property cannot be long without some Power: Let us Favour, Assist, and Countenance none but one another, or those we see inclin'd towards us: In all Affairs let us go together, as if we were acted by one Council and one Spirit: We have Numbers which will daily increase, if the other Side is so unpolitic as to enter upon Measures that may render us yet more Popular: If we do not scatter we are a formidable

ble Body, and whoever have a Mind to disturb the State will always court us: Divided from the rest, and firmly joyn'd with one another, we are of great weight, and perhaps may turn the Ballance that way we lean; but if we comply, and loose those Marks of Distinction wherein we have so long found our own Accompt, we must expect that private Advantages will very much diminish; and in relation to the Publick, we shall make no Figure, be of no Value, and must be contented to return into the common Herd of the whole People.

Thus the Bad among 'em (who in all Persuasions and Sects are the Majority) will peradventure argue; and whoever weighs well in his Mind the Persons and their Circumstances, will probably come at last to an Opinion, that the new Remedy propos'd will be apter to nourish than cure the Disease; that Time and Moderation are the best Physicians in this Case; that stronger Remedies may stir up, and yet not
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carry off bad Humours, which is dangerous in Politick, as it is in natural Bodies; that any thing which has in it but the least Shadow of Compulsion, instead of bringing 'em to Conform, will (for Reasons grounded upon their Interest, private or publick) rather make 'em more obdurate in their Schism.

But it may not be improper to look a little further. Do not their ablest Heads and deep thinking Men, really desire that such an Attack should be made upon 'em? Are they not grown weaker by the Toleration already granted? Has it not deadn'd their Zeal? Has it not impair'd the Authority of their Preachers? Do they not perceive their Flocks beginning to throw off Marks of Distinction, in Talk, Dress, and Way of Living? Does not their decay'd and sick Discipline stand in need of some powerful Cordial to revive it? Do not they want somewhat, which among their own thoughtless Vulgar, they may call a Persecution?

Persecution? May they not rejoyce at but a Colour of pretending to be persecuted, and be glad of something that will make their Pastors more respected, and help to awaken the Zeal of their Congregations, growing now to languish, and which may bring 'em back to their former Singularity, renew their Discipline, and restore that Unity in Interest and Councils, which made 'em heretofore so strong?

It is not improbable but all this may be the Case; and if so, can it be Wisdom in the Church of *England* to furnish those who fight against it with Arms Offensive and Defensive, to give 'em means of bringing better Order among their Troops than now they seem to have, and to drive 'em into such a Situation of their Camp, that from it they may annoy others, but are not to be approach'd themselves?

Can it be prudent to help their Teachers with a popular, tho' false
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Topick to exclaim upon among their Followers, That there are Designs to oppress 'em in the tender Point of Conscience, that one Attempt may be soon follow'd by another of more Importance, that they must prepare for Tryals, and that the Purity of the Gospel is in Danger?

A wise Government should never give designing Men a Handle whereby they may promote their own Interest, and work Mischief to the State. It is always prudent not to let combustible Matter get together ; if it is gather'd, and cannot be remov'd without much Trouble, 'tis to be carefully watch'd that none may have an Opportunity of putting Fire to it: Nor are the Vulgar so easily to be inflam'd on any Accompt whatsoever, as when 'tis suggested to 'em, that Religion is concern'd.

Not immediate Conveniences, but the future Consequence of Things is to be consulted by the Publick,
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which is always to extend it's View as far forward as possible. Measures leading to Division, tho' remotely, are to be shun'd; but especially all kind of Contests are to be avoided with a sort of People, accustomed to pay strict Obedience to their Leaders, and who when they seem most scatter'd, can, like *Parthians*, in an instant Rally, and be prepar'd for fresh Engagements; who grow stronger by being opposed, and who, if they are left to the Courses they are in, must, in process of Time, disband of their own accord.

But it may be objected, 'tis in their own Power to change their present ways of Living, and to introduce again among themselves their former Strictness, they may do this which way soever they are dealt with. But are Religions, either true or false, so ready to Reform, unless they are driven into it by some Motive or Impulse more than ordinary? Are not all Church Disciplines

apt to decline in time from the Severity which was profess'd at the beginning? Has not Persecution always been the surest Method of reviving Zeal, be it sincere or feign'd? Is not the Nature of Man most desirous of what is forbidden, whether it be good or bad? Does not the Prospect of Danger produce Jealousies? Doe not Jealousies, well or ill grounded, render Men watchful and more active? And does not Security beget Negligence in all Affairs, as well Divine as Human?

Whether such a Restraint upon Dissenters will do Good or Hurt, is at least dubious? The best Arguments for it are the known Worth, Experience, Zeal, and Integrity towards the Publick, true Affection to the antient Constitution of this Realm, the Wisdom, Probity, and the unblemish'd Characters of the Gentlemen who seem to promote it, whose Candour is so great, that doubtless they will not be offended to hear what may be said on the other Side, especially when
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it comes from one who has given so many Proofs of his firm Adherence, as well to the Interest as the Doctrin of the Church of *England*.

And this Subject has been the longer dwelt upon, as most needful to be handled in a Discourse, which endeavours to propose Methods, whereby the Divisions of a Country may be heal'd: Because tho' the Temple of *Janus* was shut at the Coming of our Saviour, yet the Devil has been so industrious to inspire Wickedness into the Heart of Man, that almost ever since the beginning of the fourth Century, Religion has set the World at variance.

But nothing more becomes the Piety of a virtuous Prince, than to defeat the Malice of this crafty Serpent, by taking all the Ways that lead to Peace. And when the subordinate Parts of Government bear themselves with Moderation in this Point, it attracts, and then sincere

Conversion follows. But if different Opinions about religious Matters are not to be prevented, a wise State is to contrive, that they may never be injurious to the Publick, nor interrupt it's Quiet. Differences of this Nature would give little Disturbance to Human Kind, if the Contention were, as it ought to be, whose Light should shine brightest, not which shall make the greatest Blaze.

If the *Polemicks* would only wrangle among themselves, and within the Schools; if these Tormentors of Truth would put it upon the Rack no where but in their own Closets, they might be overlook'd as not dangerous; but they transgress their Bounds, getting into Courts, Cities, and National Assemblies; till at last they kindle others with the Fire that has seiz'd them, and come to engage whole Empires in their Quarrel, and are therefore to be watch'd in all their Motions.

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'Twould be endless to shew what Tumults Zeal has produc'd, what Animofities it has created, what Armies it has rais'd, and what Blood it has been brought to shed: 'Tis Active, Malicious, fearless of Danger, warmer in the Wrong than in the Right, and deaf to Council.

They who are possess'd with this unruly Spirit, if they happen to have a Government with 'em, are apt at every turn to run it upon fatal Precipices; if it be against 'em, they traduce whatever is well done, and expose to the People all it's Weakness or Misfortunes. But the fore Place in a State upon which they stick most, is Faction, and there they do the greatest Mischief; they irritate the bad Humours in it, they promote it's Excesses, and will never let it listen to Terms of Moderation

But all these Evils wise and good Princes cure, when their Rule is in

the main without Reproach ; when they proceed by gentle and not rough Methods, holding the Reigns however with a strong and stedy Hand : And especially, when they take care to remove from warm and angry Minds, any Pretence of ranging themselves one Side against the other, under the Banners of Religion.

S E C T.

S E C T. XII.

*Of Frugality in Managing
the Publick Treasure.*

THE *French* History has a remarkable Passage, which shows what fatal Accidents Profusion may bring upon a State. When the Duke of *Guise* was press'd by the Council of Sixteen, to take Arms, and begin the Rebellion, being at *Soissons*, *Belieure* was sent thither to him, by whom he return'd his Submission to *Henry* the Third, with certain Terms he insisted upon, not unreasonable, which the Cabinet approv'd; and *Belieure* was commanded to write the Duke word, That he was kept at *Paris* by Business for three Days, at the end of which he would be with him, and bring Credentials and ample Conditions; but says *Mezeray*, in the Royal Coffers, from whence so many

many Millions had issued out to enrich the Minions, there could not be then found five and twenty Crowns to defray the Expence of an Express, so the Letter was sent by the common Post. The three days expir'd, and things being not ready, *Believere* press'd the King to be gone, suspecting some extravagant Sally, from the Duke's impatience; the King however kept him still, and order'd him to write a second time to hold the Duke in Hand; again the five and twenty Crowns could not be had for an Express, and this Letter also was sent by the Common Post; upon this, *Guise*, tho' both Packets came to Hand, went to *Paris*, came into the Presence in a Triumphant Manner, and afterwards besieg'd *Henry* in his own Pallace; this Insolence was not forgiven, he was murder'd at *Blois*, and his Murther drew on that of the King himself. 'Twas then said, That had the Letters been deliver'd into his proper Hands, by an express Messenger from the King, his Disobedience had remain'd without Excuse, and he had
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not presum'd to approach the Court with such an Ostentation of his strength; 'till then the Wound was not wide, Matters were not incapable of being reconcil'd, all might have been made up, and those horrid Murthers, and a long Civil War that follow'd, had been prevented.

This Instance shows a Government may be so shaken by Male-administration, that the smallest Incident will suffice to overturn it, and that there may be a certain Period in Disorder, beyond which there is no proceeding any further; since *France* which for fourteen Years had indur'd the immoderate Profusions of this Prince, was brought to the very Brink of Ruin for the want of such a trifling Sum as Five and twenty Crowns.

'Tis seldom indeed that the Fate of Empire depends upon so slender a Circumstance as this was, but some time or other, in all States, great Accidents happen, which are very difficult to be oppos'd, when the Treasure of the Publick has been wasted.

Princes

Princes are not frequently driven into Necessities by Magnificence, tho' even when it exceeds the Limits of Discretion; but they are rather impoverish'd by a general Neglect in their Affairs, by not minding what is ask'd, or what they give, nor on whom their Bounties are bestow'd; and so they become a Prey to all that are about 'em.

Hence it is that many Kings, whose natural Inclinations were narrow and penurious, and through whose Hands vast Sums had past, did notwithstanding always labour under Debts and Difficulties; but wanting either Capacity, a Genius, or Inclination to look after this important Business of the Crown, they suffer'd others to plunder 'em of what they had not a Heart to lay out for the Benefit of their People, or to purchase the Fame of being Magnificent: Whereas several Princes whose Minds have been truly Large, and Noble, and who were still open-handed, have yet had Wealth sufficient to support
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the Common-wealth, and where-withal to supply the Desires they had of extending their Bounty very far, and all this without Oppression to their Subjects. But then they were good mannagers in the main; they inspected their own Affairs, and took Care to be serv'd by Men of Parts and Integrity; they fav'd where Thrift was requisite and honourable; they strove to enrich Merit, and not Fraud; and upon the whole, were willing to give, but not to let themselves be cheated.

Next to the Care of Religion, there is no one Duty more incumbent upon Princes, than to have a strict Eye to the managing the Publick Treasure and Revenues. Negligence there opens a Gate to all sorts of Disorder; and where this Part of Government is defective, no material Error in the State can be corrected; for the great Ones, who commonly participate in this Male-Administration, will prevent infeior Abuses from being reform'd, for
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fear their own Conduct should come at last to be brought in Question when Things are going to be mended: And there is hardly an Instance to be given of a Court, Careless, and Prodigal, wherein all other Misgovernment did not at the same time abound.

But when this Part of Executive Power (upon which the rest so much depend) proceeds well and wisely, the other Parts grow better of their own accord; because Men are willing to conform themselves to their Manners by whom the Prince's Favours are dispensed; and what they do, becomes in time a kind of Fashion.

When such as have this Post are vigilant and frugal for the Publick, those in lower Stations think it needful to tread in the same Steps. When they who sit at Helm have clean Hands themselves, they can compel those below 'em to be Honest; and Hope of Reward, or Fear of Punishment,

nishment, working more than Sense of Duty, Men begin to find it their Interest to quit the ill Courses they were in, especially when they see they have not the Corruption of those above 'em to resort to as a Refuge. Thus great Examples from chief Ministers, may by Degrees, restore the Affairs of a whole Kingdom. Besides this Vigilance and Frugality give such Credit, and add such real Strength to any State, that they who Rule it will soon be able to reform Abuses.

On the other Hand, where there is a corrupt, negligent, and profuse Administration, does any thing go right? Is not the bad Influence of it felt from Top to Bottom? Who is there that thinks it worth his while to serve well? When the Publick is expos'd to Plunder, does not almost every Man forget the Duties of his Office, and employ his whole Thoughts in contriving how he may have as large a share of the Booty as any of his Fellow Robbers? And do
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not the great Thieves protect the less? In a State so disorder'd, what is there to induce Men to discharge their Duty, but sometimes Honour, which indeed not many Years ago, made an *English* Army in *Flanders* obedient to Discipline, and fight bravely without Cloaths, Pay, and almost without Bread? But there is more Virtue in Soldiers inspir'd with true Courage, than is to be found in any other sort of Men.

Profuse Princes have not Love and Respect even from their Domesticks, Menial Servants, Officers, Followers, and Dependents. For this Levity and Carelessness of theirs does not extend to enrich all, the sweet of it is only tasted by a few who are let in to obtain Suits, or who have opportunities to fleece the Crown in their dealings with it, but the rest starve or live in splendid Poverty; and tho' perhaps they may flatter within the Palace Walls, they rail out of Doors, expose what is doing, and are the very first to sow Discontents, and the first to infect the Common People with the Hatred they privately

privately bear, and not without Reason, to those who are at the Head of Business.

Whereas a frugal Government is Reverenc'd and Belov'd. They are in a Condition to pay the Household; they have the good Wishes of their Domesticks; Their Ambassadors and Ministers are not disgraced in Foreign Countries, by running into Debts Abroad, because they are not kept touch with at Home: 'Tis true, the Ministry is not then prais'd by Extortioners, Tally-Jobbers, and by such as were wont to get immense Sums by Dealing or Contracting with the Publick: But a better Mannagement is applauded by those who are satisfy'd with honest, and moderate Gain, in their Commerce, and Bargains with the Court.

They who are us'd to make vast Profits by their Dealings with it, to use a common Proverb, are so far from *praising the Bridge they go over*, that they scorn those whom they have thus outwitted, or surpriz'd; and are so far from thinking themselves oblig'd

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to

to the Crown for having made their Fortunes by it, that they are afraid to own the Obligation ; and the Diadem would be but weak indeed, if it had no Friends but those who have been enrich'd with the Jewels of it. 'Tis a lasting Truth, that they whose Practice it has been to deceive the Publick, thank nothing but their own good Luck and Cunning: Whereas they who deal with a State, when they see a great Man hard with 'em, as the Term is, and Thrifty for his Prince, it begets in 'em more respect to the whole Government ; they cannot but commend so much careful Wisdom, and they go away contented, with less Gain indeed, but with this satisfaction, That they shall be sure of just and punctual Payments, and never to be post-pon'd.

'Tis true, an Honest and Wise Minister, who observes this Conduct, and is more frugal for the Publick than in his own private Affairs, cannot avoid contracting many Enemies: In a bad Age, 'tis a Virtue not without its Dangers. They who have been so
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long fed with Corruption, that their Stomachs can digest no other Dyet, will dislike such Measures; and a Man treading these Steps, must Arm himself with Patience, for his coolest Temper must be often try'd. They who would steal the Golden Apples, will hate the watchful Eyes that are upon 'em; and he who undertakes this Post, is to expect that secret Malice will be working in the Dark to undermine him; perhaps he may be persu'd by the most interested part of Mankind with open Clamours, Advantages will be taken of the least Trip he makes, he must look for Traverses to be traduc'd, and to have his Actions scand, and misinterpreted: However let him persevere; for if a State be not quite devoted to Ruin, he who acts thus uprightly for it, and with such care, will overcome all Difficulties; and the Wisdom and Justice of his Councils, will at last meet with universal Approbation.

Indeed for a great Man to perform this Work alone and without help, would be difficult; and to think of introducing Thrift in a Government

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that has been long in quite another Road, would be a fruitless Attempt if his Partners in the State are corrupt, and have other Inclinations; but when they concur with him, have all the same right Intentions to the Publick, and desire its Prosperity as much as he does, and when the Prince consults the general Good of the People, encourages and promotes these wholesome prudent and safe Advices, the Task is not insuperable.

But tho' there be labour in it, tho' it requires much application of the Mind, Constancy and Patience, yet, upon the whole, 'tis far more easie than the opposite Course, or to find Ways and Means of supplying those infinite Wants which Misgovernment occasions.

Are not profuse and negligent Princes compell'd to lay perpetual Taxes on their Subjects? Do not these Impositions beget Murmurs and Discontents? And is it not evident from all experience, that these Discontents of the People have hurry'd some
of

of our Kings into the Thoughts of assuming Arbitrary Rule, and at the same time driven their chief Ministers of State upon Tricks, Arts, and desperate Measures, whereby to maintain their Posts, and preserve their Power? And has not all this terminated either in popular Insurrections, or in open Rebellion, or in producing powerful Factions, whose unruly Strength render'd Government it self so perplex'd, and full of Dangers, that they who sat at Helm, became more the Subject of Compassion than of Envy.

What great hazard is there for a Minister to contend with the Intriguers of here and there a Courtier, discontented because his immoderate Hopes of getting are not gratified? Or to suffer the Obloquies of a devouring Crew, who may perhaps be angry because the Publick is no longer expos'd to be their Prey, and for that they cannot make their wonted Gains by the high Interest of Money, large Premiums, and by discompting Tallies? Is it not much more safe and

easie to bear all this, than to have an Army mutinous for want of Pay, Seamen clamorous for their Wages, the Family grumbling for their Ar-rears, and at the same time, the whole People groaning under the weight of heavy Taxes? All which are the sad effects of Negligence and Profusion in a Court.

Were there scarce ever any differences here between the King and his Subjects, in which Mismanagement of the Publick Treasure was not one of the principal Ingredients? Whether national Interest be persued or no, is a high Point of State not often consider'd by the Multitude, provided they enjoy present Peace and Plenty. The excesses of Power likewise, unless they are very exorbitant indeed, seldom come to affect them, nor are they with ease brought to engage in those Quarrels: They mind as little (generally speaking) how the executive Power proceeds, provided the course of Justice is so free, that they may recover their Debts from those who are of higher Rank. Nor does it much im-

import them who sit at Helm and are the Ministers: They enter not into Matters of speculation, unless when Religion is concern'd, to other Points their Eyes are not very open; but tho' they may not see so far, they can feel as well as others.

They are able to make Comparison between good and bad Reigns, frugal and a careless Management; under the first they find themselves Rich and easie, under the second Poor and oppress'd with Taxes. Besides they are apt to think such Conduct in a Court an invasion of their Properties. For in a free Nation, or in a Government of the Laws, and not of Men, as Princes have a kind of right to such Revenues as may support the Royal Dignity, and enable 'em to protect the Publick, as well in its Honour as its Safety; so the Body of the People collectively consider'd, have likewise a natural Right to such a proportion of their Country's Wealth and Product, as is sufficient not only for the necessary but comfortable subsistence of Life; and when they have not this due share out

of their own Labours, when to carry on the wild Ambition of a King, or to maintain his unjust Wars for Dominion, or to supply his unlimited and partial Bounties, extended to unworthy Objects, and all his vain Expences, they are rack'd and fleec'd; and when by such a general profusion, Governments are compell'd to raise, tho' it be by legal Ways and Means, more than the People can pay without drawing their very Blood from 'em; they murmur, believe themselves directly Rob'd, they exclaim upon these Courses as Tyranical, and grow to hate their Rulers.

And does not all this commonly end in driving 'em to apply to popular and ambitious Men, who cloath their Designs with the fair Pretences of being for the Publick Good, and against all Burthens that lie too hard upon the People? And do not the Multitude blindly follow such Persons, be they Honest or Dishonest, who offer 'em help in this Case, and who are zealous to take this Cause in Hand? And from hence do not powerful Factions arise, who

who come to have great weight, and to be well heard and applauded, not only where there is, but where there is not any just Reason for complaining?

And this is so true, that let the management of Affairs be as much without reproach as the best Patriots of all sides can wish it, yet if the circumstances of the Time are such that much Money must be rais'd, whoever are stiff in this Point, strict Examiners into Estimates and Demands of the Court, inquisitive after the expence of what has been given; they who appear thus careful for the Publick, shall for this single Merit be considerable; regard will be had to what they say in all other Debates and Arguments; they will get Reputation without Doors, and make a Figure in any Party. Does it not therefore import Ministers to manage with Frugality, when let their Administration be never so severe, 'tis notwithstanding expos'd to Attacks esteem'd at all Seasons Popular?

Ill Conduct in Many Matters of it self is sufficient to raise a Strength against those in Power; and where Parties are already form'd, it renders those the bolder who design Mischief to the State; because they know how difficult it is for a Government to resist it's Enemies when it is without Treasure, and has not the Affections of the People; which was the Case of *Henry the Third of France*, whom we mention'd in the beginning of this Section; a Prince full of natural Valour, bless'd with early Victories, and adorn'd with Eloquence, which was said to be irresistible; yet one of his own Subjects, not of the Royal Blood, came to his Capital City, at the Head of no more than seven Persons, in order to begin a Rebellion, which aim'd at wresting the Scepter from him. How came a Man of the Duke of *Cuise's* Caution and Sagacity to take in hand an Enterprize at first Sight so unlikely to succeed, but that he knew how low this King had brought himself by a long Series of Misgovernment; that *France* impoverish'd by Taxes, was grown weary of his Rule; that the

the Minds of the People were quite alienated from him ; that his Riots and Profusion had quite exhausted that Treasure wherewith his Crown was to be defended. And without doubt this View gave the House of *Lorraine*, the Council of Sixteen at *Paris*, and the general Faction of the League, Courage to begin that War.

Wants in a State, from whatsoever Cause they proceed, seldom fail of furnishing those with an Opportunity who desire to innovate, begetting in 'em higher Thoughts than perhaps they would have otherwise entertain'd. Thus in the time of King *Charles* the First, had not the Exchequer been so drein'd by the War with *Scotland*, that the Difficulties the Crown lay under seem'd insuperable, perhaps the Parliament thereupon call'd, might have brought up with 'em a better Temper ; they had insisted upon modester Terms, and a Rupture had been avoided ; for it was not impossible to have preserv'd the Constitution by a great deal less than what they came to ask, when the
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Necessities were believ'd to be such that the Crown could refuse nothing.

Ill Conduct not only renders the Sovereign weak at Home, but contemptible Abroad. Thus the Emperor, *Maximilian* the First, always necessitous, added no Weight to the Side he embrac'd; when at the same time, our *Henry* the Eighth, not indeed by his own, but by the Benefit of his Father's Thrift, made such a Figure in the World, was courted by all the great Princes of that Age; *Lewis* the Twelfth, *Francis* the First, and King *Ferdinand* of *Spain*, and was able to turn the Balance of *Europe* wherever he inclin'd.

Henry the Fourth of *France*, by his own good Husbandry, and with the Assistance of that wise and frugal Treasurer the Duke of *Sully*, brought his Crown out of those infinite Disorders and Debts wherewith it had been involv'd by the Factions then reigning, and by a long Civil War; so that in a few Years, he saw himself in a Condition to defeat the Scheme *Spain* had laid for Universal Empire.

Nothing

Nothing more contributes to the Felicity of Princes, than to be well and faithfully serv'd in this chief Branch of Government; for at one and the same time, they are Powerful, and their Subjects Happy; and when the Crown thus flourishes, it can protect it's own People, and assist other Nations.

The Frugality treated of here, is not a narrow hoarding up of Wealth to stagnate in the Exchequer, or to save where saving is either Trivial or Dishonourable, but a general good Oeconomy in the Minister; when he takes care that the Publick Treasure be never wasted, and yet is ready with a liberal Hand to supply every great Occasion, where the Prince's Honour, and the Kingdom's Safety is concern'd: He who acts so, has the true Virtues of an able States-Man. However to perform one, he must do the other; for Debts are not to be dischar'gd, Armies and Fleets are not to be paid at Home, nor can craving Alliances Abroad be supported, unless all possible Methods are follow'd,

follow'd, that may tend to lessen your Expences, and advance your Credit:

And Credit is the natural Consequence of a thrifty Mannagement. When for want of due Care, a State is driven into Necessity, Private Men will take Advantage of it, and the Publick is then shun'd like a Prodigal half broken, who when he borrows must pay roundly for it, tho' he is able to give good Security. But as all strive to throw their Mony, and at an easie Rate, into his Hands who is known to be a wary Man; so thrifty Governments have always their Choice of Lenders. And thus by prudent Administration, the Exchequer Interest may be reduc'd from Fifty (for so it has been) to Four *per Cent.* than which nothing can be more beneficial to a Kingdom, since 'tis not only a present Ease to the whole People in their Taxes, but it enlivens Traffick; for where the Publick borrows at Four, the Interest in private Dealings must soon be at Three *per Cent.* which in a short time would perhaps double the Trade of *England.*

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If this Happiness be continued to us, we shall no more be the Prey of Foreigners, who, for many Years have drain'd this Realm of its Treasure, by lending their Money at high Interest. upon our Funds, and then drawing it back with a vast Increase.

And thus a wise proceeding in the executive Power, has compass'd what was esteem'd difficult for the Legislature it self to bring about. Usury and Extortion are such Gigantick Monsters, as to grow more than a Match for the very Laws, and yet they are to be subdu'd by Prudence; but tho' they seem, for the present, conquer'd and bound in Chains, any attempt to break in upon the Credit of the Publick, must restore 'em to all their former Liberties, and they will again be in a Condition to devour both the People and the State, as they did not long ago.

And it will be at all Times impossible for a Minister to persue those ways of Thrift, so needful to a Nation engag'd in an expensive War, unless

less there be an universal Concurrence with him, to preserve inviolate the Credit of the Publick; 'tis the very Foundation of good Oeconomy: There an able States-Man begins, and indeed may build upon it what he pleases; he may buy at the best Hand; he may remit Abroad at an easie Rate, borrow at a low Interest, and retrench needless Expences, in which Articles there is near a third difference between a good and a bad Management, or between losing and keeping Credit. The Treasures of a Kingdom flow into the Exchequer when 'tis punctual, and when to deal with it is found safe, tho' not so profitable as heretofore. But a Minister cannot hold to Ways of saving for the State, when his first Measures are broken, for if his Basis be undermin'd, all his Super-structures must fall to Ground.

In Reigns where they who are at Helm, propose to themselves such a frugal Scheme as may ease the People in their future Taxes, they begin with promoting Acts for making good Deficiencies, and for preserving the publick
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lick Credit, setting the Minds of such Lenders at quiet, as were engag'd in no less a Sum than two Millions, three hundred thirty eight Thousand, six hundred twenty eight Pounds, without any Fuod for the satisfaction of their Debts.

While these Methods are follow'd, a Country may be serv'd in the best manner, by those to whom this Part of Government is entrusted; but if they are departed from, there must be an End of good Husbandry. When there is a great War to carry on, there will be Dificiencies from time to time; to provide for which, if a constant Care is shown, the Interest of Mony will be kept low; but it rises of course, when the Publick comes to postpone its Creditors, a Practice that of late Years, has in the Consequences of it, cost this Nation many Millions.

A Passage in the *Roman* History, relating to publick Credit, should not be here omitted. This People had just got out of the *Carthaginian*, and
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were entring into the *Macedonian* War: There was then an eager Demand upon the State for an old Debt, which the Consuls would have put off to a more convenient Season, alledging want of Mony for the present Expedition, as well to pay the Army as the Fleet. This Matter came before the Senate, who had wiser Thoughts, and gave this Judgment; That 'twas imposing a kind of Mulct, and Punishment, upon the good Will of their Citizens to the Republick, if Mony lent for the Uses of one War, was not repaid, but withheld, and employ'd to carry on another: *Si in punicum Bellum pecunia data, in Macedonicum quoque bellum uti Respublica vellet; aliis ex aliis orientibus bellis, quid aliud quam publicatam pro beneficio tanquam ob noxam suam pecuniam fore?* And not having ready Cash, they settled such a Fond out of Land, to discharge this Debt, as was to the Satisfaction of the Lenders.

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When the Subjects observe an Universal Care in those above them, to manage what they give and pay, it makes 'em contribute chearfully to the Supplies that are needful to the Government; but when they see the Product of their Labour wasted, these Aids come from 'em with Murmurs and Reluctance.

To a good and virtuous Prince, nothing, without doubt, can be more grating and unpleasant, than to be compell'd to raise frequent Taxes from the People; but in an expensive War, 'tis not to be avoided. For, as twas once said in the *Roman* Senate, when there is no Mony, how can Sea-men be had? Without a Fleet is *Sicily* to be gain'd, is *Philip* to be driven out of *Italy*, or are the *Italian* Coasts to be secur'd? *Nam unde, quum Pecunia in Ærario non esset, paraturos Navales socios? Quomodo autem sine classibus, aut Siciliam obtineri, aut Italia Philippum arceri posse, aut tuta Italiae Littora esse?*

The *Romans* were indeed, at that time, under very great Straits, they had the Punick War upon their Hands, *Hannibal* was powerful; they were invaded by others; the Commons were exhausted, the Treasury was bare, their Mariners mutiny'd and refus'd to be lifted, and yet one wise Council brought them out of all these Difficulties.

For the Consul *Levinus* advis'd the Patricians to begin with laying a Tax upon themselves, towards the supply of this Occasion; saying in the Senate. "As we the Magistrates are chief in this Assembly, and as you are in a Rank above the People, so ought we and you to appear in the Front, and be the foremost in shewing our selves desirous to undergo any weight that is to lie upon the whole. Whatever you would enjoin to your Inferiors, prescribe it to your self, and make it your own Rule, and you shall be with more readiness obey'd: Nor is a Burthen thought heavy

heavy to the People, when they see those above, and at the very Head, give Demonstrations that they are willing to bear even more than their proportion of it. *Magistratus, Senatui, & senatum Populo, sicut honore præsent, ita ad omnia quæ dura atque aspera essent, subeunda ducem debere esse. Si quid injungere inferiori velis, id prius in te ac tuos si ipse juris statueris, facilius omnes obediētes habeas. Nec impensa gravis est, quum ex ea plus quam pro virili parte sibi quemque capere principum vident.*

This measure was accordingly taken, the Senators gave largely, the Equestrian Order did the same, and it wrought such an Effect, that their Sea-men crouded in, and strove whose Names should be first set down, and there were not Scribes enow to take an Accompt of the Contributions, coming without Edict or Constraint, and with Alacrity from the *Plebeians*,

The same will hold in kingly Governments, when the Prince leads the

way, and is the first to give great Examples of Affection to the Publick; when Sovereigns set before their Subjects Patterns of a noble Disposition to it; when to supply its Necessities they are willing to lessen that Train and Pomp, which among the Multitude adds Lustre to the Majesty of Princes; when they restrain the innate Bounty of their Minds from particular Objects, in order to extend their Goodness to the whole Body of the People; when, to ease their Country, they tax themselves; when they desire to bear a part in the Burthens of a War; when out of what was freely granted to support the Royal Dignity, when out of the proper Revenues annex'd to the Civil List, they give one Year a Hundred Thousand Pound, and the next Year more, including the Prizes; when they assist their Allies with large Sums out of their own peculiar Mony; when they make their private Purse the Nations Exchequer, and when they are as ready to give, as other Kings have been to ask, it has a general good Influence; it makes necessary Burthens sit the easier,

sier, it encourages Men to bear with unwearied Constancy and chearful Hearts, the Expences and Calamities of a long War; and when a Prince proceeds in such a disinterested Manner with the People, they never repine at what they do or suffer, and are always ready to sacrifice their Blood and Treasure to assert the Honour of the Crown.

But such Honest and Popular Bounties cannot flow from a Sovereign that is not a good Oeconomist: One Virtue must produce the other, and they who can give nobly, must have already learnt when, where, and how to save with Wisdom.

'Tis likewise being thrifty for the Publick when Princes put it out of their own, and the Power of their Successors, to alienate those Revenues that are to support the Royal Dignity; when in the very beginning of their Reign, they secure the remainder of the Crown-Lands, which had been impair'd and diminish'd by the Grants

of former Kings and Queens ; and when the other Hereditary Branches, arising from the Excise, Post-Office, First Fruits, and Wine Licenses, &c. are so fix'd, that no Gift out of 'em can be made for any farther Time than the Prince's Life ; all which is not only a present Ease, but a lasting Benefit to future Ages : For, as often as the Crown Rents, and its other Supports, were thus alienated, there was a Necessity of finding out new Supplies to carry on the Government, which brought perpetual Burthens upon the People ; and so it must have been hereafter, if a stop had not been put to this Canker in the Common-wealth, which would have eat out all at last.

Had this wise Provision been made at the coming in of King *James* the First, our Princes had been good Freeholders in their Country ; they might have subsisted upon their own Rents ; they would have had a Land Interest ; and their being now without it, has quite alter'd the Nature of our old Constitution,

stitution, and perhaps much for the worse: But I shall not enter into that Matter.

However it must be allow'd of all Hands, That our last Kings having depriv'd themselves of their Antient Demesnes, has introduc'd among us Excises, and such a variety of new Impositions and Customs, as are a constant and heavy Weight upon our Manufactures, and all our foreign Trade.

'Tis true, this Remedy and Stop came somewhat of the latest, there was little left, and yet the very Relicks, and what is now preserv'd from the general Ship-wreck, is worth at least a Million; for so much may be made from the Sale of what remains, tho' 'tis better, and more Honourable without doubt, to keep it always in the Crown.

Nor could they who are nearest the Throne, give a fairer Proof of their

their Integrity to the Publick, than to promote this wholesome Council. The Part they had in it, as it was Wise, so 'twas Honest, thus to set out of their own Reach these tempting Morsels that had allured their Predecessors, and corrupted so many Courts ; 'twas what in former Reigns, Favourites, and the Men in Power, oppos'd with all their Strength, who thought it a most sacred Prerogative, annex'd to the Diadem, for Kings to be at Liberty to undo themselves.

Some perhaps may urge, why should not Sovereigns have it in their Power to reward great Actions and signal Merits ? And why should their Liberalities be circumscrib'd within such narrow Bounds ? To which may be answer'd, That most Limitations of the Regal Authority would be needless, if Crowns never descended but to wise Princes, full of Virtue, and still careful of their People, which are Blessings that seldom come ; the Legislature therefore is to provide

vide against bad Reigns under a good one. And these Bounties so destructive to the Crown, were not always plac'd upon deserving Objects; true Worth was Modest, and to be recompenc'd at an easie Rate; but when Princes have been Robb'd, it was by the Ambitious and Importunate Men about 'em, who had no real Merit, and yet whose Avarice was never satiated; and to see such inrich'd with the Spoils of a whole Kingdom, did ever afford Matter for Discord and Division.

Frugal Princes rarely want the Means of rewarding those who deserve well of them, and of their Country, and tho' it be not so much, yet what comes from a judicious Hand, that weighs what it gives, is in the Receiver's Esteem, of greater Value than immoderate Gifts from an undiscerning Giver, which are thought, even by him who tastes the Benefit, to be rather the Effect of Levity, than Goodness.

To

To conclude this Section : A careless and profuse Reign has always been embroil'd; for in such a Juncture, Acts of Resumption become unavoidable, they who are thereby affected, seek for shelter by keeping up of Parties, and raising Heats, with hopes to be overlook'd in a general Confusion; and at these Times the Oppressors and the Oppressed take different sides: The Court and Country grow to have an opposite Interest: The vulgar clamour to see no end of Taxes: The Pallace is disturb'd by the noise of Factions, who often wrangle among themselves about dividing of the Spoil: And while all this is in Agitation, Princes are abandon'd by the few and false Friends, their inconsiderate Liberalities had made: They have for Enemies the People, to whom their Profusions had been a Burthen, and their Government is weak, unsteady, and precarious; all which bad Effects cease when their Cause is remov'd; at least
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one principal Occasion of Popular Complaints is taken away, when the Treasure of the Publick is managed with Frugality.

S E C T.

S E C T. XIII.

Of the Executive Power.

THIS is indeed a Copious Subject, as comprehending all the several parts of Government, except the Legislature. Our Constitution lodges the Executive Power originally in Princes, who devolve such Functions of it as they cannot perform in their own Persons, upon the different Members that compose a well order'd Common-wealth, of which the Chief are call'd Ministers of State; a Name given in our Records to the Prime Officers of the Crown, above three Hundred Years, tho' it has been cavil'd at of late.

In a Government of the Laws, and not of Men, Princes are a part, but at the Head of the Legislature, and either in Person, or by their Ministers, execute what the Constitution requires, what the Legislature already
ready

ready has ordain'd, and what it Enacts from time to time upon new Emergencies ; and where all this is fully done, the Administration is complete.

In these sort of Constitutions, he who receives a great Trust, has it committed to him in a fair and ample manner ; he is free to pursue the Dictates of his own Reason and Understanding ; he is at Liberty to make the Laws the Rule of his Actions ; and he is not bound to follow the bare Command and Pleasure of the Prince, which he cannot plead in Abatement, if the State be dammag'd by his Proceedings.

But all this goes otherwise in an Absolute Monarchy, under which there is no Legislative Authority but the Prince's Will ; he may have some Slaves whom he styles his Ministers, but, as was said of *Lewis* the 11th, *One Mule carries him and his whole Privy Council*. Such as he employs are not allow'd to judge for themselves what is right or wrong, they must oftner do what will please,
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than what is just and fit, and they must arrive at this Knowledge, that blind Obedience is the best skill in Courts where the Master is, or would be Arbitrary.

And yet where all stoop to the unbounded Will of a single Person, the Executive Power often proceeds well, and the Government seems to flourish; but this happens when they have some Prince of more than common Abilities upon the Throne, who looks into all himself, and who is willing to let the weight of Empire lie most upon his own Shoulders; and if at the same time he chances to be a Man of virtuous Inclinations, as well as of deep Wisdom, and is content, for the good of his People, to labour in the Duties of his Kingly Office, to see with his own Eyes, hear with his own Ears, and to perform in his own Person as much as possible, and takes care to intrust the remainder of his Business to the ablest Hands that can be found, his Affairs of State will go well in general, and such a Prince will make his Country Prosper.

Whether

Whether the Government be absolute, or limited, the Happynefs of its People depends very much upon their Care that fit at Helm, who with some Colour may throw off from themselves, upon their Master, Male-administration, when his Pleasure is the Standard of Good and Ill ; but they are left without Excuse, when, by the Nature of the Constitution, they are not hurry'd into bad Measures by Fate and Necessity in Politics, but are left to Free-will and Choice, are allow'd the Lights of Reason, and have full Liberty to avoid the wrong, and take the righter Course. If such err out of Ignorance, 'tis a sort of Plea, but not to be allow'd when their Mistakes are gross and frequent ; If willfully, they have no Pretence to complain when they are Attack'd, and fall under publick Censure.

It has been a Question among some, whether is most eligible, a Tyranny Administer'd with universal Care by those who Rule, whereof there have
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been and are Examples, or a Free State wherein all the Parts of Government are totally neglected of which likewise many Instances may be given.

Under Arbitrary Power, skillfully manag'd, the People tho' oppress'd at Home, are Protected from their Enemies Abroad : They groan under heavy Taxes, but are brought to think they enjoy something for 'em, Fame, Victories, and an Enlargement of their Dominions : They are injur'd by the Excesses of Tyranny from above, but below are kept from hurting one another : They are Poor, but contented : They have no domestick Troubles and Dissentions : They may have foreign Armies to engage with, but are in no great Danger to feel the Calamities of a Civil War : And they are, as the Patriarch describes *Iffachar*, *A strong Ass couching down between two Burthens : And he saw that Rest was good, and the Land that it was pleasant, and bow'd his Shoulder to bear, and became a Servant unto Tribute.*

In

In the second Case ; under a good Constitution ill administered, That Wealth with which Industry and Trade seldom fail of Blessing free Countries, can never be accounted safe, for their Riches which should Protect 'em, bring their Ruin on the faster, and are a Temptation for their Neighbours to invade 'em, when through bad Government, they are no longer in a Posture to defend themselves. They are rarely without Factions, by which their Native Strength is wasted ; and their Fury is sometimes so deaf and blind, as to be striving with one another for Power, in the very moment when Dangers are most impending from Abroad. They are expos'd to frequent Civil Wars, in which they lose their noblest Blood, and bravest Men ; and becoming weak, quite corrupted, and wearied out with their own domestick Calamities, Nations born to Liberty, are compell'd at last to resort for Refuge to some Superior Power ; and thus have Tyrannies been introduc'd.

But notwithstanding the Mischiefs to which free Governments, when weakly Rul'd, may be obnoxious, they are still preferable to Unlimited Authority, tho' plac'd in the ablest and most skillful Hands: For under the best of this sort of Princes, the generality of the People are Poor, oppress'd, and without any Prospect of tasting the Fruits of their own Labour. Besides Tyrannies are apt to decline, from severe Courses into Cruelty; from wise Vigilance, into Jealousies of State, mad and sanguinary; from Oppression into down-right Plunder: And 'tis rarely seen that this kind of Government grows from bad to better, it's natural Progress is rather from bad to worse; for high Power is always afraid to set it self any Bounds, as if it were like those intoxicating Drugs which lose their Operation if the Dose is not increas'd from time to time. 'Tis true, Absolute Dominion Comptrols Parties, and is not often lyable to Civil Wars, yet 'tis not exempt from Mutinies of the Camp, and Defection in its Armies; But indeed the most Melancholy

choly part of it is, that 'tis a Disease that seldom or never mends, and consequently deprives Men of Hope, which, even to the Happy, is an Entertainment always new and pleasant, and to the Afflicted, their most solid Comfort.

They whom their own Consent has once enslav'd, are scarce ever known to break their Fetters : If they have a severe Government, growing worse every Day, they must be contented with it, to struggle with their Chains, fixes 'em on the faster ; to make Com-motions tends but to render their Oppressors more Cruel, Vigilant, and Jealous ; or if they can depose one Tyrant, they do but change him for another.

But in Countries where Liberty is intire, under their worst Circumstances Hope is still left ; whatever Mis-government they may have had, and however embroil'd, their Affairs seem to be, while Sence of Freedom, that Principle of a sound Constitution in the Body Politick, is yet remaining, and when Nature is thus strong

within 'em, they may throw off their Distempers, and in time be restor'd to perfect Health.

The most dangerous Diseases with which a free Country can be infected, are Two Factions, each strong in Numbers, if their Heats and Animosities, are come to such a Height, that any Side, in the Struggle for Power, is willing to give up Liberty, rather than their irregular Appetites should be disappointed ; where this happens to be the Case, the Condition of the Publick is indeed very desperate, inasmuch as Liberty cannot subsist, unless where it has a great many more Friends than Enemies ; because they who attack, supply by Craft and Diligence, what they want in other Strengths.

But where Countries are thus Corrupted, Princes have a Noble Field, wherein to shew the Honesty and Virtue of their Minds, by taking no Advantage of the Follies and Madness, into which Men may be led by their Ambition.

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The Nations round about us were inflav'd, not by the Prince's Sword, but by their own Flattery. 'Tis notorious that the Faction of the League, which had Rebel'd upon quite an opposite Foot, gave the last Stroke towards subverting the Liberties of *France*, to make their Court the better when they were subdued. After the Restoration of King *Charles* the 2d, to atone for old Faults, and to vie with the Church who should be the best Subjects, some were going to play the same Game here, and between the Flatterers on both sides the Constitution had probably been given up, if the old Cavaliers had not then made an unexpected, and seasonable Stand, against those who began the War, because they thought (or pretended to think) that their Civil Rights had been invaded.

Where Factions have been, and are suffer'd to be of long Continuance in a Kingdom, if Absolute Dominion is not brought in, 'tis for want of an Enterprizing Temper in the Prince, or 'tis owing to his Virtue,

Wisdom, and Moderation ; for the Tools are ready, and the Fire being hot, has made the Metal soft and malleable, so that he may work it into what Shape he pleases.

That Nation is happy, where the Sovereign gives apparent Proofs of desiring no more Authority than what is intrusted to him by the Laws ; This puts a stop to the Schemes wicked and ambitious Men will be forming (if the least encourag'd) to introduce Arbitrary Power, which Attempts, in a free Country, are perhaps the Original of all Disorder, and Misgovernment: But none will strive to make him Absolute who does not wish so to be ; And when this Struggle is at an End, there is no substantial Nourishment for Faction to subsist on.

Executive Power is, in plainer Words, the Administration of Affairs, which can never be well Administer'd when such bad Designs are on the Anvil ; and from thence, generally Speaking, have been deriv'd most of the Mischiefs, that of late Years, have

have embroyl'd and divided *England*. When National Interest has been neglected, was it not in Order to Court a forreign Power, which might awe the People here at Home? When the Protestant Interest was struck at, might not one of the Prospects be to make room for a Religion, which better prepares the Minds of Men for Slavery? When the Publick Treasure was wasted, did we not all see that a great Proportion of it issued out to reward bold Mercenaries, who made open Assaults upon the Constitution, or to pay Pioneers who wrought in the Dark to undermine it? And thus Secret Aims at Arbitrary Power have had an Influence, not only in these Particulars, but well nigh in all the other Male-administrations that have been complain'd of in this Kingdom,

But when Princes have not this working and anxious Thought to perplex their Minds, when their Ministers have not this Load to bear, and when they are not in this wrong Byas, which must always mislead 'em
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in their Course, 'tis not so very difficult to go on in what is already well establish'd; nor on the other Hand, to recover a State from the Disorders past Conduct may have occasion'd : For though the Cares of Empire are almost numberless, yet there is no Degree of Comparison between their Trouble, who tread in the plain Way, and theirs who tread in the crooked Paths of Government. The principal Difficulties, Fears, Dangers, and Jealousies, follow such as carry on an illegal, false and corrupt, not those who have no more to do but to support an Administration that is right and honest.

'Tis not the good, but the bad Business of a State that is so irksome and unpleasant ; The first takes up much Time, requires Diligence, Labour, and Application, but the other puts the Mind on a perpetual Rack ; therefore an Ambitious, and a Wicked Statesman, is himself a more miserable Slave, than any of those whom by the vicious Arts of Policy, he would reduce to Bondage ; And yet,
both

both the Great and Little Vulgar, who look no further than at his Pomp, his Riches, and his Power, are so mistaken as to think him at the Top of Happiness ; whereas, in Truth the best, most unblameable, and with all the most fortunate Minister that ever Sate at Helm, (all his honest and necessary Cares consider'd) is in the Thoughts of a wise Man, more the Subject of Compassion than of Envy.

Nor is the Supream Condition of Princes so replete with Felicity, as the World is inclin'd to believe. What Pleasures or Comforts are there in Life, which those in much a lower Sphere, may not enjoy as well as they who sit on Thrones ? Which of their Moments does not the Publick claim ? Are they not compell'd to bestow most of their Hours upon the Business of the State ? Notwithstanding what Provision the Laws have made to render their Persons Sacred, are they not in perpetual Danger from the Conspiracies, and Attempts of wicked Men ? Did not an Enthusiast
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Affassinate one of the best of Kings, surrounded by his Guards, and in his Capital City? And will not Plots be sometimes form'd against 'em, that are not to be resisted by their Courage, nor avoided by their Wisdom? When Misfortunes happen that reflect upon the Honour of a Nation, the Weight almost singly lies upon the Prince; if they are such as hurt a whole Country in the Point of Interest, As for Example, Losses at Sea, by Fire, Plague, or Famine, He bears the largest Share, as having the largest Share in Property. The Adversities of the Commonwealth affect him in chief, and he has but his bare Proportion in its Prosperities: Add to this, That He can hardly have any private Recesses, and is allow'd no private Inclinations or Friendships; That he must love, and hate, as most consists with the common Welfare; that all he thinks, says, and does, must center in the Publick; That if he endeavours to please the Good, He must of course incense the Bad, who are numerous, active, and full of Clamours, and that frequently Malice enlarges his Faults,

Faults , and lessens all his Virtues.

When all this, and what else may be truly said on the same Subject, is well weigh'd, it will not appear that Princes so abound in Happiness as the Vulgar think, or that there is much Reason to repine at what it costs a People to maintain the Kingly Office : For where this Trust is discharg'd, as the Laws of God, and of the Realm require, it fully deserves whatever Taxes are paid by the Subject under a legal Constitution.

For all the Hazzards whereunto Sovereigns are expos'd, for all those watchful Cares which keep them awake, that others may sleep with more Security, They enjoy but one essential Advantage over the rest of Human kind, and it is the Power they have of doing good ; this indeed is a noble Prerogative, and the only Jewel, which should make a wise Prince think it worth the while to wear a Crown.

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Private Men may excell in Courage, or in Wisdom, but tho' plac'd much above their Fellow Subjects, yet still their Power of conferring Benefits, is, or ought to be confin'd to certain Limits, and they are still so low as to have a limited Prospect ; but from such an Eminence as is the Throne, They who stand upright upon it, and with careful Eyes look round about 'em, may see, pity, and relieve the Necessities of Human-kind, of which Misgovernment is commonly the Cause.

By extending their Virtues, not at all beyond humane Reach, they may render Millions of Men happy, and so provide, that not many shall be miserable ; and where this is compass'd, Civil Government is as perfect, as the narrow Policies of Man can make it.

And Princes may bring all this about by that Power of doing good, which they hold from the Nature of their Office ; and when the
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Administration of their Kingdoms is so order'd, That publick Liberty subsists, That Religion is maintain'd in its due Reverence, That Vice is discountenanc'd, and Piety is encourag'd, That National Interest is pursu'd, and National Honour is consult'd, That the Laws are preserv'd in their Vigour, and Justice in its Purity, That the Subjects are protected from their Enemies abroad, and kept in Peace at home, That Merit is amply recompenc'd, and Crimes are severely punish'd, That Sciences, Learning, Arts, Trade, and Manufactures, are favour'd and promoted; in Countries where all this is, and which are so Rul'd, much the largest Share of the People enjoy Plenty, Peace, and Wealth; and they prosper still the more, as all these Parts of Government go on in a higher Degree of Perfection: So that this Power of doing good, is an unbounded Pleasure, never wanting Objects, and is the only solid Recompence God bestows, here on Earth, upon such who, by his Providence, are allotted to bear the Weight of Empire.

And

And when Princes so exert their Courage, Wisdom, and Authority, that their People are thus well Govern'd, they discharge their high Trust, and perform their Part of that Executive Power which is vested in 'em. But in regard 'tis impossible they should transact in their own Persons, all that appertains to right Administration, They can neither render themselves, nor their Nation happy, unless they are serv'd by honest and skilful Ministers : So that to procure the lasting Fame of a good and prosperous Reign, 'tis incumbent upon 'em, not only to excell by their own Actions, but likewise to choose well, and afterwards to see that none of the Great Officers of State are defective in their Duties, which seldom happens when they are overlook'd with careful Eyes.

When Princes, and their Ministers of State, neglect nothing of what belongs to them, the Subordinate, and more Ministerial Parts of Government, grow better of their
own

own Accord ; for the Master-wheels going right, sets the lower in a true Motion. And then the whole Executive Power proceeds as it ought to do in a well-order'd Commonwealth.

And when things have gone amiss in a Country, generally Speaking, the Fault lay in the Administration. Either the Sovereign was himself negligent, or His Ministers were ignorant, careless or corrupt ; And so the Distempers taking first the Head, seiz'd the principal Members, and at last came to spread over all the other Parts. Tis true, they who sat at Helm have been still wont to charge the Temper of the Prince, the Nature of the Constitution, or to lay at the Doors of Fortune the Errors of their Conduct.

The first is indeed a plausible Excuse ; for Ministers have a very difficult Game to play when the Prince's Mind has an ill Turn in it, when he is unable to act of his own Head, and yet is unwilling to take Advice from those that can set him right ; which

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made *Richlieu* (who had such a One to deal with) say, That he found it harder to manage himself in the *Ruelle*, than to govern all the rest of *France*. However it appears from this Instance, that an able Statesman could so work, as, under an obstinate and half-witted Master, to compass a wise Administration.

But Mismanagement can hardly plead in its own Defence the Nature of the Constitution, of which tho' some are more perfect, than others, yet few Models are so ill contriv'd, but that as long as the Rules prescrib'd by 'em are well observ'd, they suffice to carry on the principal End of Society, which is Protection. And a Minister gives the greater Proof of his Skill, when he can under-prop a Building, so as to make it stand, tho' its Foundations are decay'd, and perhaps were never sound from the Beginning.

As to Fortune, 'tis the Refuge of none but weak Men to blame Her, who, as *Machiavel* say, *Shews her Power where there*

there is no predispos'd Virtue to resist her, and turns all her Force, and Impetuosity, where She knows there are no Banks, and no Fences to restrain her. True Wisdom so provides, that her Attacks are ineffectual, or at least soon repairs any Breaches she has made : And to say that divers States have been overthrown by the Violence of Fortune, is so far from being true, that no great Empire was ever yet destroy'd, but the very Causes of its Ruin may be trac'd out in its History, several Years before it happen'd.

And if 'tis ask'd how it came to pass that so many Commonwealths and Monarchies have been subverted, the Answer is easie : they did not sink under Invasions, or perish by Foreign Force, 'till the Way to Conquest had been first open'd by their own Misgovernment.

But to come to Particulars, and to examine into the Original of these various Mischiefs which have disturb'd Government ; Whence is it that there have been Factions in a State ? In

Commonwealths it was because they did not hold a strict Hand over their Great Ones, and took no Care to keep out Corruption, hereupon the Manners of the Common-people were deprav'd, and they follow'd those whom they thought most willing, and most able to support them in their Vices, and this first divided *Rome*. In a Monarchy Parties thus took their Rise; Either the Prince was weak, unable to exert the Regal Authority, and so private Men grew upon him; and not being in a Condition to suppress both, he was compell'd to court first one, and then the other Side, as his Necessities requir'd, himself nourishing that Disease, which, in the End, wasted his Power; or if he had false Cunning, and meditated in his Mind to overthrow the Laws, underhand he encourag'd Parties, kept 'em equally poiz'd, and suffer'd 'em to consume their Strength one against the other, in Hopes they should be both so impair'd by their mutual Strivings, as to be unable to give him Opposition, and thus to become Master of the whole at last.

Whence

Whence came it that Countries have been ruin'd by not consulting National Interest? Either the Prince himself had bad Designs, or not being endow'd with Royal Virtues, and destitute of Wisdom, he committed the Administration of his Affairs to unskilful or corrupt Hands.

Whence was it that affecting Arbitrary Rule has so often thrown this Kingdom into Civil Wars? The Fault lay in the Judges, who wrested Law, and made it serve the Turns of Power, and in the Ministers, who did not perform their Duty in Representing to the Prince the Danger of such Measures.

For whence have arisen those Schisms by which the Church has been so often rent assunder, but from Neglect, or Unskilfulness, in the general Administration? From Neglect, when the Temple was suffer'd to be Profan'd by the Licentious living, the Pride, Ignorance, and Vices of the Clergy, which might induce ma-

ny to sepearte from such whose Lives they thought were a Blemish to their Doctrine ; From Unskilfulness, when the Government has believ'd, That Diseases of long Growth, could admit of a sudden Cure, That to sharp Humours it was better to apply corrodng Medicines than Lenitives, and that Persecution was the only way of reclaiming Nonconformists from their Errors.

What has most frequently been the Cause of Publick Wants, but a Complication of Mismanagements, as well in the Prince, as in his Ministers ? He omitted his Part, which was to overlook them, and his Negligence produc'd their Corruption : They encourag'd Profusion, as getting most by it, and He neglected Oeconomy because it gave him present Trouble. In Governments ill Administer'd, Publick Wants lead the Way, but private Poverty follows close after, and when both happen together, which must always be the Case at last, then is Ruine near at Hand.

Which

Which way soever we look, when any thing has been out of Order in a State, generally Speaking, the Mischief did proceed from some Omision in the Executive Power, either from Above, or from Below ; when Vice abounds, the Laws against it are not put in Execution ; when Impiety and Irreligion prevail, they have not been sufficiently discountenanc'd ; when there is an uncommon Decay of Trade, 'tis either not encourag'd, or not protect'd ; when the Law is tedious, and expensive, some great Corruption has been suffer'd to creep into the Courts of Justice ; In Naval Matters, when good Conduct and Courage are wanting, Negligence and Cowardise, have met with too much Impunity. Thus in these Instances, and in many others, which have been ever the Subjects of Complaint, as at first they were deriv'd from a bad, so they are to be corrected by a better Administration of Affairs.

It has been observ'd long ago, that to have but few Laws is the Mark of a wise People, of which perhaps the true Meaning may be, That a wise People will be wisely Govern'd, and that in a wise Government, the Executive Power proceeds so well, as not to be compell'd at every Turn to call upon the Legislature for Assistance.

Some Countries have prosper'd many Years, both in War and Peace, without any written Laws at all ; And the greatest part of the known World was so long Rul'd without 'em, that the Word Law (in the Sense now us'd) is no where to be found in *Hesiod* or in *Homer*. Perhaps it may be said, That in elder Times, the Nature of Man was not so deprav'd as it is at present, and that as our Vices first made Laws necessary, so as these Vices increase, Law must from time to time be more voluminous.

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This is an uncontested Truth. But the chief End of Government is to prevent Corruptions, and the fewer there are, there will be need of fewer Laws; so that to correct the Manners of Men, does not so much depend upon the Law-makers, as upon those who are to execute the Laws already made.

But this will become clearer from an Instance, than by Arguing. As for Example, the *Spartans* : This People flourish'd in Courage, Policy, Military Discipline, and all other Virtues, so long as they strictly observ'd the Laws, and Model of Government, prescrib'd to 'em by *Lycurgus*, from which they deviated very little for near seven hundred Years; during which time they were the Terrour and Admiration of all *Greece*. His Laws were no more than what every Citizen could repeat and bear in Memory, and yet they serv'd to carry on a better Publick Administration than was ever known; nor can it be alledged that this Model
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was at first so perfect as to want no Correction in after Times, for that would be to attribute more to him than to *Moses*, a Law-giver divinely inspir'd ; but the Truth rather is, that a few Laws, well observ'd, may be sufficient for the Rule of any Country.

Indeed this Objection lyes, That he banish'd Riches from his Commonwealth ; That from great Riches spring up Luxury, Strife, Ambition, Intemperance, Murther, Treasons, and all other Vices and Crimes, against which Laws are pointed ; That a small Country, whose Manners Plenty has not corrupted, is easily kept to its old Constitutions, and seldom stands in need of new Restraints or Curbs ; but That in large Empires, and rich Soils, still more enrich'd by Trade, or other Acquisitions, and where Vice increases as Wealth augments, there new Emergencies will daily arise, that from time to time require fresh Exertions of the Legislative Power.

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To all which this Answer may be given, That 'tis not impossible to make Wealth and Virtue consist together : It has been seen in particular Instances ; several private Men have been both Rich and Virtuous ; a wise Man brings this about by suppressing his Appetites and Passions : If 'tis to be done by a single Person, why, by general Wisdom in those who govern, is not the same to be compass'd in a whole Commonwealth, which is but a great Body compos'd of many Individuals ? Why cannot the Publick do that in the State, which a single Man may do within himself ? If the Laws are an unequal Match for Vice, to what Purpose are they made ? But this can never be asserted while a State subsists, therefore when Vice is not suppress'd, 'tis by Reason that the Laws are not put in Execution.

All the great Nations that we read of, as soon as they perceiv'd, that either by Conquest, foreign Traffick, or by Means of their own Product, Wealth flow'd in among 'em, they
made

made early Provision to restrain, by wholesome Laws, the two opposite Vices, Avarice and Luxury, wherewith mighty Empires labour, and which as *Porcius Cato* said, prove at last their Ruin. *Diversis duobus Vitiis, Avaritia & Luxuria Civitatem laborare : quæ pestes omnia Magna Imperia everterunt.* And while those Constitutions remain in force the Commonwealth continues uncorrupted ; but when this Administration is slackn'd, the People run into those Excesses by which their Government is at last destroy'd.

As well in great, as in less Dominions, so long as old Laws are maintain'd in their full Force, Vice will get so little Ground, that new ones will be seldom wanted. 'Tis certain when new Distempers show themselves, fresh Remedies must be apply'd, but such Emergencies rarely happen in a state well Govern'd ; for the same *Cato* in a Speech before the Senate, reckons up but three Instances down to his Time, wherein Recourse was had to the Legislature, to animadvert upon the growing Avarice
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and Luxuries of *Rome*, to wit, in the *Licinian*, the *Cincian*, and *Oppian* Laws : with so much Care and Wisdom were their Affairs Administer'd.

And this *Oppian* Law is a Proof how strictly their Executive Power proceeded. 'Twas made to restrain the Excesses of their Women in Jewels and Apparel, but it was not like the Sumptuary Laws in *England* and other Countries, forgotten as soon as Enacted ; for tho' it had been establish'd in the Heat of the 2d. *Punic War*, while the State was poor, and tho' it almost levell'd, in their Dresses, the Prime Matrons with the Vulgar, yet none presum'd to break it ; But the Female Sex, not brooking this Severity when Wealth abounded, were still compell'd to apply to the Tribunes of the People, that the Constitution might be abrogated, which was done accordingly, though much against the Sence of *Cato*, who saw further than the rest of the Senate, and without doubt knew how much the Repealing of one good Law
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impair'd the Authority of all the rest.

When the Publick is out of Order, State Empericks prescribe new Laws; but as much Physick destroys the Natural, so too many of these Remedies hurt the Political Constitution; And as the Bodies of Men are best maintain'd in Health, by Exercise, wholesome Diet, and a good Regiment in living, so States are preserv'd by active Motions in the Ministerial Power, by wise and honest Councils, and by keeping all the distinct Members of the Commonwealth to a just performance of their Duty.

As much Physick viciates the Blood, so a Multiplicity of Laws depraves the Manners of the People, and makes 'em lose that Reverence to the Publick, without which Government cannot long subsist; for they are apt to believe their Constitution it self very imperfect, when it wants so often to be mended. If it is Faulty, 'tis a Secret with which the Vulgar should never be made acquainted

quainted, least they take in Hand to give it a better Form, who incline to think they have a Right to intermeddle when above all is out of Order. But nothing can be a plainer Evidence that it has material Faults, than when the Multitude see the Legislature so frequently call'd upon to correct its Errors.

'Tis Respect that sustains Empire, and enables a Few to Rule the Many, but this Respect is lost when Opinion ceases of the Few being Grave, Wise, Constant, and almost infallible, for so in their Proceedings they should be thought: But when they shew Marks of Lightness, That the Result of their Councils is such as must soon be alter'd; That their Wisdom is not strong enough to root out any Mischief all at once, but are forc'd to pull at it a second, a third Time, and yet fail at last; That Misgovernment increases as fast as the Laws to prevent it are increas'd, the People begin to despise both the Legislative, and the Ministerial Authority; and this Con-
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tempt produces Factions, Murmur, Disobedience, Sedition, and perhaps, in the End, a total Subversion of the State.

Government is never upon a right Foot, but when the Sanctions of the Legislature are so sacred, that it becomes hard to Judge, who are most afraid, the People to break the Laws, or the Ministerial Power not to put 'em in Execution: But to be thus venerable they must not be Enacted upon every slight Suggestion, nor Repeal'd with the same Levity; they must be Few and Effectual, esteem'd from their Weight, and not their Number.

'Tis evident beyond all Dispute, that in States ill Administer'd, where the fewest Laws are observ'd, they abound most; not that their Corruptions require more, but their Corruptions are the cause that so few are put in Execution. And thus a languishing Commonwealth, uneasy with its Distempers, applies to Law-Makers for Relief, but either quite throws away
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the Remedies, or uses 'em so short a time, that the peccant Humors cannot be carry'd off, and growing worse and worse, calls out still for fresh Prescriptions, which are all to no purpose, it being impossible to cure those who will neither take the Physick directed, nor yet alter their Course of Dyet.

But a Government conducting it self with Equity, Courage, and Wisdom, will rarely stand in need of these Physicians, and so order the whole Business of the Publick, as to make it an equal Matter of Wonder among the People, to have a new Law made, or to see an old One broken.

All which a good Administration may bring about, by giving an early Check to Corruption and Abuses, as they are seen to rise within the Commonwealth; or where they have already a large Entrance, by drawing down the Laws with all their Force upon 'em. 'Tis indeed less difficult to keep a right Establishment from

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declining, than to work Order out of Confusion, to irradicate Vices that have been fix'd many Years, or to make those capable of a wise and steddly Rule, who have been so long Misgovern'd, that perhaps the Majority through Interest, or Inclnation, begin to like it.

In either of these Cases, be the Affairs of the Publick upon a good, or a bad Foot, the Assistance of the Legislature will, from time to time, be wanting to keep what stands upright from warping, and to straiten what is crooked. The Nature of Man leans more to Vice than Virtue, to suppress one, and promote the other, is the Aim of Laws, and the proper Business of the Legislature, which when the Commonwealth is distemper'd, must prescribe, either purging or restoring Medicines, but not so frequently that the Body Politick shall live upon this Physick, and that strong Cordials, and high Restoratives, must become its only Food and Nourishment.

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But tho' the Constitution of a State may be so impair'd by Time and Accidents, that it can no longer stand, unless it is often mended and propt up, now in one Part and then in another, yet it does not seem impossible but that a Government may at least be so well manag'd, that the Legislature shall not be necessitated to take upon it self in a manner all the Executive Power, and be compell'd to interpose in the whole Administration of Affairs.

No doubt there can be nothing more dangerous than to mingle these two Authorities, which in a well form'd Model, are in their Nature so distinct, and cannot be confounded together without an intire Change of the Constitution; As for Example; That of *England* is called a limited Monarchy, but if the Executive Power assumes an Authority to make Laws, it then degenerates into Tyranny. On the other Hand, if the Business of the State is always so mismanag'd that there lies a Necessity upon the Legislature, to do what properly be-

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longs to the Executive Power, the Government must in time become Aristocratical, tho' here it would be most likely to end in a Democracy.

However suppose this Confusion might be continu'd without Hazzard to the Crown, which seems in the highest Degree improbable, yet it brings so many Difficulties upon Princes, and their People, that 'tis with the utmost care to be avoided.

In the Natural Body the Head does not walk, the Hands digest, or the Stomach think, but each Member has its proper and separate Performances. 'Tis the same in a State well Regulated, whereof all the Parts that compose it have their distinct and peculiar Functions. Sovereigns in their Legislative Capacity, with the other Parts composing the Legislature, Ordain ; What has been, or is from time to time thus Ordain'd, They, Their Ministers and Officers, put in Execution ; And when to all this the People give due Obedience

dience, the Commonwealth is perfect

But in a State whose Affairs are out of order, all this proceeds quite otherwise : The Legislature cannot consult maturely for the Publick in making Laws, by reason their Time is wholly taken up with Inquiries, and in performing that which should have been done by others ; And the Ministerial Authority, terrified by a Superior Power, remains astonish'd, and unactive, and having given offence by doing, or by being thought to do amiss, thinks to atone by doing nothing. In the mean while good Princes, who desire to please their People, are uncertain how much of the Executive Power they shall leave to the Legislature, how far they shall Act themselves, and how much may be committed to their Ministers: And what does this Uncertainty produce, but an Admiration both impotent and careless ?

But it may be ask'd, are the Law-makers to sit still and see a Country
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ruin'd? If Trade in general is neglected, or if any Branch of it is not National, but destructive, are not they to take Care it may be set upon a better Foot? Does it not belong to them to punish Abuses, and Corruptions in the Courts of Justice? Are they not to reform Impiety, Superstition, and Vices, that creep into the Doctrine and Practice of the Church? If the publick Treasure is wasted, or imbezzel'd, are not they to examine into, and redress this Grievance? If the Discipline of the Navy by former Mismanagement, and Negligence, has been corrupted, does it not import them to put it in a righter Method? If the Honor and safety of the Realm has not been consulted or regarded in the Administration at Home or in Treaties and Alliances abroad, are not they to interpose with sounder and better Counsels? Lastly, Are not they to see that the Ministers of State perform their respective Duties, and from Time to Time, to call such of 'em to an Accompt, whose constant Measures,
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and Proceedings, denote 'em to be negligent, unskilfull, or corrupt ?

No doubt all this and several more Points here omitted, are the proper Objects of the Legislative Care and Wisdom, which is to intervene with its Authority, as the matter requires, not only with Representations, and Advices to the Throne, but by offering new Laws, when the Fault or Misgovernment can be mended no other way.

But the Question will be, how far frequent Exertions of this Power are prudent, safe, and consistent with the Nature of the Constitution ? And whether most of the Errors in a State may not be redress'd, tho' the Law-makers do no more than overlook the Ministerial Officers ? And whether such a general Inspection may not be as effectual towards restoring Order and good Government, as for the Legislature to take upon it self the endless Trouble of doing that which should be done by others ?

When the Law-makers transact the whole Business of a State, for what can the Ministers be accountable ? Or when the Executive Power stands divided between Ministers, and one Part of the Constitution, is not the Match very unequal ? What Courage can private Men have to act in such a Partnership ? And must they not rather leave all to their Management who, collectively consider'd, are so much Superior to 'em ? If all is left to them (as cautious Statesmen must think it their Interest to do when the Legislature seems to desire it) then, as has been said before, the Constitution is in danger of becoming Aristocratical. But the Case most commonly happens to be that they do some Things themselves, leaving others to the Ministers of State, without declaring which shall be their Part, and which not ; from whence follows a making good of the old Adage, That no Body minds what is every Body's Business, and between 'em the general Administration is neglected.

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The great Officers of a Kingdom are rewarded with Precedence, Honors, Power, and the lawful Profits of their Employments; for all which 'tis but fit they should proportionably labour in the Service of the Publick. If they are allow'd to enjoy these Benefits, and the Law-makers must undergo the whole Pains, and Trouble of Government, the condition of Ministers would be happy; but yet happier if they are not accomptable, as in Reason they ought not to be, when others take in Hand the Business which belongs to them.

But this could never be intended in any wise Constitution. That of *England* has annex'd high Honors, and large Emoluments, to the respective Functions of the Ministerial Power, and has given to each distinct Authorities, of which doubtless the meaning must have been, that the State might know whom particularly to call upon when the Affairs of Government were mismanag'd.

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'Tis a Fundamental Maxim here, That Male-administration shall not excuse it self by Pleading the Prince's Directions, Pleasure or Command, who can do no wrong : And 'tis full as reasonable to take from Ministers all Occasions, and Pretences, to throw the Blame of what goes amiss, upon any other Part of the Constitution ; nor can it be wise to let the People know that any Part of the Supream Power is capable of committing frequent Errors.

But great Assemblies expose themselves to the Danger of often erring when they go out of their Legislative Capacity, and engage in the subtle and minute Intricacies of the Executive Power, where all the Corrupt Members of the State think it their Interest to mislead 'em, and obstruct their Endeavours, that such good Intentions for the Publick may at last be defeated, as generally they are in the Conclusion, after much Time has been lost, which might have been
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employ'd in matters of real Use, and Service to the Commonwealth.

However, the Administration happens sometimes to be so neglected, that there lies upon 'em an absolute Necessity to interpose, or all must go to Ruin: When this appears, and on such high Occasions, they resort to extraordinary Remedies, and supply with their own Proceedings, what is defective in the Ministerial Power, as the General of an Army is now and then to fight with his own Hands like a Common Soldier; but as to do this in every Skirmish, would be thought Levity in a Great Commander, so perhaps it may not become the Gravity, and Wisdom of the Legislature, to engage in every trivial Business of the State.

When the Persons of Men, or their Crimes, are grown too big for the Laws in their common Course, to deal with; or when they to whom the management of Affairs is committed, neglect their Duty, or betray their Trust, then is the proper Season
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for the Legislature to exert it self, upon which the Imputation of Assuming the Executive Power can never be fix'd, while it undertakes no more than to intermeddle with what is either omitted, or with what is too strong to be encounter'd by the subordinate parts of Governmen.

And the seldomer 'tis made use of, the more venerable this Authority becomes ; whereas when the People are as much accustom'd to it as they are to the Common Exercise of other Powers, its Inquiries, Attempts to reform, Complaints, and Accusations are look'd upon as Things of Course, and from their Frequency, grow not to be regarded by those who would maintain, and not be awful to such as would invade the Constitution.

The Legislature best preserves its Weight when it attacks but one Crime or one Mismanagement at once. It preserves its Weight, because in this Conflict against a single Opponent, it may, and indeed always does prevail whereas it runs the Hazard

zard of being foil'd and defeated, when it goes about to contend with a multitude of Enemies.

And in such single Attempts of first mending one thing and then another, it interferes less with the Executive Power, of which every Part, either through Fear or through Caution, is at a stand, when the whole Administration is in a manner question'd.

To apply to the Throne, and to call upon the Ministry for Redress of Errors in the State ; To commit to the Government's Care whatever 'tis able to compass ; To help its Omissions by Advices, or new Laws when wanted ; To think of mending by degrees, and not with such Haste as cannot succeed ; To leave no Fault, Vice or Crime, unconquer'd when once assaulted ; and to exert it self but upon great occasions, are perhaps the true Methods of preserving to the Legislative Authority that due Respect from the Multitude, without which 'tis impossible to keep a Free Country

try from running into the Absolute Dominion of a single Person.

Let Ministers behave themselves with all imaginable Integrity, let 'em be easy of Access, Courteous, willing to do good Offices, ready to advance Merit, faithful to the Prince, vigilant for the State, and careful of the People; yet there is still something in eminent Power so hated, fear'd or envy'd, that they can never Act in such a manner but they must have many Enemies: If they are Active they displease those who love Pleasure more than Business; If they are Frugal for the Country, they are not lik'd at Court: Their Care of the People is call'd Affecting Popularity; for their good Offices they are scarce thank'd by those that taste the Benefit, who are apt to think they deserve more, and they are forc'd to disappoint far a greater Number than 'tis within their Sphere to gratifie.

But not to Contemplate the distinct Stations of Great Men, let us consider a whole Government together
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in it's Executive Capacity. 'Tis the Duty of such as sit at Helm to root out Vice, To take Care that furious Zeal may commit no Outrage, and that Superstition may get no Entrance; To punish Immoralities; To see that the Prince may not be secretly deceiv'd, nor openly plunder'd; to restrain Luxury; To hinder Parties from hurting one another, or the Publick; To countermine against the dark Workings of Ambition, and to Rule with such Wisdom, that neither Plenty, nor Wants, may beget Disobedience in the People. All which, and much more, is the Business of a Severe, Steddy, and right Management.

But must not the doing all this contract many Enemies? If things are ill conducted the Good will be displeas'd; if well the Bad are discontented; so that 'tis impossible to Govern in such a Manner, but there must be a great Number who will censure the Management of Affairs; Besides the State is never without some who may be call'd

call'd wanton Enemies, who hurt it without Malice, by reason they have nothing else to do, and because to find Fault is the most pleasant Subject Wit can work upon, and a never failing Matter for Discourse.

That Authority should be thus malign'd in whatever Hands 'tis lodg'd, may not one of the Causes be, that we retain some Thoughts of that Equality wherein the Race of Men were plac'd in the free State of Nature? That by submitting to Laws, and the Rules of Society, Man is inclin'd to think he has not so divested himself of his natural Right, but that there still remains a Claim, which he seems to put in when he finds Fault with such as are above him.

From whence soever it proceeds, 'tis evident that, at all Times, the Exercise of Power has been accompany'd not only with the Envy, but often with the Hatred of those whom Fortune has plac'd in a lower Degree; all which they should bear without repining

reposing, who to enjoy the Profits and Titles which follow Power, are contented to be the Slaves of Business.

But the Legislature, whose Service to the Publick is voluntary, and attended with no Recompence, except the Honour of doing well, should endeavour to avoid all this Envy and Hatred, which seem so inseparably join'd to the Executive Part of Power, and leave those Burthens to such as are paid for what they suffer.

There is nothing more natural than for the Commonalty to love their own Representatives, and to respect that Authority, which by the Constitution, was establish'd to protect their Civil Rights ; And yet the Parliament of 1640 is an Instance, that when the House of Commons took upon themselves the whole Administration of Affairs, the People grew as weary of them, as they had formerly been of State Ministers, and when in this Executive Capacity, many of the Multitude began to complain of their Proceedings,

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question their Priveledges, and arraign their Authority : For when Collective Bodies take in Hand such Affairs as were wont to be transacted by private Men, Mankind is apt to suspect they may be lyable to those Partialities, Errors, or Corruptions, of which particular Persons may be accus'd in their Management ; So that 'tis possible for Assemblies to become unpopular as well as Ministers of State.

But had that Parliament (which was indeed driven into a variety of Enquiries, by numberless Errors, Corruptions, and Neglects in the Administration) proceeded by Degrees, and reformed one Abuse after another, without embracing too much at once, they had not overthrown the State as they did, and they had given distaste to none but the very Criminals upon whom they animadverted in their Inquiries and Complaints : And when this Course is taken, Ambitious and designing Men will never have it in their Power to shake the People in their Affections to the House of Commons.

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When the Executive Power proceeds amiss, not only the Legislature may interpose, but each particular Member of the Commonwealth thinks it lawful for him to intermeddle. For Man, having first subjected himself to Government, for Ease, Plenty, and Protection; if he is neither happy, nor safe, through their Fault who Rule, begins to believe that the Contract is broken into which he entered for the Benefit of Society; That they who, by their Conduct, shew themselves to be no stronger, nor wiser than he is, have no Right to command him; That he is return'd into the full Liberty his Progenitors enjoy'd in the free State of Nature, and that he may act for himself, and take all the Ways of Consulting and Compassing his own safety.

And probably from hence it is, that, under loose and weak Administrations, all degrees, from the highest to the lowest of the People, will be Statesmen. And the Vulgar growing from time to time still more inquisitive,

cenforious, and turbulent, it becomes at last very difficult to keep 'em within the Bounds of Duty to their Rulers.

In this uneasy Condition they suspect and hate that Ministry whereof they have had Experience, which leads 'em to fly for Refuge to those whose Vices lie conceal'd, because they have not yet appear'd upon the Stage of Business. But when their Clamours have produc'd a Change of Hands, finding themselves no better than they were, they complain on, being full of Jealousies, and Discontents. And all this is the Matter out of which wicked and ambitious Men create Factions in Kingdoms and Commonwealths ; and from hence Parties are formed, who become insignificant and unregarded when there are few or no Faults in the Executive Power, that is, when the general Administration of Affairs is sound and perfect.

S E C T.

S E C T. XIV.

Of Ministers of State.

IT was the Saying of *Hannibal*, That many Things, which in their own Nature seem almost impossible, are to be compass'd, when taken in hand with Skill : *Multa quæ impedita Natura sunt, consilio expediuntur.* To restore Order in a State where all has been in Confusion ; Vigilance in the Publick where its Business is us'd to be neglected ; Frugality where opposite Courses have been thought most politick ; and Probity among those who are long accusom'd to Corruption ; or to lead such into the plain Ways of Honesty, and Truth, whose Experience and Dexterity, is More vers'd in wrong than in right measures ; To suppress Faction in a Country, where most of the great Men for many Years have known no other Road to Honor and Preferments ; To reconcile Parties, when perhaps both

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think it their Interest to remain divided, one side aiming to engross all, and to exclude Rivals in the present Juncture ; and the other side desiring likewise in their Turn to have no Competitors, conceiving vast Hopes from the future Condition of Things ; To bring Affairs so embroy'd into a better Posture, is, without doubt, very difficult ; but who can pretend 'tis out of the reach of Humane Wisdom ? Since there are Instances, and not remote ones, in History, that as much as all this has been brought about by a wise and vertuous Prince, assisted with a good and faithful Council.

As I have noted before, Parties,† far more exasperated against one another than ours can be, and when the Sword of Civil War had been unsheathed for near forty Years, were reconcil'd in *France* by *Henry* the Fourth, a King roughly bred in Camps, a Stranger to the Skill of Courts, and who had not the Natural Parts which shin'd in his immediate Predecessor *Henry* the Third, and none of that dark Cunning which lurk'd

lurk'd in the subtle Head of *Lewis* XI ; But Heaven had blest'd him with what was much better, a Mind nobly dispos'd, full of virtuous Thoughts, and tender Inclinations towards his People.

The deep Reaches of Policy, so much applauded in some Kings, have generally tended more to the Hurt than Good of Humane kind. In those dark Caverns and Recesses of the Brain, are often forg'd the Chains of Bondage: And as, in relation to private Men, Honesty will in the end be always found the best Policy ; in the same manner as to Princes, true Honesty ought to be accounted the sublimest part of Wisdom.

Machiavel observes, That they are very much mistaken, who are apt to cry, when Princes have created in the People an Opinion of their Prudence, that the Excellencies of their own Nature are not to be thank'd for this, but that 'tis owing to the good Councils of those who are about 'em : Whereas, says he, 'tis an infallible

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Rule, That a Prince who has no Wisdom of his own, can never be well advis'd, and that good Councils proceed rather from the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Prince's Wisdom from the Goodness of his Councils.

This Observation holds yet truer in *England* than perhaps in other Countries, *France* had a steady and wise Management of Affairs under a weak Prince, *Lewis* the 13th, who at last committed the whole Administration successively, to the Cardinals *Richlieu* and *Mazarine*, and these indeed rul'd the Kingdom. But among us, not one Instance can be given that Things have been well administer'd in the Realm, when the Sovereign was defective in those Abilities of the Mind which are requisite for Empire.

The Reason whereof is obvious to any who consider the Nature of our Government, and of its People. A free Country, and Men jealous of their Liberties, can never brook that the Prince should be engross'd by any one Person; whoever pretended to
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take upon himself this Post, and to be a Minister without Associates in Authority, has always been unfortunate. *Wolsey*, as peradventure he was the ablest Man we ever had for such a Station, so he held it the longest, and yet he sunk at last under the weight of being a single Minister.

Therefore since the Form of this Constitution, and Temper of the People, seem to require, that the Council by which the Affairs of State are govern'd, should consist of more than are consulted in an absolute Dominion, and since many must here participate in the derivative Power, if Princes are not endow'd with Faculties to judge amidst these Numbers, they will be ever at a Loss.

Even where all have the same right Intentions to the State, and the same Ardour in the Prince's Service, still among several Heads, there will be variety of Opinions, and it must be a good Judgment that can determine, which of divers Advices is the best.

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But some of our Princes heretofore have been so unfortunate that their very Ministers were divided, which always happen'd to be the Case when there were Parties in the Kingdom; and then to steer a true Course was yet more difficult, and it requir'd a quick Eye to see which Councils were suggested by his Ambition who gave 'em, his own Interest, Corruption or Intemperate Zeal, or which were the Result of long Experience, perfect Wisdom, and real Affection to the Publick, especially because it is not hard for great Parts, and flowing Eloquence, so to cloath Falsehood that it shall appear as fair as Truth it self.

Among the great Ones, to keep intemperate Zeal within Bounds, to curb their Ambition, to see that their selfish designs, and the Corrupt Ends they drive at, may not prejudice the Commonwealth; so to Countenance the Good, that they may be able to overule the Bad in all Debates and Consultations, and to bring different Interest,

Interest, and opposite Opinions, to concur in promoting what is for the general Advantage of the whole, is indeed not an easy Task. *And for Princes to be serv'd by a Set of Men without Faults, is, as Machiavel observes, impossible : For Man will be bad, unless he is compell'd to be good by some Necessity.*

But Sovereigns impose this necessity of being good upon their Ministers and Councillors when they themselves are so, and this Royal Goodness is a Light that will guide 'em thro' all the most hard and darkest Parts of Government, especially when to it are join'd the Help and Grace of God, who never fails to assist such of his Vicegerents here on Earth as tread in the Steps of Piety and Virtue; unless, at certain Seasons, when his Divine Providence thinks fit to scourge a wicked People by laying Afflictions on a virtuous Prince.

Diffimulation, breach of Faith, when it serves a Turn, the Arts of extorting Treasure from the wretched
Subjects

Subjects, or undermining them in their Liberties, with what else bad Kings and their Flatterers have call'd high Wisdom, are far from being the Right supports of Empire ; And for the good Government of a free Country, such as is this Kingdom, no more Skill, no more Policies are requisite, than what may be comprehended by a Woman, as was seen in the Instance of Queen *Elizabeth*.

That Great Princess laid the Foundations of Her happy Reign in the Beginning of it, giving Proofs at her Accession to the Throne, that her chief Endeavours should be to promote the Honor and Welfare of her Country , and to gain the Affections of her People.

What Effect had the fine-spun *Italian* Policies, suggested to her Contemporary Neighbour *Henry* the 3d. of *France*, by his Mother *Catharine* of *Medicis*, who perswaded her Son that his Power would be stronger by keeping up two Factions equally poiz'd within his Kingdom? Didnot all these

these Arts, and all this false Skill, terminate in the Ruin of that Prince? Or what Effect had the deep-laid Councils, of her other Contemporary *Philip* the 2d, who impoverish'd *Spain* by feeding the League in hopes to get *France* for his Daughter the *Infanta*? Did not this end in his losing above half the *Netherlands*? Both *Catharine*, and this *Philip* are celebrated for great Politicians, and yet the one saw nothing but Troubles and Civil War during her Time, and the other, every Thing consider'd, left his Dominions in a far worse Condition than he found them.

Neither the *French Henry*, nor *Philip* of *Spain*, had entr'd into those destructive Measures, had they not prefer'd their own Ambition, and immoderate Thirst after Power, above the Quiet and Happiness of their respective Countries: And these Instances prove how little there is in these Subtle Policies or King-craft. Each had it in a large Degree, and yet it mislead 'em both; from whence may be justly argu'd, That to love their People, and to Consult

sult their Welfare, is in Princes the highest, and carries along with it all the other Parts of Wisdom.

And in a free Country, such as *England* is, when Princes in the Beginnings of their Reign, give apparent Proofs, that the publick Good is the Chief Object of their Thoughts, and that their Measures and Designs, shall still Center in the Ease and Happiness of their Subjects, it may be safely concluded, that their Hands are strong enough to wield the Scepter, that their natural Lights are sufficient, that they have attain'd to the Degrees of Wisdom and Knowledge, which are requisite for Empire, and *that they are fit to go out, and come in before, and to judge this People that is so great.*

As Queen *Elizabeth*, by convincing her Subjects in the first step She made, that her chief Glory should consist in their Welfare and Prosperity, got such Credit and Power as enabled her to accomplish one of the greatest Works that had ever been performed by any Prince, which
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was to reconcile a Kingdom, divided about Religious Matters, and where the strength in Numbers was of both sides in a manner equal ; so a Sovereign, in whose Royal Mind and Thoughts, the love of *England* is deeply rooted ; and whose own Heart is intirely *English*, without doubt will be able, by degrees, to put an end to Faction and Divisions, and to heal all our present Breaches.

For they whose Fortunes, Birth, or Abilities, give 'em Encouragement to approach the Throne, and undertake the Administration of Affairs, when they see one plac'd upon it, who is resolved to promote National Honour and Interest, must adapt all their Councils to this Resolution, and it reduces Ministers to *that Necessity of being good*, whereof *Machiavel* speaks.

To say that Men are Corrupted in an ill Court, is by no means true : But now and then it happens that such as are but half honest enter upon the Stage of Business ; These indeed,

deed, observing the Advantages with which compleat Wickedness is attended in a bad Reign, are easily persuaded to lay their half Honesty quite aside, and to become as abandon'd in their Principles and Actions, as the rest with whom they have to deal. But the Vices of the Palace leave no Taint at all on him, whose Vertues are perfect and consummate ; He is as sound when he comes out, as when he went in, and come out at last he must, for his Fellowship there cannot be grateful long.

'Tis not that the Morals of the Men of Business, are alter'd in a bad Court, but the Truth rather seems to be, that they bring all their Vices and Corruptions with 'em, and that none repair thither when ill Designs are upon the Anvil, but the worst Persons, who are then most acceptable, and indeed fittest to carry on Misgovernment.

On the other Hand, when there is a fair prospect that Things shall be well administer'd, and that there is
such

such a Court as is capable of honest Councils, Men of Fortune, Worth, and Probity, think it proper to make a Tender of their Service. And there can be no truer Indication, that the Time is seasonable for Persons so qualify'd to engage in Affairs of State, than when Princes, by their general Conduct, shew that they are in no degree so studious of enlarging their own Regal Authority and Power, as they are careful to promote the Interest of their People, and anxious to advance the Honour of their Country.

As these Measures attract and invite the Best, so they help to keep the Worst at a fit Distance from the Throne. They who are Masters of no other Skill than to flatter the present Inclinations of the Prince, will say, what shall we do at a Court, where the Sovereign relishes better what is sound and wholesome, than what is false and pleasing? They who build all their Merit in a profligate Resignation of themselves to whatever is commanded, will say

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there is no need of such as we are when the Prince desires to be Obey'd in Nothing, but what is Convenient, Just and Honourable. They who are tainted with Arbitrary Principles, or who cannot satiate their unbounded Ambition in any Legal Government, will say, this is no Time for us, Our Tricks, and Subtle Policies, are of no use, and out of Date, the Sovereign does not like to walk in our dark and difficult Meanders, but delights in the plain Road of Justice, and the Laws. And such as grasp at Power, with no other Design, but to be in some Station where they may have Opportunities to rob the Publick, may perhaps not think it worth their while to thrust themselves into a Court, where immoderate Gains are no longer to be made, and where the Prince is frugal, not by Natural Temper, but in Compassion to the People.

When they see their Sovereigns Mind fully bent upon restoring Peace, Order and Union in a Country, which is the most certain Proof that can be
given

given of bearing true Affection to it, they will thus argue among one another : The Prince is resolved to root out Faction, our Course of Proceeding is therefore to be chang'd ; Let us cast aside our pretended Zeal for the Publick, and learn to love it in good earnest : We must make no more Attempts to inflame the Multitude, by finding Fault where there is no Occasion ; when we complain hereafter, let it be in Order to mend Things, and not to remove Persons only to bring our selves into their Stations: Let us not accuse Ministers, and when they are depress'd, be more Arbitrary, Corrupt, and Rapacious than they were, when we are in their Posts, and the Power is in our Hands ; 'Tis no longer the Season to think of embroiling the Prince's Affairs, to render our selves necessary ; The Way now must be to endeavour at rising in the State by real Merit, and not by Popular Arts, and by being Considerable in this or that Party : Let us rather be disengag'd from the Intricacies, Insincerities, Indiscretions, and Partialities, with

which Parties are commonly attended; The Prince designs so to Rule as, not to want the help of either Side, but will invite or compel both to make all their Thoughts, Proceedings, and Councils, center in the Publick Interest: Invite by good Government, and Compel by discountenancing all such as shall pretend to advance themselves by the Numbers, Power, and Noise of Factions: Let us therefore put an End to Parties; Divisions must cease, that this united Strength may make our Sovereign Great, Powerful, and in a Condition to hold the Balance of *Europe*, and render the People safe and Happy at home, and Formidable to their Enemies abroad.

These will doubtless be the thoughts of such who intend to mount upon the Stage of Business under a good and virtuous Prince. They who are conscious of their own Imperfections, Vices, and Incapacity, will either be afraid, or think it impossible for 'em to approach the Throne; And such a Court, instead of Corrupting Men, renders 'em better than they are by Nature,

Nature, and becomes the School of Honour and true Vertue ; so that an early Resolution of Rulingwell (which they seldom fail to take, and afterwards pursue, who indeed cherish their People, and love their Native Country) is the certain way for Princes to be serv'd by faithful Ministers, and able Statesmen.

The Struggles of Faction are commonly for Power ; Therefore one way of putting an End to 'em, is so to order Affairs, that the Offices, Employments, and Dignities of the State, may be the Rewards of Merit, and not the Prize of this, or that Party, as it chances to get the upper-hand, since the taking away the Matter contended for, is one step towards quieting Contention : And 'tis in some Degree remov'd, when they only are advanc'd and regarded, who strive to deserve well from the whole, not they who think it Desert sufficient to have walk'd obsequiously under such and such a Banner. To see bad Men preferr'd to high Trusts has been frequently the Cause of Sedition, and

truly in some Measure it renders forming of Parties unavoidable, by Reason such as fear Injuries and Oppression from wicked Ministers in Power, are necessitated to join together for their own Preservation. But, generally speaking, all Degrees of Men think themselves safe, and acquiesce in the Recompences they see bestow'd on Vertue, and true Merit.

And in Nations where there happens to be a Court and Country Party, there are two sorts of Men very unfit to act in Affairs of State, either for the Prince or People ; And yet the Persons here meant, have in former Times, been by both most look'd upon and trusted ; that is, the Court lik'd those most who were fallen under the Displeasure of the People, and the People had the best Opinion of those who had receiv'd the highest Affronts and Disobligations from the Court. But there is a Vein of Passion running through all the Actions and Councils of such Men, which is very prejudicial to the Publick, and commonly they are too
much

much in Anger themselves, to be good Authors of Peace and Concord among others.

Ministers contribute very much to root out Faction when their own Conduct is without Reproach ; when it manifestly appears, by all their Actions, that they take more care of the common Interest than to build up their own Fortunes ; when they are not over greedy for themselves ; when they show no Endeavours to Engross the Prince, or to confine the Royal Favour only to their own private Followers and Creatures ; when they do not so much consider who are their Personal Friends, as who best love, and can best serve the Publick ; when they have disinterested Minds, clean Hands, and such undaunted Spirits, as constantly to pursue what is right, and to avoid what is wrong, without regarding either to please, or displease, the Great or Little Vulgar, which Courage arises from true Sense and solid Virtue ; when they desire to have Power and Interest rather by their

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proper Merits and Endowments, than from the Station they are in; And lastly, when they are of such a Temper that they can with Ease and Satisfaction quit those Posts wherein they cannot be of Service to the Publick, or which they can no longer hold with their own Honour. When all this becomes visible both to those who wish 'em ill, and wish 'em well, they quickly grow to have such Weight, and Authority with the whole People, that the Ministerial Part of Government begins soon to be an Over-match for those who would disturb its Peace. And such Ministers add Strength to the Prince, and are a Lustre to the Court.

One of the best Proofs Men can give of their Capacity, for the Management of great Affairs, is when, by their whole Conduct, they shew that they hate Flattery, and can bear Truth: If they do not like the first, the second will never be ungrateful to 'em; For what *Machiavel* says of Princes, may full as well be apply'd to their Ministers, *That*
they

they have no other Remedy against Flatterers, than to let every Body understand they are not offended when the Truth is told 'em. And this Sincerity from their true Friends is the only Antidote to be made use of against the Poison that is daily pour'd into their Ears by the false Friends, and obsequious Followers of their Fortune.

They who have well weigh'd the Point, will perhaps come to an Opinion, that to love Flattery is of worse Consequence to Statesmen, than it can be to any Prince. For suppose a King so unfortunate, as to hear the Truth from none that are about him, and that he is sooth'd in every wrong Measure, by those who hold his good Graces by no other Tenure than by approving and putting in Execution, all the Results of his Will and Pleasure; Yet if he Reigns over a free Country, and consults a Parliament, he will from Time to Time be put in Mind of his Dangers, either by the House of Lords or House of Commons; and through these Organs will

will be convey'd to him the Complaints, the Sense, and Voices of his People. Besides the Hazzard, Confusions, Blood-shed, and the long Train of unforeseen Consequences, with which Revolutions are attended, Respect and Allegiance are all powerful Motives to keep Subjects within the Bounds of Duty, and to bear many Things ; how much shall not be here argu'd, but most certain it is, that the Laws of God instruct us to suffer a great deal from Princes.

But nothing of this holds as to Ministers of State. That faithful Monitor the Legislative Authority, is by no means oblig'd to give them Warning, or to take any Pains to hold 'em back, when they are running towards a Precipice : In their Case the Law-makers are to correct as Judges, and not to advise as Fathers. And tho' the Scriptures enjoin Obedience to Government in general, which includes all the Ministerial Officers of the State, yet this cannot be so constru'd as to imply, That in free Countries the People,
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by their Representatives, have not a Right to call Ministers to an Account, and to question their Proceedings, or that the Supreme Judicature may not punish their Offences. On the contrary 'tis Evident, that the Laws were as much intended to preserve the Commonalty against the Excesses of Power, as to keep 'em from hurting one another.

If therefore Great Men give way to have their Actions smooch'd over to 'em by Parasites with their Oily Tongues, if they love to be applauded in all they do, and are impatient of Contradiction, they must be ruin'd first or last; they will not hear of their Failings, Inadvertencies, Mistakes, and wrong Measures, till their Errors are past Redress, and till Complaints and Accusations, come with a Force which is no longer to be resisted. And all this is the more unavoidable because 'tis not quite clear, whether or no God allows the Subject any other Remedy for Misgovernment, but to punish Ministers for what the Prince has done amiss,
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by reason it was their Duty to Advise him better.

There never was a Man born with such a Share of natural Wisdom within himself, as could conduct him without the Help of others, through all the Lab'rinth of publick Business: And indeed true Wisdom does almost as much consist of the inventive as of the deliberative Faculties. A great Statesman must not only be qualified to iudge aright, but he must be likewise able to invent, and propose what is fit to be done in the Arduous Affairs, and in the new, sudden, and difficult Emergencies of Government: In the first his own Abilities, if they are very strong, may be a sufficient Guide, but no single Head is capable of conceiving all that is comprehended in the second Part of Wisdom, and to furnish from his own proper Stock, all that is wanted for the full and perfect Execution of any considerable Post or Employment in the Commonwealth.

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And whether shall he repair for the Intimations, Advices, Lights and Helps he must certainly stand in need of? Shall it be to the Companions of his soft Hours, the Associates of his Pleasures, and that perfidious Band of Flatterers which great Men are seldom without? They will say nothing to him but what they know pleases, and suits with his Temper and Inclination. If they propose, it shall be what tends to their own, and not to his advantage. And how can they advise him whose Opinions, and Sentiments, they are never us'd to Combat?

He therefore who desires to preserve Power should endeavour to contract sincere and solid Friendships; and because they are not easily to be found in Courts, he should seek 'em elsewhere, purchase 'em at any Rate, and encourage such as he has thus chosen, to tell him Truth, and oppose his Thoughts and Notions; But they
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can do him no service, unless they are qualified themselves with such Judgments as to be able to discern all his most hidden Faults and Imperfections.

He whose sight goes no further than to see the Virtues of a Great Man, will like all he does, and incline his own Opinion that way, and helps to confirm him in his Errors ; whereas he who knows his weak side (and there are none without it) is ready arm'd and prepar'd to assist his Friend, and tho' much inferior to him upon the whole, yet not having just the same Weakness, may hinder this Friend from running into many Mistakes and Dangers.

For he who has a good Head, and a sincere Heart, will be apt thus to judge within himself ; My Friend's Ambition will of Course lead him to make such a false Step that must be fatal to him ; The Matter is now in Agitation, he is blind that way, I am not, and must endeavour to dissuade him from it : The Temper of my Friend is too flegmatick
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and cautious, I am not so wise as he is, but from Nature have more Spirit and Warmth, without being rash, I shall therefore lay before him, that if he were not quite so cold and circumspect, it would be better for himself and for the Publick. Or my Friends natural Heat carries him too far, he weighs the present Advantages, but not the future Event of Things and Councils, and because he knows no Fear, he thinks there can be no Danger; I have more Experience than he has, tho' his Parts are above mine; I have seen great Designs defeated by small Accidents, and have known small Accidents produce great Effects, and I will go and try to moderate his Heat with my Flegm.

They who have Friendships with such as are in high Posts, and design to do 'em good, either out of real Love, or in Gratitude for kind Offices done, and Favours receiv'd proceed in this manner. Or if they see them alter'd and made worse by power, and become reserv'd, positive, presumptuous, arrogant, too much elevated,

levated, and giddy in the height to which they have reach'd, they shew 'em how unpopular all this will be, and that 'tis impossible for a Man to continue great any long Time, who does not study to be agreeable to good Men, since of necessity in doing well himself he must displease the bad.

When they have that Sincerity which is requir'd by the strict Laws of Friendship, they inform 'em which of their Measures are ill relish'd, and which applauded by the whole People, that they may be encourag'd to persist in what is right, and be diverted from what is wrong. He who believes himself to be above these Intimations, and that he can always depend upon himself, may be said to live alone : And as they who retire from the World, grow by degrees Savage and Fantastical, and at last to know nothing ; so they who are too proud to take Advice, are sure to meet with the same ill Effects of solitude amidst all their Business, and in the throng of

of a full Court; whereas they who frequently consult such as they know to wish 'em well, are not only fortify'd with their own, but reap a Benefit from the Knowledge and Experience of others, and thereby they arrive at that true Wisdom, which is attain'd, not by reading Books, but Men.

And thus a Minister who is so happy as to have, and who is so wise as to hear faithful and well chosen Friends, avoids running on those Rocks, upon which they seldom fail to split, who in the most important Affairs, where they alone, or where they with the Publick are concern'd, either rely on their own Judgment (of what Force soever it be) or only communicate with that Servile Crew at Court, who see no Faults in a great Man while he preserves his Post of Power and Favour, and will allow him no Virtues or Perfections when his Fortune changes.

And in Matters fit to be communicated, they will find Information,
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Eafe, and Safety, by now and then conferring with some of the ablest Men that can be found among those whom Modesty, or perhaps true Wisdom, has all along kept out of Business. No Country is without such a sort of Persons that have no Engagements with, or Dependencies on the Court, but whose meer Affections to the Publick, lead 'em often to meditate upon all its great Affairs. These Lookers on, generally speaking, are exempt from those Partialities, Heats, and Prepossessions to which they may be lyable who are deeply concern'd in the Game themselves, and whose All lies at Stake: And the cool and disinterested Advices of such Men sometimes prove better Helps, and truer Lights, to a Minister, than he can elsewhere meet with.

Nothing more conduces to the Prosperity of Sovereigns than to be fortunate in the Choice of those who are to serve 'em; I say fortunate, by reason that to choose well is not always within the Reach of Prudence;
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because many Men have had Vices and Imperfections, which lay quite conceal'd till they were mounted on the the Stage; so that Princes may thank their own good Luck, when such as they call into the Administration of their Affairs grow better, and not worse, in that high Power with which they are intrusted.

Nor should they who know they are deficient in the Abilities expected from those who sit at Helm, venture to approach the Throne, lest their Defects should be prejudicial to the Prince, and hurtful to themselves; if they have not Courage to face a Danger, nor Prudence to avert it; if they have not a Temper that can bear with the Heats, Passions, and Follies of Humankind; if they shrink under Perils, and are too much elated with Prosperity; if their Genius is low, and their Thoughts high; if they have not Foresight, a quick Apprehension, together with a solid Judgment. In short, if they are not equal to the greatest Affairs, for their own and the publick Good, they

should not presume to take upon 'em the Administration of a Princes Business.

For their own, because without excellent Endowments it will be impossible for 'em long to keep their Ground in a free Country, where the People are inquisitive and censorious. 'Tis true, Men of a much lower Form, have often got to be Ministers, however they have enjoy'd but a brief Authority. They have been Fortunes Bubbles blown up, and of a sudden blown down; and they have frequently perish'd, under the Weight which they were not strong enough to bear.

And for the sake of their Country they should not intermeddle, because to the weakness of such Men most commonly has been owing all Misgovernment in a Nation; either their corrupt, or their unskilful Conduct, was the Cause that national Interest has been neglected; that Arbitrary Measures were taken; that Heresies have started up, and that Separations have been made from the Body of the Church;

Church ; that the Realm lies under the pressure of so many Debts ; that the executive Power proceeded no better, and with no more Vigour, than to suffer Factions to grow up to such a Head, as in Time may perhaps endanger the publick Peace ! All which Mischiefs had been avoided in a large Degree, if our States-men had been equal to the great Affairs they undertook to mannage. So that upon the Choice Princes make of their Ministers, depends both their own, and the Felicity or Unhappines of their Kingdoms.

But admit their capacities of Mind, and deep reaches in Policy to be such, that they can carry on illegal Government with a strenuous and powerful Hand, and support it for a while, of which sort of States-men there have been now and then some in every Age, who to gratify their Ambition, have attempted to enslave their Country and went a great way towards it ; who to preserve their Post of Favour with a Prince of Arbitrary Inclinations, have acted against their own natural

C c 3 Lights,

Lights, and exercis'd those Talents, to promote an unjust and a bad, which should have been employ'd in establishing a rightful Administration. Yet let not these Men rely too much upon their Strength of Parts, which at last may fail; since the World has seen the ablest of 'em, want Skill to prevent their own Ruin. For either they serve a Prince who is absolute, and if so he is some times compell'd to Sacrifice an ill Minister to the Indignation or Fury of his People; or they live in a free Country, and then in some Juncture or other, the People will be strong enough to force 'em from their Master.

None should presume to come very near the Throne, but such as are conscious of their own Worth, who know they have Abilities to serve the Publick, and who find within themselves a stock of Virtue sufficient to bear them out in the roughest Storms of Fortune, and to resist all the Temptations which eminent Power may lay before 'em.

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When Ministers are thus qualify'd, Princes are not compell'd to that frequent change of Hands, for which weak States are despis'd at Home, and contemptible in Foreign Countries. Sagacity must be the Result of long Experience; that which has shin'd in some young Men who had seen little, and yet would meddle in great Affairs, was rather Wit than Wisdom, and could never bear 'em through all the difficulties of publick Business. Wit is a Steed full of Mettle, but underlimb'd, and is by no means proper to travel in deep and heavy Roads. Witty Men are pleasant Companions for such as desire to laugh at all which the busie World is doing; but they seldom prove able States-men till Time has ripen'd their Wit into Judgment, and then they arrive to the highest Perfection, because Wit gives 'em the inventive, and their deliberative Faculties are mended by Experience.

But what Knowledge can be attain'd to in Courts where they change their Ministers as often as they do

their Fashions, and where Few are continu'd in a Post half the Time that is necessary to make 'em understand it?

Where there is this bad Conduct and Levity, the People must needs believe the Government it self to be out of Order when they see it so restless and unquiet, like a Person on the Bed of Sickness, who tosses from Place to Place, and can find no Ease; Nor will a State be thought in sound Health when it is so often for removing. Besides, nothing can be more absurd than to imagine Governments can subsist where such as are intrusted by the Princè have not their due Respect; but how can they be respected, whose Authority is known to be so short-liv'd, precarious and uncertain?

What the Patriarch said of his Son *Reuben*, holds true as to a whole Nation, *Unstable as Water thou shalt not excel.* 'Tis rarely seen that a Country becomes considerable which is subject to frequent Alterations in its Measures; but when Hands are shifted Things must often change, because
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few Common-wealths are so well constituted, but that Things very much depend on Persons. And this being the Case, what Foreign State desires to have Engagements with a Prince, whose Affairs, by having at every moment a new Court, can never be long upon the same Foot. He may indeed be apply'd to by those of his Neighbours who want his Purse and Help; but he will have few Allies and Confederates contented to be with him upon equal Terms, and as much to his as to their Advantage: For a wise State will be as unwilling to enter into strict and important Alliances with such a Prince, as a prudent Man would be to contract a solemn Friendship with one who was always known to be of an inconstant Temper.

There are two Ranks of Men who may have it in their Minds to repair to Courts, in order to better their Conditions: First, such as hope by Merit to advance themselves to high Honours and Preferments. Secondly, such as may come thither with great Titles and Fortunes already made,
who

who think their Pretensions to Power just, because their Virtues, Birth and Parts, deserve it.

Among the first Sort, what Encouragement can there be to think of rising by long and faithful Service (and so to reach the Top at last) in a Court accusom'd to intercept its best Servants in the middle of their Course? Do not these Thoughts make Men of real Abilities and Worth afraid to come upon Ground so slippery, and where 'tis in a manner impossible for the most wary Feet to stand any Time? What has been the consequence of all this for several Years? The Court was shun'd by the honestest and ablest Men to serve it, and crowded with such as were resolv'd to grow Rich apace, and so to be too quick for any of the nimblest Turns of Fortune; and was not *This making overmuch hast to be Rich*, (which in the late Reigns has been so visible in the Men of Business) the principal Cause of the Abuses and Corruptions that have been complain'd of, and which have cost *England* so very dear.

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As to the other Rank, what Invitation can there be for Men of the first Quality, to enter into the manningment of Affairs, when they are to hold their Posts, and Offices, by so slender a Tenure, when their Power is to depend upon Chance, and not their own Endowments, and when they are thus set up, like Meteors to be gaz'd on for a while, and then to disappear?

Without doubt, 'tis a strong support to the Throne, to have about it, Men of high Birth, who come into the Service of their Sovereign, with large Fortunes of their own, not made at Court, and of whose Ancestors the People read every Day in the Chronicles of past Times; when such Persons have Courage, Eloquence, Parts, Experience, and a sound Judgment, their Greatness is not invidious among the Vulgar, who applaud the Princes making Choice of such a Man, and think one so qualified, has a kind of Right to any of the chief Stations in the Commonwealth. But, when a
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Minister has these Abilities, it is not worth his while to exert himself, unless it be in a Court which he sees is steady, and constant in its Measures.

That Courage and Resolution, without which it is impossible to carry on a good and wise Government, must be grounded on a Belief that he who acts well, shall be justify'd, and that Intrigues, false Insinuations, and malicious Whispers, shall never be suffer'd to bear him down, whose Integrity is perfect, and whose Conduct is without reproach.

But in a free Country, when it happens to be divided into Parties, 'tis almost as difficult for Princes to support good Ministers, as 'tis for bad Princes to think of defending a corrupt set of States-men, against the Resentment and Voices of their People: For as good Patriots believe it their Duty to attack an ill Administration, so wicked Men conceive it to be their Interest, not to give Time for Order, and right Mannagement to
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take place, and be establish'd for whatever is well done, is an affectual Impeachment of their Proceedings; therefore where there has been a long series of Misgovernment, they who come after with Intentions to mend Things, must expect to be assaulted, and to have for Adversaries, all such as think themselves arraign'd by a better Conduct in the Persons, by whom they are succeeded.

And where Corruptions are become so extensive, that the Guilty are almost as many as the Innocent, where they who have robb'd the Publick, and they who would have given up the Constitution, are Active, Insolent, proud of their Numbers, and grasping at Power, vvhhen they should think Impunity, much more than they could in Reason hope for; where all this is, and where the Country likewise is divided in Religious Matters, it will not be hard to form such a Faction as may raise Clamours, Traduce, and under popular Pretences, disturb and interrupt the Measures of the most faithful Servants of the

the Crown, who are no other ways to be protected in such a Case, from the Strength and Violence of their ambitious and designing Enemies, than by the Courage and Resolution of the Prince.

As 'tis not consistent with the safety of Princes, their Wisdom, nor indeed with their Duty to God, whose Vice-gerents they are, to let their personal Kindness to private Men go so far, as to defend Ministers who, by their Unskilfulness, Negligence, or perhaps by high Crimes, are become obnoxious to the whole People. So on the other side 'tis a safe, wise, and a religious Duty, for 'em to take into Protection their faithful Servants, and to Shield 'em against such Enmities, as by just and upright Dealing they must of necessity contract in a corrupt and a divided Country.

'Tis true, where there are Parties, 'tis not so easy for the Sovereign to judge whether the Accusation is well grounded, or only the result of Malice;

lice; peradventure the best Guide in this Case, is not so much to consider the Person accus'd, as who are his Accusers, and who take his Part. If there are frequent Complaints of his Conduct, and still urg'd from the best Men, tho' not the strongest in Numbers, and if he is defended, tho' by a Majority that are under his Influence, embark'd all along in his Designs, and who have been Partakers in his Crimes, such a Minister is a greater Load than 'tis fit a wise Prince should bear. On the other Hand, if the Accusers are known to be Ambitious, Impatient of a Good, and hankering after a loose and corrupt Government, if they give Signs of aiming at such a one, as that under it, they may rob the Publick with Impunity, if this reforming Spirit is in them quite new, if from their past Behaviour it appears that they find Fault with the Administration for no other Reason but because it is not in their own, or in such Hands as they like; and if the Person accus'd is justify'd in his Proceedings and Measures

tures by all such are disinterested, sagacious, without Prejudice, or Passion, and who are known to have no other aims, but that right Government may be promoted, and that the State may flourish. In such Cases heretofore resolute, wise, and virtuous Princes, have not regarded who were the Majority, but where Truth lay, and how the common Welfare might be best consulted; and having duly weigh'd the Merits of their Servant, and consider'd as well the Objections to him, as the Temper of his Friends and Enemies, they have interpos'd with the Regal Power to preserve a just and able Minister, against the Rage of mistaken Numbers, by whom the Innocent may sometimes be assaulted and oppressed.

If the Majority had been never known to err, we might believe it not capable of Error in Times to come. But where Parties have long subsisted, Anger and Prejudice have sometimes
hurry'd

hurry'd 'em into Councils, which, upon cooler Thoughts, and better recollection, had been avoided: Princes therefore who prudently stem these sudden Tides, and are willing of one Hand, to resign Offenders up to Justice, but on the other, are steady and firm to protect Innocence, give Men time to recollect themselves; and so Reason grows, at last, to regain that Dominion over their Minds, which was usurp'd before by Passion.

Sovereigns, who have not this firmness of Mind, upon which the Innocent may securely rely for their Protection, must never expect to be serv'd by the best sort of Men, who, careful of their Fame, and having a great stock of Reputation in the World to lose, are loath to stake it on their Side by whom they are sure to be abandon'd in every the least Attack that shall be made upon 'em; and in a divided Country, to manage so as to be without Enemies, is almost impossible; who then will engage in the Service of an unsteady Prince? Persons who know themselves to be of so little Consequence,

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quence, that 'tis quite indifferent what becomes of 'em, a forlorn Hope, Food for Powder, and fit matter for any sudden fury of the Vulgar to spend it self upon ; Men obscure, or of desperate Fortunes, who, tho' greedy of Honours, are yet asham'd of no Disgraces, who are pleas'd to be Journey-Men, or Day-Labourers in a Court, glad to be in Service, tho' but for a Week, and who submit to be taken in, or to be thrown out, as it best serves the present Turn. But can it be proper that the Palace should be fill'd with such a mean and servile Crew ? And in former Ages, what has been the Effect of a Ministry so compos'd ? Have not the People, by being accustom'd to pull down the weak Supports about, and near it, come at last to assault the very Throne ?

To which may be added, That the frequent Changes which had been of Officers in the State, occasion'd the Faction that was called *The League for the Publick Good*, which, in the beginning of *Levis* the Eleventh's Reign, produc'd a Civil War in *France*.

They

They who administer well, of Course will have to Freinds, true Patriots, all Wise and Honest Men : But where there are Parties, a right Administration is not always pleasing, it distastes the ambitious Intriguers on both Sides ; in some, it may thwart their Avarice or over-weening Opinion of themselves ; it may not proceed fast enough for the inconsiderate Zeal or Passion of others ; or it may be too severe for those who have seen and felt what Wealth was to be acquired in a loose and careless Management. Good Ministers, therefore in the perpetual Conflicts they are certain to have with the Heats and Indiscretions, or with the Vices and Corruption of the Times, must be supported by the unshaken Courage and well-grounded Resolution of their Prince.

And this Magnanimity in Sovereigns, emboldens such as are about 'em, to persevere in just Measures for the Publick, and to give faithful and disinterested Advices ; not what are pleasant to the Taste, but what will

be wholesome in the Digestion. Whereas in Kingdoms, where they are attacked on slight Occasions, and with the same Levity deserted, they adapt their Proceedings to what seems the present Temper of the prevailing Side, let the future Consequence be what it will; and every thing consider'd, peradventure it is not easie to determin, who is the most pernicious Minister, in relation to the whole Government, he who makes his Court by flattering the Prince in whatever he does, and by pursuing all his worst Inclinations, or he who looks no farther than to affect being popular, by taking Aim in all his Transactions for the State, from what he thinks is the immediate Sense of the superior Party, be it right or wrong.

This Magnanimity is not shewn in obstinately defending bad Men in a bad Cause. One of the bravest of our Kings, *Henry* the Fourth, removed from Court four of his Servants at once, for no other Reason, but that they were so unfortunate as not to be grateful to the People: [*Rot Parl. 5. Hen.*]

Hen. 4. No. 16.] But it was at a Time when there were no Divisions in the Kingdom; And probably the Vices of these four were visible to others, tho' conceal'd from him. Indeed where Factions reign, 'tis difficult for Princes to judge upon whom they should shine, and from whom they should withdraw their Favour: But when this happens to be the Case, they will seldom err in openly joining with the Virtuous, to support Truth and Virtue.

Generally speaking, the Suggestions of such a Courage as is govern'd by Wisdom, are the truest Lights, not only for Princes, but for private Men in their service, to follow. The fearful dare not so much as desire Help: *Pavor etiam auxilia formidat.* He who finds within himself a Heart not capable of great Affairs, should avoid engaging in the Business of a State: The Passion of Fear will so often disorder his Reason, as to make him liable to Errors without Number: And as to matters of Government, the fearful are directly Slaves to those who are bolder than themselves. But this holds

yet more strongly in Countries that are divided : For can the Enemies of a great Man desire a fairer Game against him, than to know, that tho' they have not Skill enough to defeat the Measures of his Wisdom, yet that they are able to bring him over to their Designs and Interest, by working upon his Fears?

A Minister of State fully qualify'd for the Service of his Prince, should be afraid of doing nothing but what is ill in it self, and against the Rules of Virtue, his own Honour, and the Honour, Interest, or Advantage of his Country : He should not only be a brave, but a magnanimous Man ; whom *Aristotle* in his *Ethics* to *Nicomachus* [Lib. 4] thus describes : “ He
“ is one who strives to do great Things,
“ or what may be for great Ends, and
“ by which he may acquire great Honour. He is not therefore so apt to
“ run into frequent Dangers, as into
“ great ones ; not prompt for every
“ Turn, but rather slow and deliberate ; he will not rashly undertake
“ even great Matters, but with Council, and good Caution ; he is not
“ much

“ much taken up with the Care of
 “ worldly Concerns, as not thinking
 “ them either great enough, or of
 “ much Account. But Honour is, in
 “ his Esteem, as the highest of Hu-
 “ man External Benefits; inasmuch
 “ as he observes, 'tis the highest thing
 “ we have to pay even to the Gods.

And this Philosopher [*ibid. Lib. 2*]
 says, “ That the true Medium in Vir-
 “ tue, and that which is it's very best,
 “ must be ascertain'd with Regard un-
 “ to Time, and to Occasions, and to
 “ the Persons with whom, or for
 “ whose Sake we act, and to the man-
 “ ner of acting.

Andronicus defines Courage, “ To be
 “ a Virtue by which a Man carries him-
 “ self stoutly, and with Circumspecti-
 “ on, through all the Affairs that have
 “ Relation to the Publick.

Thus stood the Opinions of these
 Wise Men, as to Magnanimity, Virtue,
 and Courage. But they would have
 their magnanimous Man, who attempts
 great Things, or what may be for

great Ends, to be slow and deliberate; to proceed with Council and Caution; to have Regard to Time and Occasions, and to the Persons with whom he has to deal; and to be Stout, but still with Circumspection.

There is Courage in Action, and in Council. The first is Military Virtue, which is a noble Ardour, pushing Men on to perform great Deeds, that they may acquire much Fame. He who has it in Perfection, shrinks at no Perils he is going to encounter, and is present to himself in the hottest Dangers, and when they are come upon him. This sort of Courage is what properly belongs to such as are to serve Princes in the Business of their Wars.

That Constancy of Mind which is not surpriz'd at a new, sudden, and unexpected Accident, but is ready, with an undisturb'd Judgment, to determine in an Instant, what is fit to be done upon it: That firm Resolution which is not to be diverted from what is Right by the Voices of the People: That unshaken Temper that can wait a long
time

time, till the Fruit of Wisdom is grown ripe, and in the mean while, with Patience bear the Obloquies of Men, is what may be call'd Courage in Council, and is one of the principal Virtues necessary to the Composition of a good States-man, whose Service the Prince makes use of only in Civil Matters.

Courage in the Field is more Popular, and shines most, and 'tis the truest Course of obtaining solid and lasting Greatness; for Power which is attain'd by meer Wisdom, has seldom been seen strong enough to resist Faction, Envy, and the Intrigues of a Court; and therefore such as have been Ministers for the Council, or Execution of Affairs meerly Civil, unless under very wise Reigns, have been rarely long liv'd; for none but the Wise see what is done by Wisdom, and they are not often a numerous Party. But the Effects of Valour make a greater Show, and are visible to the whole People; for which Reason, he who endeavours to establish himself by repeated Proofs of his Courage, and by Military Skill and Conduct, forms a real Strength, such

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as is able to support him in the constant Struggles, Men of eminent Worth, and in high Stations, must be sure to meet with. Nor does this hold any where more truly, than in this Kingdom, where the Vulgar are more apt to admire the Marks of great Valour, than the Results of deep Prudence.

And yet where there are Divisions, Valour, the Virtue which is of such use to a Country that has a big War upon it's Hands, can hardly defend it self against Detraction. At any other time such a Success as the taking of *Bonn* the fifth of *May* in the beginning of the Campaign, would have been receiv'd with universal Applause. And though it was thought of such Consequence by the *French*, as to be Garrison'd with thirteen old Regiments, and tho' it secures all the *Lower-Rhine*, yet they who are resolved to be angry, will always find somewhat to complain of: And if the Commander in Chief pursues his own natural Inclinations, and pushes on the War with Vigour, they are apt to say he consumes the Blood and Treasure of the Kingdom,

in

in forming Sieges, and taking Towns, which must be all restor'd at the Conclusion of a Peace: That he only regards to increase his own Glory and Renown, and that therefore he has press'd so earnestly for Action in all the Councils of War, and by his Memorials has shown how needful it was to make some bold and brave Attempts, which might give Reputation to the Confederate Affairs Abroad, at a season when they declin'd in other Parts; at the same time others who sit at home at their ease, cry, Why were not the Lines attack'd? We pay Taxes and nothing is done. Never considering the difficulties a General lies under who Commands Confederate Troops, and who must act in concert with others. They never ask the Question, Will this be otherwise next Year? Or have the Allies consented that the Captain General hereafter shall have a more absolute Command over the whole Army? In the mean while they reckon for nothing the taking of *Huy*, by which the Conquest of all upon the *Meuse* is forwarded, nor the reducing the Town, Castle and Dutchy of *Limburg*, with whatever else he may have design'd

design'd, for the future Service of his Prince and of the common Cause.

Thus in a divided Country, Men will censure whatever is done, either in the Cabinet, or in the Field, against which there is no such sure Defence for great Men, as to do what is Right and Wise, without regarding which Side is pleas'd or displeas'd with their Actions or Councils; And if their Measures are founded upon Truth and Virtue, this Constancy of Mind, and this noble Contempt of popular Discourses, will not only prevail, but at the long run, must receive Universal Approbation.

In all Affairs whatsoever, 'tis natural, both for the great and little Vulgar, to desire more haste should be made, than may peradventure consist with the Rules of Prudence: But especially Parties never think their Friends move fast enough, not reflecting that they who make too much speed at first, may come to want Breath before the Race is half perform'd.

And

And when there is a Faction in the State, Corrupt, Ambitious, Implacable, Restless, bred under a loose Administration, impatient of a good one, and grasping at Power which they so much abus'd when they were in Possession of it; perhaps such a Strength is best reduc'd by observing the Conduct of *Fabius Maximus*, who avoided, as much as possible, to engage in Battle with an Enemy, desperate, active, and full of Stratagems: And tho' his encamping upon the Mountains, his Caution and slow Courses were derided for a time, yet at last he was esteem'd the only Wise Man among the *Romans*, when the Temerity first of his Colleague *Minutius*, then of *Terentius Varro* had brought 'em to the very Brink of Ruin.

Factions in the State, Sects in Religion, and Armies reduc'd to streights, are ever desirous to be in action; they consume of themselves, and dwindle away to nothing, when you are strongly intrench'd near 'em, when you cut off their Provisions, and watch their Motions. What can Men, brought to Def-

Despair wish for more, than a Day for the Decision of their Fortune? This *Hanibal* saw, and try'd all Arts to provoke *Fabius* to fight, but *Fabius* was too wise to be provok'd to do what was against the Publick Interest, tho' insulted by his Enemies in the *Carthaginian* Army, and tho' censur'd by his own Friends, as well in the City, as in the Senate; but, as *Ennius* observ'd, his prudent Cunctation or slow Proceedings restor'd the Common-wealth.

The same Conduct will perhaps subdue Factions and Religious Sects, against which, the Publick is to intrench it self by ruling well, by a Management without Reproach, and by discountenancing such as endeavour to give disturbance to the State; where all this is done, its Adversaries moulder away by degrees, starve in their Camp, and must Disband of course, whereas they grow considerable, and begin to think they are upon an equal foot with that Government which descends so low, as frequently to join in Battle with them.

But

But Ministers, who will take this flow, but sure Method of healing Breaches, and appeasing the Divisions of a Kingdom, must arm themselves with the Patience and Courage of our Noble *Roman*, like him they must not startle and give ground upon Rumors and Calumnies; and to bear all this, is one of the Duties they owe to their Prince and Country, who cannot pretend to hold the Ballance, or to be safe and happy at Home, nor indeed to make any sort of Figure Abroad, while Civil Discord rages.

The *Tarentins* once sent Embassadors to interpose in some Differences that had happen'd between the *Romans* and the *Samnites*, but they were laughed at by the Consul *Papirius*, for pretending to meddle in the Affairs of other Countries when they were rent asunder by their own Domestick Quarrels: *Vanissimum increpans gentem, quæ suarum impotens rerum præ domesticis seditionibus Discordiisque, aliis modum Pacis ac Belli facere æquum censeret.*

What-

Whatever in the Beginning we might propose, of going so far and no farther, of confining our selves to such a Quota of Ships, Men, and Mony, in all likelihood this War, as it is the most Necessary, most Honourable, and the Justest, so 'twill be found the greatest that ever *England* undertook.

For the Dispute is not the same now as it was for many Years, when the Arms of *Europe* were employ'd to prevent *France* and the House of *Austria* from getting ground one upon the other, and to keep the Ballance even between two Powers, that of themselves were in a manner equal. To do this, requir'd but a small exertion of strength, we could then at any time have turn'd the Scale, and with no very great Expence, which made our *Henry* the Eighth (when this Kingdom made far a less Figure than it does at present) take this Motto. He prevails whom I join with, *Cui adhæreo præest*. But the Face of things is now quite alter'd, that equality in Dominion, which was
so

so easily kept pois'd, is lost, we are to aid a weak Side against that which is stronger by many Degrees, and consequently we must come into the other Seale with much a greater Weight than ever we did, or it will be still too light.

Affairs are brought to such a Crisis, that if the House of *Austria* is not in a Condition to oppose *France*, it cannot exist at all; if his Imperial Majesty is not so assisted, as to be Superior in the War, the *German* Strength will be so broken, as hardly to rise again in some Years, and if that Bulwark be overthrown, what is there to stand in the way of Universal Empire?

The Matter in Contraversy between these two great Powers, seems incapable of Accommodation; both lay claim to the whole Succession of *Spain*; if such an Addition be made to the *French* Monarchy, *Europe*, in all appearance, must be ruin'd: 'Tis therefore the general Interest, that those

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Dominions should be possess'd as heretofore, by a Branch of the House of *Austria*: But the one is in Possession, and the other unable to assert its Rights without considerable Assistance, which is no where to be had but from *England*, *Portugal*, and the *United Provinces*, upon whom the Burthen must chiefly lie, as in reason it ought, because we and they shall be most hurt by the Growth of *France*.

All these Things, with our Ancient Enmity to that Kingdom, and the Danger of Religion being consider'd, 'tis perhaps evident enough that this War will be the most bloody, and the longest that has been seen in Christendom for many Ages, unless such vigorous Efforts and Impressions are made betimes, as may bring it to a speedy Issue.

But if we, upon whose Courage and Perseverance the rest of *Europe* must so much depend, are embroil'd at Home, what Figure can we make Abroad? Where will be that secrecy and dispatch in Business, that is so needful
in

in the Conduct of great Affairs? And what Vigour can there be in divided Councils? What Success can they expect, who waste that time in contending with one another for Power and Dominion, which should be employ'd in consulting for their common Defence? Or how can they who are broken among themselves, oppose a well united Strength? Who can Rule well when the Wheels of Government are clogg'd, where each Side endeavours to put the other in the Wrong, tho' with the Hazzard of their Country's Honour and Safety, where you are not only to oppose Attacks from without, but to provide against Mischiefs from within, and where nothing is thought Wise that does not succeed, because there is a Side to cry it down, and where Folly, Rashness, and ill concerted Measures pass for current, and are approv'd of, because there is a Side to cry 'em up?

Irresolution, Delays, Treachery, fruitless consumption of Strength, loss of Opportunities, and many more Mischiefs, are the effects of Civil Dissen-

tion ; where that prevails, you are often compell'd to do that which will please the Majority, rather than what in it self is just and fit ; And to what Streights is Wisdom then reduc'd, concerning whose Results, only the few can judge aright, and in which the many must determine before they can have Effect ? Whereas in great Assemblies, where there are no Divisions, and where Parties are not concern'd to form Oppositions, Folly is frequently wrought upon, and convinced by the good Sense of the smaller Number. So that they who hope to be prosperous Abroad, must endeavour to have the People at Unity, and well cemented at Home ; and as *Flaminius* advis'd the *Ætolians*, lay aside Tumults, where Consultation is needful : *Desistite Tumultuari consultandum est.*

When Affairs in the Government are so conducted, that particular Men cannot find their Accompt in keeping up Factions, they vanish of themselves ; When Advances are made to all that shew any real Desires of returning

turning into the Bosom of the Common-wealth ; when all Sides that have equal Deserts stand upon an equal Foot in their Pretensions ; when old Objections are forgotten in their Cases who are able and willing to serve the Publick for the future ; when Partialities and Animosities are quite laid aside ; when the Good of both Sides are chearfully embraced on all Hands, and the Bad are despis'd and abandon'd, Peace and Union come in by degrees, and insensibly take Possession in the Hearts and Minds of the whole People ; all Men grow to have one and the same Interest, and your Bottom is so enlarg'd, that you are strong at Home, and terrible Abroad.

Now and then indeed it happens, that Men are compell'd to join in what is call'd a Party for their own Preservation, as the *Romans* did, some with *Sylla*, and the rest with *Marius*, where the Side that got the upper hand, endeavour'd to secure themselves by the Ruin and Extirpation of the others ; and as Fortune chan-

ged, both Sides had Opportunities to exercise their mutual Rage, from whence follow'd Murthers, Accusations, Banishments, Proscriptions, and all the other Mischiefs with which Civil Dissention is attended.

Few Factions are at any Height, but at last they proceed to some of these Extrems; and if one Side has as much Rancour as the other, the Common-wealth must Bleed for ever; therefore if one Party happens to have been harrass'd by those who were heretofore Superior, but are then reduc'd, they that have the better, should lay aside their Anger and Resentment; for nothing more tends to perpetuate Faction, than those Exertions of Fury to which Revenge incites us. Does one Side proscribe your Friend to Day? You attempt to proscribe him upon the next Occasion: So during the Civil Wars between the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*, our Noble Families attainted one another, 'till most of 'em were ruin'd or extinguish'd; the unforgiving

forgiving Temper that then reign'd, made those Wounds continue so long open. One Instance of Revenge, tho' it be just, seldom fails to produce another, and he always thinks his own Cause right who has receiv'd the latest Injury: Whereas you have quite disarm'd that Enemy whom you shall treat better than he treated you when at his Mercy. And since in all these Cases, Peace must ensue at last, or the Publick will be quite destroy'd, they show the greatest Generosity, who having gain'd the Field, are the first to promote a Truce, and to propose that Acts of Hostility may cease.

We should in this Juncture sacrifice all our own Resentments and Animosities to the general Good of *Europe*. We have begun this War for the Preservation of its Liberties, and to oppose the Growth of *France*, than which there cannot be a juster Cause; for it never fares well with the collective Body of Mankind, when a Tyranny is any where set up, that is supported by large Revenues, and great Armies.

Such mighty Monarchs disturb the Peace of the whole World; during their Times, War, Blood-shed, and Devastation, afflict the Universe, and no considerable Country is suffer'd to be at quiet; Besides their Example invites inferior Princes and States to invade the civil Rights of their own People.

When several free Countries joyn together in a League (which is our present Case) and are enter'd into a great and expensive War, they should have it in their View to do as much Good, as possibly they can, to other Nations, whose Condition they should endeavour to meliorate by restoring to 'em their antient Laws, and civil Rights, and by helping 'em to throw off Arbitrary Power: And 'tis to be hop'd, if our Arms prove successful, we shall imitate the Conduct of the *Romans* in their warlike Expeditions, who better'd every Place they Conquer'd, which appears from what the Senate gave in Charge to those Ambassadors they sent to settle *Macedon* and *Illyria*. *Omnium primum Liberos*

heros esse placebat Macedonas atque Illyrios; ut omnibus gentibus appareret, arma Populi Romani, non Liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus Libertatem afferre; ut & in Libertate Gentes quæ essent, tutam eam sibi perpetuamque sub Tutela Populi Romani esse: & quæ sub Regibus viverent, & in præsens Tempus mitiores eos justioresque respectu Populi Romani habere se, & si quando Bellum cum Populo Romano Regibus fuisset suis, exitum ejus victoriam Romanis, sibi Libertatem allaturum crederent. Where they vanquish'd Common-wealths, they left 'em their Liberties and Laws; and where they reduc'd Kings to submit, and ask for Terms of Peace, they render'd them more mild and easie to their Subjects. And if this be the Design of Germany, England, and Holland, they may expect a happy Issue from the Justice of their Intentions, and Goodness of their Cause.

The End of the First Part.

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